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This Thesis analyses the form and content of the US' re-examination 
of its involvement in Vietnam. Commencing in the late 1970's this "coming 
to grips" with Vietnam is widely perceived by cultural institutions within 
the US as a confrontation with some of the darker aspects of its history. 
Vietnam Vets, once beyond the pale, have gained a new recognition based on 
an acceptance of the re-adjustment problems which they faced as a result of 
the effects of heavy combat. The US is also widely perceived as being a 
changed nation after Vietnam: there has been a breakdown in social and 
foreign policy consensus, and Americans are now a lot warier of foreign 
intervention. 
However there is enough evidence to suggest that this "New America" 
is no more than skin deep. The confrontation with history is taking place 
in a cultural context that is characterised by a new sense of national 
pride, with an affirmation of US history as one of its major 
characteristics. As far as foreign policy is concerned the influence of 
Vietnam seems to have altered only the character of military intervention 
abroad without changing a fundamental US willingness to arbitrate in the 
affairs of other countries - by force if necessary. Overall, the 
resurgence of interest in the period of the Vietnam War seems to be less a 
confrontation with the past than an attempt to incorporate a "difficult" 
period in US history within a set of traditional US myths and cultural 
processes. 
The key to understanding the US relationship with Vietnam is an 
awareness of US' culture's unwillingness to acknowledge its own changing 
structure in anything more than a superficial manner. The Introductory 
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chapter discusses US culture within the framework of the development of a 
postwar, postmodern cultural environment. This section demonstrates that 
although the cultural processes of the US may be postmodern, the cultures 
perception of itself continues in the vein of an unproblematic modernism. 
The Second section, "Mentioned in Dispatches" discusses Vietnam's 
relationship to postmodern culture as expressed in Michael Herr's 
Dispatches, with special emphasis on communication and representational 
theory. "Revelations - Revaluations" explores some of the literature 
written by Vets and the way in which US culture is trying to incorporate 
their experience, and the experience of Vietnam in general, into a 
wider traditional cultural description of itself. "We Gotta Get Outta This 
Place ... " looks at the phenomenon of the Vietnam film and its relationship 
to the production of film since the Vietnam war and to wider issues of the 
modes of cultural representation. 
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His nostrils turned to me in an interested way. 'I 
understand you're looking for a business gonnegtion.' 
The juxtaposition of these two remarks was startling. Gatsby 
answered for me: 
'Oh, no,' he exclaimed, 'this isn't the man.' 
'No?' Mr Wolfsheim seemed disappointed. 
'This is just a friend. I told you we'd talk about that 
some other time.' 
'I beg your pardon,' said Mr Wolfsheim, 'I had a wrong man.' 
Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby. 
She stared at it in wonder. It was as if she had just 
discovered the irreversible process. It astonished her to think 
that so much could be lost, even the quantity of hallucination 
belonging to just the sailor that the world would bear no further 
trace of. She knew, because she held him, that he suffered DT's. 
Behind the initials was a metaphor, a delirium tremens, a 
trembling unfurrowing of the mind's plowshare. The saint whose 
water can light lamps, the clairvoyant whose lapse in recall is 
the breath of God, the true paranoid for whom all is organized in 
spheres joyful or threatening about the central pulse of himself, 
the dreamer whose puns probe ancient fetid shafts and tunnels of 
truth all act in the same special relevance to the word, or 
whatever it is that the word is there, buffering, to protect us 
from. The act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, 
depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost [ ... ] 
"dt" God help this old tattooed man, meant also a time 
differential, a vanishingly small instant in which change had to 
be confronted at last for what it was, where it could no longer 
disguise itself as something innocuous like an average rate; 
where velocity dwelled in the projectile though the projectile be 
frozen in midflight, where death dwelled in the cell though the 
cell be looked in on at its most quick. She knew that the sailor 
had seen worlds no other man had seen if only because there was 
that high magic to low puns, because DT's must give access to 
dt's of spectra beyond the know sun, music made purely of 
Antarctic loneliness and fright. 




Once upon a time ... 
There may have been a time when it was that simple. When to utter 
that statement was to assume a narrative detachment that was literally 
unquestionable; to draw boundaries and lines of de-marc(k)ation between 
myth and history, art and criticism, fact and fiction; to delineate a 
previous time, a past that was clearly different - other - than the time 
frame that contained the writing; a past suspended outside the frame and 
anterior to the present moment by the introduction of spatial unities into 
a linear temporal flow (Once upon a time ... ). There was a time .... 
For even as the argument still rages over whether there is something 
that can properly be called postrnodernism, the debate is shot through with 
the realisation that we have somehow, somewhere entered a new age, or at 
least another age; concepts which were once taken for granted are now at 
the very least regarded as extremely problematic. Much of this 
heightened awareness sterns from what has been called the "crisis of 
representation", the calling into question of the claims of authenticity 
and realism that are made by and for mimesis and interpretation. One of 
the more obvious results of this interrogation of representational 
ideologies has been a liberation from - or a corruption of, depending on 
your point of view -the distinction between primary art and secondary 
criticism. Some critics have argued that this new para-literary 
post-criticism has resulted from a break with tradition, prompted by the 
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application of the techniques of modernist art to critical analysis, 1 but 
it must be remembered that the modernist' break with representation was a 
break only with certain forms rather than with the concept of a 
representational truth. 
The position that this postmodern culture has emerged out of a 
radical break or rupture is itself a reflection of the modernist belief in 
the transformative power of crisis and transgression, exemplified by the 
ideals of the avant-garde. Similarly, the position of radical 
post-structuralism, which claims to have emerged from this break and argues 
that narrative unity, representational realism and an autonomous self never 
existed (other than as bourgeois illusion), serves only to negate this idea 
of a rupture by implying a form of continuity, an ersatz narrative 
tradition. Obviously a change of some sort has been effected and the 
notion of crisis must be re-interpreted, in the way in which Berman posits 
crisis as an ongoing mechanism of history, the very possibility of its 
transformation, rather than a singular event. Thus, to be Modern: 
is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, to 
find one's world and oneself in perpetual disintegration and 
renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and contradiction: to 
be part of a universe in which all that is solid melts into 
air. 2 
Postmodernism describes this type of cultural environment and is thus 
a word already straining under misappropriation and overuse. It can be 
re-invoked here not to describe a culture that is beyond the modern (that 
is impossible - at least as we now perceive things) or even necessarily 
beyond the variety of cultural formations labelled "modernism", but in 
order to convey the sense of a culture living very fast, tearing itself 
apart and recreating itself anew simultaneously, almost as if culture were 
living beyond itself in dense combinations of aspiration and frustration. 
It would seem that the crisis intensified, or reached a new level, 
when we moved almost imperceptibly into the so~called post-industrial age 
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which, as Jameson convincingly argues, is not post-industrial at all, but 
the most perfect realisation thus far of the mechanisms of Capitalism. 3 
Post-indstrialism "commences" in the Thirties and Forties where Capitalism 
develops new avenues of communication and new means of processing 
information and people (the passenger plane, the expansion of radio, radar 
and primitive computers) and gathers momentum during the post-war period. 
The 'fifties, which saw the intensification of the cult of the image (based 
upon the heightened scope effectiveness and power of the electronic media) 
and the rise of consumerism further eroded the stability of 
representational forms by undermining the crucial distinction between 
subject, object and audience and replacing it with the commodity, which has 
no need of representation. 4 As Baudrillard demonstrates, 5 the object never 
completely gives up its secret, retaining a familiar alterity, while the 
commodity is always completely readable, manifesting a visible essence 
which is its price. It is not then a question of a break with 
representation as much as representation slowly collapsing in upon itself, 
its limits being internalised, its internal contradictions slowly moving 
outwards to colonise its surroundings. 
Further evidence for Berman's model of a "crisis of gradual 
transformation" is provided by the diversity of forms, practices and 
theories that come under the umbrella of postmodernism, each of which has 
emerged in reaction to a specific aspect of high modernism. In many cases 
the modernist form continues to exist side by side with the newer forms: 
the diversity of critical styles, for example, guided by an older 
hermeneutic tradition, indicates that post-structuralism has not carried 
the day yet. It is difficult at any rate to see how a form could emerge in 
reaction to another without internalising at least some of the 
characteristics of its object, and this also militates against a radical 
break with the past. The Sixties, often targeted as the period of the 
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break, is rather, where the mechanisms (or lack of) of post-industrialism 
are becoming more pronounced, emerging at the level of national political 
and social culture rather than as a series of local reactions to specific 
cultural forms such as abstract painting; the system beginning to quake as 
contradiction, paradox and instability come into conflict with older values 
of unity and solidity. 
This suggests that what is called postmodernism is a superposition of 
two cultural/historical periods where the result is not a gradual 
replacement of older modernist forms but a side by side, simultaneous 
existence with these forms where the relationship between the two is an 
ambiguous, unstable mix of nostalgia, prophesying, exhilaration and 
despair. Postmodernism is both a distinct cultural phenomena and 
inseparable from older cultural forms. So much that is labelled postmodern 
is convoluted (even involuted) and paradoxical because it itself is so. 
Postmodernism is a description of the complex situation achieved when 
narrative periodisation fails completely - it is also that which causes it 
to fail. Yet there remains a force in the events themselves; a powerful 
tendency to collapse diversity into narrative that resides as much in the 
culture as in the illusive reality of exterior allusions. 
The period of the Vietnam war is either implicitly or explicitly 
regarded as a crisis of postwar US culture, often as the crisis. Within 
this perception one can already see the beginnings of a modernist narrative 
taking shape. For Vietnam is seen as somehow causing the crisis rather 
than as the effect of a violent intermingling of postmodern and modernist 
values: the Vietnam issue polarized society, defeated the Poverty programs, 
abetted the evolution of a more permissive and unstructured society, 
destroyed a sense of tradition .... It is this modernist perception of the 
singularity of the moment of crisis that is called into question by the 
events of the Sixties. Rather than representing the crisis the Sixties 
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gives way to a period of successive crises that runs from the oil shocks 
through the Iranian hostage drama to the October '87 Stockmarket crash. 
Even the current re-examination of the US role in Vietnam has been 
presented as a crisis: the US facing up to the dark deeds of its past. This 
indicates that US culture has become increasingly dependent upon the notion 
of a singular crisis for its perceptions and representations of itself. 
Despite a recent history littered with "crises" US culture accepts that the 
Vietnam war was the turning point in US history; an acceptance that also 
conceals a denial. It is a turning point that is seen largely in terms of 
a resolution of many of the disturbing aspects of a postwar, postmodern 
culture. The fact that nothing has been resolved is concealed through the 
presentation of the Sixties as calling into question only various aspects 
of the culture, rather than being symptomatic of a more problematic 
uncertainty about cultural representations and the way in which the culture 
constructs itself. By concentrating also on a narrow period of US history, 
the present cultural discourse masks the existence of a larger cultural 
narrative into which into which the Vietnam war is rapidly being 
incorporated. 
US history has proceeded, perhaps even progressed through a series 
of major wars as well as a number of more minor armed interventions in 
areas of the world, particularly Central and South America. Each of these 
wars can be seen to accompany significant developments in the evolution of 
the US as a nation and to understand the traumatic importance of Vietnam it 
is necessary to comprehend the sense of affirmation that had always seemed 
to result from the US armed dealings with the rest of the world, before its 
involvement in Indochina. The early settlers were in almost continuous, 
conflict with Indian tribes in a struggle for land and resources that was 
often unfairly weighted in favour of the new arrivals who, when all else 
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failed, had nwnbers at work for them. This conflict with the indigenous 
peoples of North America is an almost uninterrupted undercurrent in US 
society for the next 200 years. Settled for nearly 150 years, US 
independence is achieved through armed conflict: first, as British 
colonists the American settlers throw off French Colonialism in the French 
and Indian Wars of 1763; then as Americans they throw off British 
Colonialism in the War of Independence. 
The War of 1812 then is really unfinished business arising from the 
Revolutionary War; the war with Mexico, displays the US unswerving 
determination to become a coast to coast nation, even if it means 
confiscating half of Old Mexico to do it. The Civil War forcibly settles 
the US internal argwnents: amongst the outcomes and possible motivations 
for the war are the certainty that the future United States will, firstly, 
be just what it says; secondly, that it will possess a primarily 
urban/industrial, as opposed to rural/agricultural character; and thirdly, 
that it will at least pay lip service to the rights of Man. The rest of 
the century is therefore characterised by a separate culture in the South, 
and uneasy coexistence between agriculture and industry and the development 
of institutional racism at the same time as the US' newly heightened 
military powers are turned against the Indians with renewed ferocity. 
The Spanish-American war of 1898 ushers in the new century and is 
thus full of significance. Firstly, it demonstrates how economically, and 
therefore militarily powerful the US has become; secondly it is a war in 
which the role of the press is vital in ensuring support for the war effort 
by helping to create a particular image of the war in people's minds; most 
importantly, it reflects an early perception of an imperialistic 
development of US capitalism, its tightening hold over Latin America and 
its further expansion into Asia. The emergence of the US as a world power 
was further confirmed when the US broke with over one hundred years of 
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traditional non-direct involvement in European affairs to fight on the side 
of the allies in World War I. 
The Second World War not only served to lift the US out of the 
Depression but to confirm its emergence as the industrial and military 
power in the arena of world politics, a role that is reflected in the 
plethora of alliances that it initiates in the years immediately following 
the war. What this entails can be gleaned from the US description of its 
role in Korea as a "police action". Being the most powerful equates with 
being the most authoritative, and part of authority is the privilege to 
decide what is right and wrong - something that the US had been doing on a 
lesser scale in Latin America for over a hundred years. In terms of 
capitalist pragmatism, being Policeman of the world enables the US to 
safeguard a very widely spread net of vested economic interests, but in 
moral terms it puts the US in the position of arbiter of the world's 
problems. There is the assumption that its democratic tradition will 
enable it to decide what is in a country's best interests - even if these 
interests are not always seen to be separate from those of the US. Although 
there surface some worrying trends with regard to information, war 
reporting and military strategy, Korea is widely perceived by the US as a 
defeat for the arch-rival, the USSR. 
On a cultural level then, wars have always provided Americans with a 
sense of achievement and self-definition; they have always been perceived 
as advancing the cause and development of the United States as a nation. 
The US always won its wars and the creation of "purpose" and "results" is 
one of the spoils of victory. 
Until Vietnam. 
Jameson, in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" 
discusses Vietnam as America's first postmodern war, but doesn't make clear 
what he means by this. Certainly there exists a widespread feeling amongst 
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Americans and non-Americans alike, that Vietnam was somehow a "different" 
war - if only because it was the first war that the US ever "lost". Was the 
outcome different because the character of the conflict was different? Many 
observers point to the massively ineffective displays of US firepower, the 
confusion and savagery of the fighting, the nature of guerilla warfare. 
But the latter stages of the World War II Pacific campaign bore many 
similarities to Vietnam: days of naval bombardment reducing tiny atolls to 
rubble but failing to reduce the number of defenders which had to be 
eliminated in close fighting, sometimes in thick jungle. Veterans' 
accounts of the fighting on Tarawa, Okinawa and Iwo Jima record battles as 
savage as anything from the worst moments of Tet. All of which is to say 
that Vietnam cannot be reduced to the specificity of its killing 
technology. 
What had changed was the cultural situation of the US, indeed of the 
West as a whole, where an emerging postmodern culture had gradually altered 
the whole context of international conflict. In many ways Vietnam can be 
regarded as a postmodern paradigm; it cannot represent a total organising 
concept for in a very real sense, the word, like the country, is absent to 
our perception; it has become overused, exhausted and overloaded, too 
charged with meaning - capable of representing so much that it represents 
nothing: "After enough time passed and the memory receded and settled, the 
name itself became a prayer, coded like prayer to go past the extremes of 
petition and gratitude: Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam, say again until the word 
lost all its old loads of pain, pleasure, horror, guilt, nostalgia 11 • 6 And 
like prayer, the word retains its power, but the universality of its 
meaning has disappeared inside a cavernous subjectivity. The language that 
whirls around Vietnam is such a bewildering mix of Western, particularly 
US, values, cultural perceptions and justifications, that Vietnam has 
become too large to comprehend in its entirety - in the same way that US 
11 
culture possesses a diversity and variability that baffles any attempt to 
incorporate it into definitive statements. 
Even more important than the aspect of Vietnam as paradigm is the 
dialectical relationship between US culture and the events in South East 
Asia. Stated all too reductively, this means that Vietnam (the war, the 
actions, the "idea") was derived from, but also aided in the evolution of a 
postmodern culture. Michael Herr seems to suggest as much in Dispatches 
when he says: 
Out on the street I couldn't tell the Vietnam Veterans from 
the rock and roll veterans. The Sixties had made so many 
casualties, its war and its music had run power off the same 
circuit for so long they didn't even have to fuse. The war 
primed you for the lame years while rock and roll turned more 
lurid and dangerous than bullfighting, rock stars started 
falling like second lieutenants; ecstasy and death and (of 
course and for sure) life but it didn't seem so then. What 
I'd thought of as two obsessions were really only one.· I 
don't know how to tell you how complicated that made my life. 
Freezing and burning and going down again into the sucking 
mud of the culture, hold on tight and move real slow. 7 
The intermingling of rock 'n roll and war metaphors indicates that Vietnam 
is not merely a problem of history, or foreign policy, or politics, or 
capitalism, but of all of these constituted in the larger field of culture. 
To select any one style of narrative to impose upon the Vietnam experience 
is to emerge with the complaint that Vietnam doesn't make sense; this 
statement uttered as if it were the result of a failure of communication, 
shows that Vietnam raises a representational and interpretational problem. 
The problems only become worse if one tries to understand only the content 
of the "message" that Vietnam is widely perceived to embody, rather than 
examining the medium, or indeed accepting that there may be as many 
"messages" as media, 
This fascination with what is being represented, at the expense of 
the manner of its representation, permeates the resurrection of the debate 
about US involvement in Vietnam. We are told that after a decade of 
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silence, the US has embarked on a "healing" process that involves it 
confronting not only what it did in Vietnam, but what it did to its own 
citizens, in the form of the soldiers who fought there: it is, we are told, 
the US confronting its history. But in amongst all the "white noise" of 
the docwnentaries, films, plays, poems, novels, courses in Vietnam studies 
and so on, there is the experience of a profound silence; the sheer volwne 
of textual itself output has a levelling effect on any critical discourse 
about Vietnam as everyone rushes to give voice to what was apparently 
repressed. The silence has fallen most heavily over the moral, political 
and (other) ideological questions raised by events in Vietnam - precisely 
those areas, ironically enough, about which there has been most discussion. 
This ideological exclusion abets a cultural bias which favours the 
role of apologist for US involvement. Films such as Platoon and Full Metal 
Jacket, curiously uncritical of involvement in themselves, run side by side 
with the latest Rambo and Missing in Action films, sagas of revenge in 
which a failed US past is turned into triwnph; A 1985 Time article 
reporting on the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon notes that ROTC 
enlistments are 45% higher than in 1979; a whole fashion industry has 
emerged around the wearing of military paraphernalia; above all, the US in 
the 1980's has not shied away from further involvement: the Lebanon, 
Grenada, dogfights over the Mediterranean, followed by air strikes on the 
Libyan mainland, freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Contras in Nicaragua, 
warships in the Persian Gulf. 
The current debate is, after all, taking place in the midst of a US 
culture which has under Reagan been imbued with a new nationalism and sense 
of historical purpose. It is important to note that both these ideals 
require that history be viewed as a continuity, a progression of events 
that is somehow outside the narrative frame which we use to describe them. 
This history is a structure that is built upon and reinforced by values of 
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objectivity and rationality; values that seem to make possible the 
perception of a definitive, ideologically circumscribed meaning to events, 
even an originary meaning that governs the nation's history. Consequently 
the current discourse on Vietnam is liberally (and conservatively) 
sprinkled with talk about what Vietnam "meant", the "lessons" that can be 
learned, the "forces of history" and so on. But the language of the debate 
and the political/cultural framework within which it is taking place 
indicate that the US is not really learning anything new from its 
reincarnation of its involvement in Indochina. Instead there is a 
re-working of the material, often re-stating older positions under the 
guise of a new foreign policy direction. What seemed an aberration, a 
national trauma, a period of time which unsettled traditional US 
perceptions of itself to the degree that the culture could not make sense 
of the events, is now being made "sense" of. This of necessity involves 
the incorporation of the US' Vietnam experience within a mythic and 
narrative structure with whose ideological assumptions its citizens are 
already familiar. 
It is however a mistake to think that if those same historical 
perceptions failed once to make sense of the issue, they will be able to do 
so now. That the "problem" of Vietnam is a cultural problem is only 
implicitly acknowledged by the way in which the new look at Vietnam is 
being considered alongside a more general re-appraisal of the Sixties. 
However the examination of that decade seems to be proceeding largely 
through processes of appropriation and denial, indicative of the 
ambivalence with which US culture views the Sixties. The decade represents 
a highly charged period in US history and there appears to be a kind of 
discomfort that the energy has not been dissipated entirely. The Sixties 
was, amongst other things, a period of intense (if not always effective or 
sincere) criticism of the US, a time in which the US government hinted at 
14 
the facelessness beneath its many masks. While much of this criticism may 
have been naive, misguided and politically reductive, it was also 
characterised by an· effort at self-critical appraisals of the culture and a 
distrust of received knowledge, authority and official truth. Because of 
its turbulence and also for ideological reasons there are many people who 
would prefer that the Sixties didn't come back. Hence culture invites us 
to revel in the spectacle of the Sixties, that sense of drama, 
expansiveness, of bold sweeping narratives, that serves to place us at one 
remove from the personal impact of many of the events. Culture also 
encourages a nostalgia for the Sixties: a period of musical greatness, a 
time when the US was going places, when the ordinary people were seizing 
control of their destiny .... By fixing our eyes in so mythic a fashion 
firmly on the past, nostalgia blinds us to the faults of the period, even 
as it distracts us from analysing our immediate surroundings. In the same 
way, through appropriation, artifacts of the Sixties are stripped of their 
specific associations with the Sixties and turned into items that are 
inscribed with a more general cultural identification. In this way US 
culture reinforces an image of the Sixties as an aberrant decade, distanced 
from us and made vague and fuzzy by the loss of any historical specificity. 
The mixed feelings about the decade contrast strongly with the belief that 
Vietnam, regarded in isolation from the Sixties, holds an essential truth 
about US experience. 
The Vietnam War has become the US' Holy Grail. To find the 
significance of the War, to find its "meaning" will be to learn something 
fundamental about the US. This self-knowledge is widely perceived as 
something that the US has lost during the Seventies, and its re-discovery 
will empower it to act once again. The Camelot of the early sixties 
failed, and a succession of American Kings since then have been 
characterised by vacillation and impotence. But we no longer live in an 
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age where this sort of Arthurian legend is of substantial relevance. The 
modern "type" of the Grail Quest is rather that portrayed in Pynchon's The 
Crying of Lot 49 8 ; a hermeneutic text that demonstrates the failure of 
hermeneutic criticism as it is outfaced by postmodern culture. As with 
Vietnam, Oedipa Maas' attempt to obey the instruction to Pierce Inverarity, 
to find the essential truth, leads only to an exponential multiplication of 
meaning and connection. The quest for the legacy of a single estate 
becomes the quest for the legacy, the meaning, of America as a whole. 
Oedipa finds that trying to clarify the inheritance of others, at least in 
a hermeneutic fashion, is to effectively sign the release on the critic's 
own disinheritance. 
Rather than attempting to impose such a definitive coherence from 
without, Michael Herr's Dispatches operates from within the fragmentary 
collection of events and perceptions that inhabit Vietnam, in an attempt to 
show how that overdetermined cultural space that is "Vietnam" has come 
about. Dispatches uses ideas that are similar to those in Lot 49 with 
regard to textual proliferation and a communications field that is 
heterogenous and overdetermined. Herr argues that the significance and 
meaning of Vietnam eludes us because there are so many different meanings. 
Western contact with Vietnam has been characterised by attempt at textual 
interpretation to the extent that the object of the discourse has tended to 
be obscured by the discourse itself. In the course of US involvement this 
was abetted by the Armed Forces whose efforts at exerting control over 
Vietnam were as much linguistic and representational as military. Control 
meant definition and redefinition which was itself reliant on a history of 
interpretations that were subject to this same distortion. Dispatches is 
significant because it extends the critique of the possibility of the 
transpiration of truth through interpretation to the recognition that 
interpretation largely is a matter of narrative imposition. The form of 
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Herr's text is thus a recognition that cohesive, linear narrative, doesn't 
sort out the confusion as much as it is culpable in its creation. 
It is this awareness that is being obscured, sometimes deliberately, 
in the creation of a cultural narrative that will incorporate the US' 
Vietnam experience. Literature written by Vets generally presents the 
experience of Vietnam in the form of a personal testimony that reveals 
an often painful encounter with the arbitrariness of meaning, the 
precarious nature of the self, the loss of the authority of traditional 
ways of perceiving and describing US culture. These novels have tended to 
be received as descriptions of the "Vietnam experience", rather than 
descriptions of an encounter with US culture that happened to take place in 
Vietnam. For the one thing that all the writers have in common, including 
Herr, is the sense that what was happening in Vietnam was not very 
different to what was happening in mainstream US culture; that the two, in 
fact, fed off one another. But these writers, with the exception of 
Michael Herr and Tim O'Brien9 tend to believe that the one representational 
mode that is still capable of painting an accurate picture of its object is 
the form of the personal narrative, and this stylistic conservatism is 
easily appropriated by a culture that stresses individual objectivity as 
the basis of tradition and unity. 
This is in spite of the fact that diversity and heterogeneity are the 
most obvious features of both the field of post-industrial (or 
multinational) capitalism and its postmodern culture. As Jameson 
argues: "in the decades since the emergence of the great moderns styles 
society has itself begun to fragment in this way, each group coming to 
speak a curious private language of its own, each profession developing its 
private code or idiolect, and finally each individual coming to a kind of 
linguistic island ..... lO The same fragmentation extended into the realm of 
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culture has served to undermine the notion of the autonomy of cultural 
production, such that: 
today art is regarded mostly as entertainment or spectacle 
(of interest to the public primarily as a financial item) 
and criticism as so many opinions to consume. In effect the 
bourgeoisie abandoned its own avant-garde artist and 
cultural experts (whose competence is now often dismissed if 
it does not fit the political agenda). Though federal 
governments may offer token support, art (at least in the 
United States) is today the plaything of (corporate) patrons 
whose relation to culture is less one of noble obligation 
than of overt manipulation - of art as a sign of power, 
prestige, publicity.11 
Art has not been eliminated, subjugated or co-opted in the usual way: 
rather the sphere of culture has expanded into all aspects of social and 
economic life, to the extent that everything, as Jameson points out, from 
state power to the structure of the psyche, can be said to have become 
cultural in some way.12 
Many cultural forms still exhibit a lack of awareness of this shift; 
none more so than film. For film that designates itself solely as 
entertainment, this lack of cultural awareness has been more or less a 
given. But it is also evident in films that try in some way to be critical 
of that which they are representing and this is significant in view of the 
fact that films on Vietnam, in particular Platoon and Full Metal Jacket, 
have been important catalysts for the discussion of Vietnam. Both films 
present the viewer with powerful images of the Vietnam "experience" but 
lack any acknowledgement of the problematic nature of representation or of 
the cultural values which their representations embody. This is 
particularly surprising given that they are dealing with an event which 
many people at the time perceived as being highly problematic not only with 
regard to the content of its images, but also the largely visual way in 
which they were represented. There is also the tendency to regard these 
films in isolation, separated out from the context of Hollywood's 
production since the Vietnam war. This may be a serious problem in that 
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the films do exhibit strong links with a strain of films - disaster movies 
and science-fiction films - that were offered during the seventies as a 
compensation for things having gone so drastically wrong with the American 
Dream. In the same way, the films of Kubrick and Stone turn their material 
into cultural spectacle in such a way that they tend to pacify their 
audience rather than challenge it. As is the tendency of most of the 
cultural production centred on Vietnam, both films tend to evoke just 
enough of an experience of Vietnam to enable it to mesh with existing 
cultural narratives. 
This unwillingness of the US to come to grips with the implications 
of involvement in Vietnam is indicative of a larger unwillingness to 
acknowledge the cultural changes it has undergone since WWII. The cultural 
processes of the US may be postmodernist but the way in which the culture 
perceives itself, the ways in which it acts on that perception are 
consistently modernist and essentialist. The US currently feels itself 
to be in a position of economic and political strength and the imposition 
of older modernist assumptions about history and narrative seem capable, at 
last, of making sense of a problematic period in the US' past. But 
somewhere between the culture and its description the issue of US 
involvement in Vietnam is becoming lost amidst a lot of talk about its 
"significance" and "meaning", even as a wider sense of the US relationship 
to its history is increasingly manifested in perceptions of crisis and 
spectacle; the past and its evaluation viewed largely in terms of 
entertainment. This rationalisation of the problematic nature of Vietnam 
with traditional US assumptions about itself obscures the degree to which 
the questions raised by Vietnam are not merely those to do with morality or 
military intervention but those posed by the act of representation: how 
does the US perceive itself and, more importantly, how does its 
self-perception influence its perception of Others? 
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MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES 
"There were 50 Marines on top of Sugar Loaf Hill. They had been 
ordered to hold the position all night, at any cost. By dawn, 46 of them 
had been killed or wounded. Then, into the foxhole where the remaining 
four huddled, the Japs dropped a white phosphorous shell, burning three men 
to death. The last survivor crawled to an aid station." 
TIME magazine report on the fighting on Okinawa. 
Quoted in William Manchester's Goodbye Darkness. 
"Patrol went up the mountain. One man came back. He died before he 
could tell us what happened." 
Told by a 4th Division Lurp to Michael Herr in 
Dispatches. 
Michael Herr1 is well aware of the attempts to textualise Vietnam that 
have accompanied Western contact with that country. These attempts have 
failed to arrive at an understanding of Vietnam that was not corrupted by 
the desire of Western cultural institutions to see Indochina as they wanted 
to see it. This imposition of a familiar alterity upon the Vietnamese was 
related to, or at least appropriated by, the forces of economic 
exploitation. By the time direct involvement on the part of the US 
commences in the 1950's, Vietnam is already a highly problematic cultural 
text, and the way in which the West has constructed the object "Vietnam" 
means that its attempts to understand Vietnam, and Indochina as a whole, is 
less a dialogue than a self-perpetuating discourse. This situation is 
further complicated by US involvement which brings with it the complexity 
of an evolving postmodern culture. It becomes a problem of the distortions 
imposed by representation itself, by the proliferation of communication 
channels that subvert representation's attempt to sustain meaning and a 
direct connection to the world. Dispatches functions as the closing 
bracket on the period of US military involvement, even as it recognises 
that this closure is of little significance. It does not mark the end of 
the West's relationship with Vietnam, nor does it represent the 
clarification of postmodern processes in such a way that the "real" Vietnam 
can now emerge. If Herr's story is one bracket, the open bracket is the 
story of another correspondent: Graham Greene's The Quiet American. 2 
At first glance Greene's text seems less a study of Vietnam, than a 
story about the relationships between three people: Fowler, the narrator 
and a correspondent, Alden Pyle, the fresh-faced American who dabbles in 
covert operations, and Phuong, the lover of Fowler who is gradually 
"stolen" from him by Pyle. However the "eternal" romantic triangle, with 
its connotations of a closed system, is shown to be especially 
inappropriate in the context of Vietnam; the interrelationship of Fowler, 
Pyle and Phuong is shown to have an intensely personal aspect, but at the 
same time the three cannot escape the web of interconnections that 
characterise their involvement in Vietnam. Their actions and 
justifications cannot be separated from the ideological aspirations of 
others, the confusion of political corruption and the endemic violence that 
constitutes their environment. Even the eternal aspect of the triangle has 
become extremely problematic and one is given an assortment of signals: the 
triangular tragedy is fresh and important for all those involved, yet one 
is left with the sense of this very same tragedy being played out again and 
again, day after day, all over the country, all over the world; the idea of 
eternity is undercut by the figures of decay that fill the novel, the 
corrupting effect of the war, and the world-weary obsession with mortality 
displayed by the narrator. At the same time the text seems to evidence a 
Romantic faith in the timelessness of the Vietnamese landscape and of the 
people, a sense of the present conflict as just a brief, frantic blur, in 
the continuum of history. 
21 
Yet the idea of history as a continuum - together with its associated 
assumptions concerning objectivity, meaning and its corollary, judgement -
is called into question, albeit indirectly. The Quiet American is portray-
ing a specific historical moment3 in the early Fifties. It is the period 
before Dien Bien Phu, where US influence is gradually replacing that of the 
French. But it is not simply one country picking up where the other left 
off - the US involvement is not only intensifying the conflict, it is 
altering its character, through the radically different perception of the 
situation that is possessed by the US. At this stage for the French it is 
largely a colonial war; they are trying to hold onto an imperial possession 
and the conflict in South-east Asia is seen to have very little 
significance outside the immediate region. For the Viet Minh, although the 
socialist influence has come to predominate the war is still very much one 
of national liberation. The Americans, of course, see things in a very 
different light, and Vietnam comes to represent part of the global struggle 
against communism. Regional factors are less important than the 
repercussions that "losing" Vietnam to the communists will have on the 
global political, and economic environment. 
Within this framework the protagonists are not only characters but also 
symbolic types which embody the ideological values and styles of their 
countries. Thus Pyle's quietness, innocence, seriousness are not qualities 
that one normally associates with the stereotypical American. More repre-
sentative of this perception of national type is perhaps the rough crudity 
of Granger, or the brash geniality of the US Economic Attache. The 
youthful energy and enthusiasm of Pyle are qualities associated with a 
young country whose penchant for isolationism has meant that its dealings 
with the rest of the world exhibit a lack of a sense of others' traditions, 
an emphasis on immediate problem-solving rather than a long-term commitment 
of resources, and a tendency to see things ahistorically because of this. 
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Thus Pyle exhibits a preference both for direct attempts at influence that 
masquerades as subterfuge, and for a frankness and honesty that conceal 
intentions far more effectively than the courtly and elaborate diplomatic 
rituals that mark relations between the French and British. Set against 
Pyle is Fowler, representing Old Europe and tradition. But this is a 
European tradition that Fowler acknowledges to be burnt out, exhausted. 
Fowler is declining sexually, and the onset of impotence is seen to typify 
the European presence4 : Fowler knows that Phuong will leave him for Pyle, 
just as he knows that Pyle will run into trouble, but he is powerless to 
prevent either. Fowler is selfish; he only wants Phuong for sexual 
companionship in his approaching old age, in much the same way as the 
French seem to acknowledge that they are fighting a rearguard colonial 
action to hold onto something that was never really theirs. 
The important difference between Pyle and the Europeans is that the 
latter are capable of acknowledging the true nature of their intentions. 
By contrast Pyle has only the best of intentions; he is, at one and the 
same time, self conscious and appallingly naive. If the Europeans are 
trapped within the specificity of their colonial mentality, Pyle trusts in 
generalisations and blunders into trouble armed with a profound 
unwillingness to take local circumstances into account, and an inability to 
comprehend the influence of history: Vietnam's as well as his own. As a 
symbol of US foreign policy, it is not that his enthusiasm and good 
intentions conceal evil motives: rather, he cannot see that this naive good 
faith leaves him open to other forces whose intentions are not so noble; 
likewise he fails to see how his moral philanthropy is built upon the 
self-interest of men like Granger (who is only in Vietnam for a cushy tour 
and "a piece of tail") and the Economic Attache - who makes sure that the 
French are kept fighting, while the Americans encourage Vietnamese 
industry, in order to link then with the US economy. Pyle is an innocent, 
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and innocence, as Fowler says, "is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, 
wandering the world, meaning no harm" (QA, p. 37). 
The period of the early Fifties is thus a prelude to direct US involve-
ment, and as Pyle lies face down in the mud under Dakao bridge the first 
consignment of US planes is being unloaded. Pyle's death would seem to be 
the death of American innocence, but given the substance of recent dis-
courses on Vietnam and Latin America, US innocence seems to be of the sort 
that is not easily killed: an innocence so firmly implanted in the realm of 
ideas that it is impervious to experience. The early Fifties also sees 
the development in the US of a post-industrial, multinational form of 
economic organisation and the postmodern culture that permeates it. This 
helps to explain why the US goes from a dearth of foreign alliances before 
World War II, to the plethora of bilateral and multilateral aid agreements 
and defence pacts of which it is now a part. The ideological 
transformations behind this shift are complex, but at least part of the 
evolution of this view that American political interests now lay everywhere 
can be traced to the fact that its economic interests now lay everywhere 
also. Hence, Greene's book is set in the time in which US involvement is 
developing as a result of its postindustrial economic organisation and its 
fledgling postmodern culture. At the same time it is helping to form the 
postmodern experience of which it is a part. As Jameson says: "This whole 
global, yet American, postmodern culture, is the internal and 
superstructural expression of a whole new wave of military and economic 
domination throughout the world: in this sense as throughout class history, 
the underside of culture is blood, torture, death and horror. 115 
Cultural assumptions and formations ensnare the characters, espe-
cially the two men, as much as economic and political ones. Indeed it is 
the belief that culture can remain separate from other ideological formula-
tions that misleads both men. This belief belongs to the colonial world, 
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where the corollary of economic exploitation was a belief in the imposition 
of cultural values from without; economics and culture were clearly distin-
guishable, yet worked side by side to impose an order and coherence upon 
their environment. This, however, is not the world of multinationalism. 
Both Pyle and Fowler adhere to these earlier colonial assumptions albeit in 
different ways. Pyle possesses an Enlightenment ideology that posits man 
as a rational actor, capable of thinking and acting according to logical 
principles, and being desirous of doing so. These logical assumptions, of 
course, are those that his culture defines as logical. From this 
perspective, if man acts logically and rationally then history, as an 
amalgam of men's actions, also proceeds in a logical, linear fashion, where 
every action will have a more or less predictable outcome. Thus it is an 
ideology that relies heavily on description of events, actions and outcomes 
in the past; the assumption being that historical processes come close to 
revealing innate truths about mankind which operate irrespective of 
cultural differences. But this is a view of history that is blind to its 
own narrative construction; because of this it is also blind to cultures 
that do not conform to the innate truths it supposedly reveals. As a 
result Pyle "never saw anything he hadn't heard in a lecture hall, and his 
writers and his lecturers made a fool of him. When he saw a dead body he 
couldn't even see the wounds. A Red menace, a soldier of democracy"(QA, p. 
32). The "real" Vietnam eludes him; he checks everything back with York 
Harding whose theoretical models, based on the possibility of "engineering" 
change in other cultures, he attempts to translate into action irrespective 
of the culture environment of Vietnam, and in ignorance of the 
irrationality and self-interest of those who surround him. 
Fowler seems to be the diametrical opposite of Pyle, yet the 
worldview of both men is predicated upon similar assumptions. Fowler 
recognises the dangerous futility of Pyle's ideas and is familiar enough 
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with the Vietnamese environment to know that preconceptions and theories 
that have been worked out and applied elsewhere are likely to be completely 
useless. Yet his cynical appreciation of human self-interest and greed is, 
like Pyle's "innocence", based upon a belief in objective analysis and 
appraisal. Pyle believes in his authors and lecturers because of their 
traditional status as detached observers and critics of a history that 
possesses its own objective reality: Fowler's cynicism accepts to an extent 
the relativistic nature of history, the degree to which it is inscribed by 
other people's ideas and outlooks, but retains his faith in the individual 
as a detached, critical observer: 
The human condition being what it was, let them fight, let 
them love, let them murder, I would not be involved. My 
fellow journalists called themselves correspondents; I 
preferred the title of reporter. I wrote what I saw. I took 
no action - even an opinion is a kind of action. [QA. p. 28] 
Fowler is presented as the burnt out residue of European existentialism: 
the alienation of man from God now manifests itself as a cynical detach-
ment from events. Human relationships are empty of understanding because 
humans are empty of belief: "Perhaps if I wanted to be understood or to 
understand I would bamboozle myself into belief, but I am a reporter; God 
exists only for leader writers" (QA, p. 60). 
Fowler's involvement with Pyle however, sees his detachment begin to 
break down. Spending the night in a guard tower in enemy territory, he 
thinks he feels someone coming up the ladder, then realises he is too 
frightened to recognise that it is his own trembling shaking the ladder: 
"I had believed I was tough and unimaginative and all that a truthful 
observer and reporter should be" (QA, p. 107). This betrayal by his mind 
and body is a prelude to a much larger failure of his ideology. After a 
number of people are killed by a bomb constructed out of materials 
indirectly supplied by Pyle, Fowler knowingly lets Pyle go to his death; 
knowing also that Phuong will not be as well off with him as with Pyle. 
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With this comes the realisation that he is no longer the detached observer. 
"Suffering is not increased by numbers: one body can contain all the 
suffering the world can feel. I had judged like a journalist in terms of 
quantity and I had betrayed my own principles; I had become as engage as 
Pyle and it seemed that no decision would ever be simple again" (QA, p. 
183). 
Greene's text has clear links to the concerns of Michael Herr's Dis-
patches even if the two texts are stylistically very different, and Herr 
refers to The Quiet American several times with the sense of a narrative 
connection6 . The link between the two is that Greene is describing a dis-
tinct shift in Western culture, while Herr is writing from within that 
cultural shift. The narrators in each text are journalists and this is 
important because what is being addressed between the two is a shift not 
only in global political and economic patterns but cultural forms as well. 
Thus both men must confront information distortions and deceptions, and 
Greene's scene of the French military press conference is strikingly 
similar (even if his loyalties are not necessarily so clear cut) to Herr's 
descriptions of the farcical MACV briefings. For both narrators it is also 
a question of coming to grips with being engage; incurring a loss of the 
distinction between the observer and that which they are observing. But 
the irony is precisely the fact that both men are discovering this fact. 
The two texts are written 30 years apart, yet Herr is making the same 
discoveries; if his perception of cultural change is perhaps more extensive 
because it embraces the question of style, it is still going over ground 
already covered by Fowler. This irony is already evident in The Quiet 
American: the Europeans are operating in an older cultural mode yet seem to 
have a sort of tired self-consciousness of their own motivations and the 
futility of their actions. On the other hand we see the Americans 
operating under a more complex economic/political/cultural regime, yet 
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blundering into similar mistakes in Vietnam. It is implicit in Greene's 
text that even though US culture may itself be characterised by a pluralism 
and a postmodern reflexivity not evident in European culture, the way in 
which Americans regard their culture is much less problematic, with a 
characteristic naivete, a certain innocence. The fact that Herr is only 
discovering this 30 years later speaks volumes about the accuracy of 
Greene's perception. 
The focus of Herr's text is the breakdown in conventional notions 
of historical analysis and narrative organisation, due to their inoperabil-
ity in an environment such as Vietnam and, by extension, within our culture 
as a whole. The concentration is on a different type of discourse, one 
that breaks with older forms by eliding what have heretofore been regarded 
as incompatible styles and methods. Dispatches self-consciously blurs the 
distinction between conventional history, fiction, biography and journalism 
in an attempt to produce, not a definitive History of Vietnam, but an 
alternative "history". The intention is not only to reveal the opposition 
between an official and a secret history of Vietnam, but also the 
dialectical interaction between Vietnam and the phenomena of postmodernism, 
especially in relation to the field of communications. 
Dispatches is working against all those privileged representations 
that tried in their own way to suppress, or merely omitted, what happened 
in Vietnam; in particular, Herr's textual interpretation stands in opposi-
tion to the photographic attempts to "cover" the war. It is now something 
of a cliche to state that this was the first television war, but one needs 
to go further and realise that for most people this television spectacle 
:lli!..§. the war. Americans could see bombs dropping, villages burning, and 
Marines dying in the Highlands within hours of the pictures being taken. 
The television coverage of Vietnam was counterpointed by coverage of 
28 
dissent within the US; in each case the pool of images and their 
dissemination was supplemented by magazines and newspapers. The privileged 
position accorded these visual representations (partly historical but also 
amplified by the ease of association extended by film and TV) is such that 
people believed in the pictures; the pictures were how it really was over 
there/back here. 
Which they were, but only in the most rudimentary sense, within the 
parameters of an unbridgeable gap between event and image. For in the pho-
tographic image there are very specific forms of repression at work. Herr 
recalls as a kid looking at war photos in LIFE: 
Even when the picture was sharp and clearly defined, 
something wasn't clear at all, something repressed that 
monitored the images and withheld their essential 
information. It may have legitimised my fascination, letting 
me look for as long as I wanted; I didn't have a language for 
it then, but I remember now the shame I felt, like looking at 
first porn, all the porn in the world. I could have looked 
until my lamps went out and I still wouldn't have accepted 
the connection between a detached leg and the rest of the 
body .... rn_, p. 23] 
The photographic image presents us with an illusion of reality only; its 
duplicity is to be found in that its contents seem to have an optical veri-
similitude which places the image in the present, a very summation of the 
present moment. Roland Barthes calls this aspect the purely 
"denotational": the image is completely given over to the message and there 
is no trace of any secondary connotational message, the sense of "style" 
that characterises other representational forms. The press photo in 
particular is, however, highly connoted: 
on the one hand, the press photo is an object that has been 
worked on, chosen, composed, constructed, treated according 
to professional, aesthetic or ideological norms which are so 
many factors of connotation; while on the other this same 
photograph is not only perceived, received, it is read, 
connected more or less consciously by the public that 
consumes it to a traditional stock of signs. 7 
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The photograph remains analogous to reality, but in addition to a variety 
of connotational processes 8 , there is a representational duplicity implicit 
in the photographic method itself that goes undeveloped by Barthes. The 
photo evokes a perceptual continuity, yet its discrete existence belies 
that same continuity. In fact the image "lies" in the past; it is a relic 
committed to chemical memory, no more than a second-hand recording. Herr 
makes this distinction between lived visual experience and filmic 
representation in another passage: "But you could fly up into hot tropic 
sunsets that would change the way you thought about light forever. You 
could also fly out of places that were so grim they turned to black and 
white in your head five minutes after you'd gone" (Q, p. 17). 
Herr's use of colour terminology here is quite deliberate. Not only 
does it invoke the radical difference between the two perceptual (and 
therefore representational states), but the use of black and white refers 
back to the photographic image. In contrast to the plurality of 
experience, the photographic image is seen to be locked in, reductive, a 
way of reducing the impact of traumatic events. Barthes speculates that a 
pure denotation may exist not at the level of the "realistic" and 
objective, but at the level of the absolutely traumatic image. Trauma 
represents "a suspension of language, a blocking of meaning". 9 But contrary 
to Barthes' hypothesis, what the traumatic photo does is precisely to 
invest the image with language (it is read like any other photo) and 
therefore with meaning. 10 
The incitement to reading and context is derived from the way in 
which the photographic format frames its object, providing the viewer with 
an implicit set of spatial co-ordinates, literally a frame of reference. 
The camera offers the viewer an organised privileged state of perception; 
it also legitimises that position and turns it, as Herr says in connection 
with the LIFE photos, into voyeurism. The photo/filmic image thus seeks to 
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trap its object - we speak of "capturing a moment" (this is the ideal) or 
"capturing a good shot" (the actual result - reality has escaped and we are 
left with an image that is real only within the parameters of photographic 
convention). The filmic image thus breaks the continuum of "reality" by 
abstracting a single moment and giving it heightened significance, making 
it stand for a whole variety of "missing" moments. When this is coupled 
with the editing of film "coverage" and the placement of the image within a 
variety of possible contexts (magazine covers, protest placards, etc.), we 
see that film cannot lay claim to being a representation of events that is 
more meaningful through an exact portrayal of its object. The camera does 
lie. All the time.11 
These distortions and biases that are inherent in the camera gaze are 
even more pronounced, yet more deceptive, in film and video. Film is seen 
to be a closer analagon to reality because it reproduces motion; this is, 
of course, an illusion only, because the filmic image consists of a series 
of "stopped" (in the sense of both a halting and a blockage) moments of 
reality - it remains only "moving pictures". The distortions do not stop 
there. The ability to reproduce motion records movements instituted by the 
photographer: camera movement - jarring the camera and "travelling" shots 
provide a feeling of live action, low angle heightens dramatic effect, and 
so on - as well as such aspects as moving close-ups, focusing and aperture 
changes. All of this before the film even gets to the editing stage, at 
which time it is chopped and rejoined to suit what may be the very definite 
ideological requirements of TV news and documentary production. 
Television is thus characterised by (and many of its programmes are 
predicated upon) this representational gap, but Herr acknowledges that the 
gap between image and experience was something that afflicted all communi-
cations processes in Vietnam: 
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Conventional journalism could no more reveal this war than 
conventional firepower could win it. All it could do was 
take the most profound event of the American decade and turn 
it into a communications pudding, taking its most obvious and 
undeniable history and making it into a secret history. [Q, 
p. 175] 
The problem was communication itself: there was too much of it. Because 
Vietnam was largely a guerilla war (although on an incredible scale) and 
therefore a type that the US military was not used to fighting, it was 
also an information war: information - of the enemy's whereabouts, 
disposition, support among the civilian populace, etc - aquired a priority 
over tactics, because it was more then ever the necessary precondition for 
their formulation. In a postmodern environment, it is not long before 
information starts to turn around and bite the hand that feeds; the aquisi-
tion and processing of statistical information starts to become confused 
with the achievement and securing of military objectives. For example, 
Herr comments that the infamous Search and Destroy operations were in fact 
just the opposite: unfocused, often massive destruction followed by an 
attempt to find numbers and bodies to fit the Kill Ratio narrative. 
Introduce into this situation a news media which possesses technology 
and techniques of information aquisition and control whose potential is 
just starting to be realised, and suddenly, the air is thick with communi-
cation: numbers, jargon, buzzwords, acronyms, tactical representations, 
coded reports, and images to match. So there is enough information from 
Vietnam to fill magazines and broadcasts for the troops (intensifying the 
informational overload within Vietnam), and to glut every newspaper, maga-
zine, TV and radio station in the US. And yet: 
in the back of every column of print you read about Vietnam 
there was a dripping, laughing death-face; it hid in the 
newspapers and magazines and held to your television screens 
for hours after the set was turned off for the night, an 
after-image that simply wanted to tell you at last what had 
somehow not been told. [Q, p. 176] 
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This process of informational overload was of course in train before 
Vietnam, but Vietnam inherited and inflamed the process of fifties 
consumerism until it became the very condition of our existence. Jean 
Baudrillard discusses this change in relation to mass culture, but the 
point is also relevant to Vietnam: 
We are no longer part of the drama of alienation; we live in 
the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. 
The obscene is what does away with every mirror, every look, 
every image. The obscene puts an end to every 
representation. But it is not only the sexual that becomes 
obscene in pornography; today there is a whole pornography of 
information and communication, that is to say, of circuits 
and networks, a pornography of all functions and objects in 
their readability, their fluidity, their availability, their 
regularity, in their forced signification, in their 
performability, in their branching, in their polyvalence, in 
their free expression. 
It is no longer then the traditional obscenity of what is 
hidden, repressed, forbidden or obscure; on the contrary it 
is the obscenity of the visible, of the all-too-visible, of 
the more-visible-than-visible. It is the obscenity of what 
no longer has any secret, of what dissolves completely in 
information and communication. 12 
This recalls Herr's comment that looking at war photos as a kid was like 
looking at first porn; in each case there is a fascination with what is 
traditionally hidden but seems to be made present. 13 Yet the meaning of the 
image remains hidden and this may be a result of the "forced signification" 
that Baudrillard talks about: the act of reading a photo is never innocent, 
and itself engenders the expectation of meaning; the absence of meaning in 
photos of death, paradoxically opens the photo up to a multitude of mean-
ings, and the one, sacred meaning with which our society supposedly invests 
death, is lost.14 
This ecstasy of communication evolved as a by-product of the elabora-
tion of the media spectacle, where information becomes a product that has 
to be dressed up and sold just like anything else: 
Khe Sanh was famous, one of the very few place names that was 
recognised by the American public. Khe Sanh said "siege", it 
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said "encircled Marines" and "heroic defenders". It could be 
understood by newspaper readers quickly, it breathed Glory 
and War and Honoured Dead. It seemed to make sense. 
[Q, p. 88] 
The process didn't start with Vietnam and it didn't stop with it. The 
sixties was a decade of spectacle, crying out for sensory overload and 
transcendence and getting it - only to have it return as nightmare and 
immanence in unexpected ways. The metaphor of information as product 
during this period is surely Watergate. The Senate hearings were 
predicated upon the belief that the more information that was uncovered -
if we only had the tapes - the easier it would be to unravel the network of 
corruption. While people were talking about issues of surveillance and an 
imbalance between Presidential and Congressional information-gathering 
agencies, the whole episode was being turned into the most multifaceted, 
convoluted, protracted National soap opera communications spectacular ever 
devised. 
The communications instability was culture-wide, inherent not only in 
its awesome spectacles but in the language of its most ordinary citizens. 
The men from the rural and urban ghettoes who constituted the majority of 
US soldiers in Vietnam brought with them their own language. "They were 
rough and wild and dirty, and they spoke a dialect that was geographically 
undiscernible, with minor variations of tone and pitch as if they had all 
been recruited out of the same small town. Groovy. Wow. Number One. 
Number Ten. There it is, man. A bust for your dust, What a bummer. But 
it don't mean nothing. 11 15 What makes this language distinctive is that it 
is so undistinctive, Existing as collections of street slang, movie 
quotations, sporting, car and sexual metaphors, it tends to substitute a 
grammar of stock phrases for a more elaborate vocabulary. Thus a limited 
amount of jargon can be applied to an almost infinite number of situations, 
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each coded so that the precise meaning is recognised only by a specific 
sub-group. 
There it is, the grunts said, like this: sitting by a road 
with some infantry when a deauce-and-a-half rattled past with 
four dead in the back. The tailgate was half lowered as a 
platform to hold their legs and the boots that seemed to 
weigh a hundred pounds apiece now. Everyone was completely 
quiet as the truck hit a bad bump and the legs jerked up high 
and landed hard on the gate. 'How about that shit,' someone 
said, and 'Just like the motherfucker,' and 'There it is.' 
Pure essence of Vietnam, not even stepped on once, you could 
spin it out into visions of laughing lucent skulls or call it 
just another body in a bag, say that it cut you in half for 
the harvest or came and took you under like a lover, nothing 
ever made the taste less strong; the moment of initiation 
where you get down and bit the tongue off a corpse. [Q, p. 
203) 
On the one hand this use of stock responses seems to describe a moment that 
represents an epiphany of the Vietnam experience; on the other hand the 
precise significance of the moment is unknowable in anything more than a 
sense of raw power. This jargon is a language that is so universal, so 
repeatable, so capable of being used to signify everything that its 
significance is instead offered as a profound lack. If, as Derrida seems 
to suggest, one of the primary characteristics of writing (language) is its 
iterabiltiy (the possibility of its coded repetition), then this is a 
language widely spoken, that is founded not on a communication of 
information but the communication of iterability. 
In addition to the language of middle America, Herr has also pointed 
to the way in which the military was a prolific inventor of words and 
phrases, based around acronyms and abbreviations. In an effort to make 
language precise and neutral, old contexts were ruptured to create new 
modes of expression that were often euphemistic to say the least. 16 The way 
the military used language had a lot in common with the language of middle 
America; its emphasis upon the value of information and efficient 
communication often seemed to place more emphasis on the passage of 
information, its gathering, transfer and display, than upon its actual 
35 
content. Thus it was a language that also tended toward "pure" 
iterability. 
To this must be added the particular jargon of the large black and 
Hispanic contingents, as well as the pidgin language that evolved in commu-
nication with the Vietnamese, but was also used extensively by the sol-
diers: an uneven mixture of Vietnamese, English and French, liberally 
spiced with idiom from all three. All of which managed to create a manic 
proliferation of linguistic styles that seemed designed to keep reality, or 
perhaps the unreality of Vietnam at bay. There is also the extensive use of 
the word "fuck" which del Vecchio describes in a glossary entry as "along 
with Fucked and Fuckin -the most commonly used word in a GI's vocabulary 
other than the article !!". 17 The proliferating use of "fuck" during wartime 
may reflect the strong links between sex and war, links that are often 
exploited in the soldiers training, 18 as well as the cultural 
commodification of desire through advertising. But profanity extends the 
possibility of adding a new dimension to language by virtue of its being, 
nominally at least, forbidden and repressed. It is the situation of 
pornography once again and, like the pornographic close-up, through 
repetition fuck loses any descriptive power it may once have had and 
flattens the language around it. Instead it becomes a free-floating 
grammatical unit, capable of being used as noun, adjective, verb, 
intensifier or combinations of all of these. Its meaning is unstable, 
oscillating between utterances and evidence of a much more extensive 
instability within the language. 
In the early sixties, however, there remained a faith in the process 
of textual signification even if the content was sometimes suspect. So 
when America moved into Vietnam in a big way, trailing Coke cans and 
television cables, it possessed assumptions not only of its technological 
superiority but of the superiority of its culture and language. The 
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attempt to exert control through language was not merely a masque for 
control exerted through military power - the two were indistinguishable. 
It had been a matter of military expediency to impose a new 
set of references over Vietnam's older, truer being, an 
imposition that began most simply with the division of one 
country into two and continued - it had its logic - with the 
further division of South Vietnam into four clearly defined 
tactical Corps ... even if it effectively obliterated even some 
of the most obvious geographical distinctions, it made for 
clear communication, at least among members of the Mission ... 
rn, PP . 1 s -9 J 
Faced with a war it could not win, the military command structure created 
through language a war that it could win: a whirlwind of jargon that served 
to obscure reality through the imposition of a set of linguistic co-
ordinates upon a war narrative that had little connection (the less the 
better) with any possible objective reality. It was a language that corre-
sponded to the way the US military command wanted/needed to see the war, as 
much as it reflected the traditional Western assumption of the superiority 
of its language and culture and its necessary imposition upon existing 
indigenous cultural and linguistic references. The problem was, when 
language wasn't merely exhausted by overuse, the existence of communication 
for the sake of communication severed it from any meaningful relationship 
with reality. 
That fall, all that the Mission talked about was control: 
arms control, information control, resources control, 
psycho-political control, population control, control of the 
almost supernatural inflation, control of terrain through the 
Strategy of the Periphery. But when the talk had passed the 
only thing left standing up that looked true was your sense 
of how out of control things really were. [Q, p. 45] 
The fracturing of the assumed correspondence between signifier and 
signified yawns wide in the language of "incendigel", "containment", 
"Hearts and Minds", "Search and Destroy", "slicks", "MACV", "forward 
defensive modes", "Rolling Thunder", "discreet burst" and a thousand other 
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jargon terms - language turning back upon itself in a frenzy of disembodied 
desire. 
Herr writes, he dispatches, because he believes that there is a story 
of many stories about Vietnam that has not been told. It is a story which 
needs a new way of talking about things, because the traditional narratives 
are, like many of those who went to Vietnam, back in the World and not mak-
ing it. "The press got all the facts (more or less), it got too many of 
them. But it never found a way to report meaningfully about death, which 
of course was what it was really all about" (.Q, p. 173). 
The unconventional nature of Herr's efforts becomes clear when Dis-
patches is compared with a text that offers a more traditional approach to 
the problem of history: William Manchester's Goodbye Darkness. 19 Written in 
the late seventies, both these books are an attempt to come to grips with 
the past from an individual perspective. The title Goodbye Darkness is 
reasonably specific; Dispatches, while the word means official 
communication, particularly military, also refers to a prompt settlement of 
business, and a putting to death. Herr and Manchester are men plagued by 
what is loosely called "survivor's guilt", now recognised by the 
therapeutic profession as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Herr from 
his experiences in Vietnam, and Manchester from his experience of combat in 
the Pacific during World War II. For both men it is also a recognition 
that Official History and Modern History are juxtaposed with a personal 
history that incorporates the other two in a new way, outside the 
totalizing function of either. 
It is not a question of Dispatches being unconventional journalism, 
or radical history, but an effort to break apart such arbitrary categorisa-
tion. Manchester, on the other hand, is a long-serving member of the his-
torical establishment, author of a "definitive" work, 20 and although he 
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recognises the existence of a "secret" history of the Pacific in World War 
II, the narrative paradigm that he uses is one of the oldest that we know: 
a quest for origins, for a return. For although Manchester is motivated, 
like Herr to an extent, by a profound sense of loss, he seeks to recover 
the origins of that loss and assuage it. To this end he returns to the 
Pacific and visits the sites of the great conflicts. A narrative of the 
events that shook these places mingles with Manchester's observations con-
cerning the present state of the South Pacific and his personal experiences 
during the war, looking forward to his re-encounter with Okinawa where he 
was seriously wounded. 
But there is a coherence here for Manchester. It lies in the fact of 
his journey back, the ordering structure of his personal narrative. And 
like all such narratives it must have a resolution. Standing on Okinawa's 
Sugar Loaf Hill, near the spot where he was left for dead, he comes to 
understand why he fought. 
It was an act of love. Those men on the line were my family, 
my home. They were closer to me than I can say, closer than 
any friends had been or ever would be. They had never let me 
down, and I couldn't do it to them. I had to be with them, 
rather than let them die and me live with the knowledge that 
I might have saved them. Men, I now knew, do not fight for 
flag, or country, for the Marine Corps or glory or any other 
abstraction. They fight for one another. Any man in combat 
who lacks comrades who will die for him, or for whom he is 
willing to die, is not a man at all. He is truly damned. 21 
The book evidences a modernist faith in the cohering power of memory, 
assuming that while a man may have been many men, his experiences are 
arranged more or less in layers that can be peeled away to get down to 
bedrock, that which has gone unexamined or been repressed. Manchester uses 
this to impose a temporal unity upon his experiences, to make connections, 
to make the dream disappear (another ancient narrative trope), to figure 
out what it was all "for" - a conventional historical exposition that when 
set against the fragmentation of both memory and experience and the 
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inseparability of past and present that the book reveals, only serves to 
show how unusable conventional historical precepts have become. Herr, on 
the other hand, is not interested in what it was for or even what it meant, 
but in how it was seen to be what it was. 
The focus of Herr's endeavour is thus a revised attitude toward His-
tory. The concept of history as a linear organisation of real events 
- "facts" - into a rational narrative pattern is thrown into question in 
Dispatches by Herr's calling attention to the instability of communications 
mediums, with their ability to fragment events out of context. The 
processes of History are themselves culpable in the generation of this 
communications miasma, through their selectivity, and the degree to which 
Historical methodologies are reliant on the same processes of fragmentation 
and re-contextualisation. 
Straight history, auto-revised history, history without 
handles, for all the books and articles and white papers, all 
the talk and the miles of film, something wasn't answered, it 
wasn't even asked. We were backgrounded deep, but when the 
background started sliding forwards not a single life was 
saved by the information. The thing had transmitted too much 
energy, it heated up too hot, hiding low under the 
fact-figure crossfire there was a secret history, and not a 
lot of people felt like running in there to bring it out. 
rn, p. 46 l 
So Herr's experience of the shortcomings of conventional journalism in 
Vietnam has repercussions for the study of history; in an age of mass com-
munications what is journalism today is history tomorrow. Lest we fall 
back into a Manchesterian rage for imposing order and coherence upon an 
environment that no longer operates by these rules (an effort that created 
many of the "omissions" about Vietnam in the first place) there is a need 
for a re-evaluation and a re-inscription of both the position of the 
reporting subject, and the discourse that is used, breaking down barriers 
to perception such as the ideological distinction between History and 
Journalism. 
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This necessarily forces Herr to acknowledge the ambivalence of his 
own position: "I never knew a member of the Vietnam press corps who was 
insensible to what happened when the words "war" and "correspondent" got 
joined. The glamour of it was possibly empty and lunatic; but there were 
times when it was all you had ... " (Q, p. 152). Herr sees the distortion 
that is being imposed here. The job of a "correspondent" is, as the word 
suggests, to make things correspond, to put two and two together and 
communicate the sum. But what if there is nothing to put together, or at 
least no way of doing so; and what if there are further distortions built 
into the process of communication? 
"Correspondent" is also a power term, an appellation that puts the 
bearer of it in a privileged position vis a vis other people and reality. 
Dispatches posits instead a subjective pluralism, recognising that everyone 
is a correspondent. The voice that speaks via this text is not the 
authoritative discourse of Michael Herr, but a composite; stories told by 
everyone from Generals to civilians to the lowest grunt on the line; a 
proliferation of discourses, each with its own narrative mode, descriptive 
style and peculiar way of valorising reality. The term "story" says it all 
- what Herr has collected are a series of individual representations of 
"reality": as such, the distinction between what is truth and what is 
fiction comes to be seen as problematic. "War stories aren't really 
anything more than stories about people anyway" (Q, p. 198). 
There were two major obstacles facing the media in its attempt to 
"cover" Vietnam. The first was that the field of communications had 
already been laid out and down. Stepping out from a media saturated 
culture, every kid had seen a lot of war films, and whether in response to 
the informational free-for-all, or as an attempt to organise the chaos 
around them, many soldiers self-consciously assumed attitudes and postures 
inherited from war movies: 
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As is frequently the case before an operation, we are filled 
with a "happy warrior" spirit and tend to dramatize 
ourselves. With our helmets cocked to one side and 
cigarettes hanging out of our mouths, we pose as hard-bitten 
veterans for the headquarters marines. We are starring in 
our very own war movie, and the howitzer battery nearby 
provides some noisy background music. 22 
Herr also comments about the way soldiers under fire would act like a guts-
and-glory John Wayne in the presence of a camera. But the media personnel 
did not escape the effects of this cultural backgrounding either: 
We'd all seen too many movies, stayed too long in Television 
City, years of media glut had made certain connections 
difficult .... It was the same familiar violence moved over to 
another medium; some kind of jungle play with giant 
helicopters and fantastic special effects, actors lying out 
there in canvas body bags waiting for the scene to end so 
they could get up again and walk it off. But that was some 
scene ( you found out) there was no cutting it. 
A lot of things had to be unlearned before you could learn 
anything at all, and even after you knew better you couldn't 
avoid the ways in which things got mixed, the war itself with 
those parts of the war that were just like the movies ... [Q, 
p. 169) 
For Herr, the recognition of this sort of cultural inscription raises 
serious questions about the possibility of the objectivity upon which the 
formulation of "History" is seen to depend. 
The other difficulty faced by the Press was the legitimation of that 
which many of them tried to criticise: 
Somewhere on the periphery of that total Vietnam issue whose 
daily reports made the morning paper too heavy to bear, lost 
in the surreal contexts of television, there was a story that 
was as simple as it had always been, men hunting men, a 
hideous war and all kinds of victims. But there was also a 
Command that didn't feel this, that rode us into attrition 
traps on the back of fictional kill ratios, and an 
Administration that believed the Command, a 
cross-fertilization of ignorance, and a press whose tradition 
of objectivity and fairness (not to mention self-interest) 
saw that all of it got space. It was inevitable that once 
the media took the diversions seriously enough to repeat 
them, they also legitimised them. The spokesmen spoke in 
words that had no currency left, sentences with no hope of 
meaning in the sane world, and if much of it was sharply 
queried by the press, all of it got quoted. [Q,, p. 173) 
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The points that Herr makes here are very important and in many ways are the 
substance of Dispatches. The assumption of objectivity in journalistic 
reporting has been under fire for some time. It is popularly believed that 
during the course of the Vietnam war, the US media was transformed from a 
passive, largely conservative institution, into one that was often highly 
critical of administration policy. In the minds of many military men there 
is the belief that the media were largely responsible for the US losing the 
war, because they stirred up dissent at home. 23 This is similar to the 
belief amongst many politicians that this same "radicalisation" of the 
Press was responsible for the malaise, and decline in political legitimacy 
during the 197O's - the fatuous belief, for example, that an innocent Nixon 
was hounded from office by Woodward and Bernstein. 
Daniel Hallin examines this notion of an oppositional media in some 
detail. 24 He maintains that while it has been shown that critical coverage 
of events does generally result in more critical public attitudes and vice 
versa, there are a number of questions that need to be asked before this 
thesis can begin to be applied to coverage of the Vietnam war: how much of 
the coverage overall is favourable or unfavourable to political authority? 
is criticism directed at institutions or individuals? how does the critical 
element of coverage change over time? Hallin's analysis of a random sample 
of 779 TV broadcasts in the period from 1965 to 1973, does indeed show a 
marked increase in negative news coverage, especially after the Tet offen-
sive of 1968. This is reflected in editorial comments on major actions, 
criticism of democracy in South Vietnam and reportage of the low morale of 
US troops. The question is whether or not this simply mirrors the increas-
ing failure of US policy. On the one hand, the reports of low troop morale 
roughly parallel the rise of £ragging incidents and insubordination convic-
tions. On the other hand, there is a massive increase in negative coverage 
of the South Vietnam political system during 1968, when in fact 1966 was 
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far more turbulent in terms of bombings, assassinations and corruption 
scandals, than anything that occurred later. 
Hallin's thesis is that while journalists after Tet were much more 
inclined to report material that was critical of official policy, journal-
istic reporting throughout the war was characterised by a commitment to a 
tradition of objective journalism. Especially in comparison with other 
countries, Hallin argues, US journalism is relatively disengaged from 
active political involvement, and the journalist is assigned the largely 
passive role of transmitting information to the public. This is supported 
by the fact that only 8% of his sample of Vietnam stories contained expli-
citly favourable or unfavourable comment. This excludes news commentaries 
which, as we have seen, can be shaping forces, but the fact remains that 
the overwhelming majority of the news stories concentrated on supplying 
basic information of the "who what when where" variety. This is even more 
obvious when one considers that the most "damaging" news stories can in no 
way be attributed to investigative journalism: the Tet offensive erupted 
under journalists' noses, the Pentagon papers were leaked unsolicited, My 
Lai was not discovered until the story was broken by an independent 
reporter and the secret bombing of Cambodia only became an issue when it 
became the subject of a Congressional investigation. 
This commitment to objectivity has one important outcome: 
Once it is accepted that the task of journalism is to provide 
the public not with opinion but with information, the crucial 
choice becomes the choice of sources. And the American 
journalist in the twentieth Century has solved this problem 
primarily by relying on official sources. 25 
Thus journalists centre around points where official information is to be 
released: the White House, the Pentagon, the MACV situation briefings. 
Naturally what is transmitted is primarily the government's view of the 
world. The situation was made more complex by the fact that a new story 
appeared beside the story of the war, that of domestic dissent. News from 
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the field and the Executive branch continued to reflect official sources, 
while policy opponents would more often appear to explain themselves and 
their actions rather than to talk about the war. The tradition of 
objective journalism requires that all this official information be passed 
on without comment, and Hallin's research shows that commentary was 
substantially less common on coverage of the US Executive than with other 
actors, the assumption being that official spokespeople could speak for 
themselves. By contrast one would expect an oppositional media to give 
more coverage to the opposition, and this is what happened - but with a 
large amount of unfavourable comment. As is common with much criticism of 
the United States way of life, critical coverage of Vietnam reporting was 
directed more at the administration and individuals than the political 
system itself. When core values, such as the belief that US Foreign Policy 
is prompted by consideration for democracy, were involved, coverage was 
usually legitimising. Indeed, even when things went horribly wrong, US 
journalists were often at great pains to point out that the US intentions 
had been good. 
Hallin sees the Journalist world as divided into three regions. The 
first is the sphere of consensus - those social objects and beliefs 
regarded by journalists and most of their society as non-controversial. 
Here, journalists feel under no compulsion to present opposing views. Sec-
ondly, there is the sphere of legitimate controversy; the realm of public 
debate where the ethic of objective journalism comes into play. Lastly 
there are those political actors and viewpoints that are regarded as 
unworthy of being heard: in the early years of the war, the anti-war 
movement, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were all regarded as 
"unworthy". 
Hallin argues that coverage in the early part of the war was favour-
able because Vietnam was not a particularly controversial issue within the 
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mainstream of US politics. Debate was usually confined to tactical consid-
erations and reporting the official viewpoint did not involve taking sides 
on a controversial issue. But gradually: 
the sphere of consensus contracted while the sphere of 
legitimate controversy expanded. Not only did the media 
report the growing debate over the war, they were also 
affected by it. As the parameters of political debate 
changed, so did the behaviour of the media: stories that 
previously had been reported within a consensus framework 
came to be reported as controversies; subjects and points of 
view that had been beyond the pale in the early years came to 
be treated as legitimate news stories. Neither the 
institutional structure, nor the professional ideology of the 
media had changed substantially, but in a changed political 
environment these could have very different implications for 
the reporting of news. 26 
Although this does not mean that the Press is a passive or insignificant 
body, it does mean that it is an intervening, rather than an independent, 
link in the process by which political support and consensus is created or 
broken down. 
Hallin's analysis is extensive and accurate as far as it goes, but it 
doesn't really take into account the highly visual nature of the war, and 
the changes that were occurring within and around representational con-
texts. Lawrence Lichty and Murray Fromson argue that this visual aspect 
was not as extensive as many people believed. 27 Their discussion centres 
around Morley Safer's famous report on the burning of the village of Camne. 
They indicate that most TV reports were not as critical as the Camne 
coverage and that, especially in the early part of the war, Safer's report 
was atypical, and not even consistent with the tone of many of his later 
reports. The conventional view is that the TV sets of middle-America were 
saturated every night with coverage of bloody fighting in Vietnam, but the 
two journalists indicate that this was not necessarily the case. They 
cite four influential and striking images from Vietnam: the burning monk, 
the shooting in the head of the VG suspect, the little girl that was 
accidentally napalmed and the marine setting fire to a hootch with a zippo 
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- all except the last image (from Camne) made their impact as still photos 
rather than as video footage. But this merely highlights the problems in 
trying to determine the effect of images. The key point is that while 
there were distortions imposed by the communications climate of Vietnam, it 
was the first un-censored war in the sense that the military extended 
almost unlimited access to news gathering agencies. Television thus had 
access to a great deal of information about the war and presented it in a 
fashion that was more immediate than, say, newsreels during WWII. The 
problem with typifying Vietnam as a television war, is that this statement 
most consistently crops up when television is being invoked as one of the 
reasons why the US lost the war. Thus the media is granted its objectivity 
- and this is turned around and used against them: resulting in the 
exclusion of the Press from Grenada, for example. 
Fromson is not at all sure that coverage of another war now would be 
any different and he points to the situation in Iran, where the media is 
once again imposing the same distortions and exhibiting the same failure to 
try and understand a different culture. He says: 
So, did the television industry learn anything about covering 
a war, about showing a war on television? I don't think so. 
The war left a permanent effect on many of 'us individual 
journalists. There was a great frustration in our not being 
able to capture the essence of the war. That essence was 
never consistently translated to television film in human 
terms. 28 
Unfortunately this statement reveals the working of assumptions of objecti-
vity in different ways. The problem with Vietnam was that it had no 
essence, in the sense of a single, transmissible meaning that would provide 
perception of events with some coherence, and the terms of the war were 
anything but human. If Hallin is right, then the commitment to 
journalistic objectivity served to expose the divisions within the 
governing and military elites, but the effect of this was not that people 
were exposed to more critical viewpoints and adopted these, as he seems to 
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indicate; rather, people began, perhaps, to dimly perceive the 
representational complexity of the world around them and to react against 
it. The much overused "credibility gap" was thus a representational gap. 
The comfortable asswnptions that most people possessed, not only about 
their world, but about the way in which they perceived it, were being 
challenged. A natural response was to minimise the effects of this 
challenge and the easiest way to do this was to try and eliminate the one 
thing that the various disruptions seemed to centre around: Vietnam. Thus 
the US withdrawal from Vietnam may have been a triwnph for the forces of 
political radicalism/liberalism, but it was also a victory for the forces 
of representational reaction. Public opposition to the war on a large 
scale stemmed not from the belief that it was morally or politically wrong 
- most people had no idea why the US was in Vietnam - but eventuated 
because people were sick of it, and frightened of the disruption and 
divisions it was creating within US society. 
Believing in the veracity of its own truth-gathering processes, the 
media was never able to come to grips with a war that often flexed the lim-
its of rationality as well as those of perception. Unable to perceive the 
link between language and control, the press was penetrated by the object 
that it was meant to describe, innuring the public to the language of kill 
ratios and the sight of burning children. The reverse was also true, it 
became a media war also in Vietnam itself: gung-ho commanders ready to 
stage whole operations for the benefit of the TV cameras and tours of 
recent battlefields were organised for the press and an assortment of dig-
nitaries, military and civilians alike, all tarred by the same brush with 
dead language. 
These obstacles to an effective coverage of Vietnam by the press rev-
eal the impossibility of achieving a journalistic (or historical) detach-
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rnent. The observer is always enclosed by a particular cultural context 
whose values and assumptions inscribe the object the observer is meant to 
be describing. In part this sterns from the real breakdown that Herr 
experienced in the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the 
realisation that the observer cannot stand apart from that which is being 
observed. 
But of course we were intimate, I'll tell you how intimate: 
they were my guns and I let them do it. I never let them dig 
my holes or carry my gear, there were always grunts who 
offered, but I let them do that for me while I watched, maybe 
for them, maybe not. We covered each other, an exchange of 
services that worked all right until one night when I slid 
over to the wrong end of the story, propped up behind some 
sandbags at an airstrip in Can Tho with a .30 Calibre 
automatic in my hands, firing cover for a four man reaction 
team trying to get back in. One last war story. [Q, p. 160) 
Herr is operating from a context where levels of information have become 
not levels of knowledge but levels of disorientation. There has been a 
mutation in the spatial environment, proceeding largely from the intrusion 
into it of the mainly temporal considerations of communication. This, in 
the words of Jameson, who sees this as the quintessential postrnodern 
experience, "has finally transcended the capacities of the individual human 
body to locate itself, to organise its immediate surroundings perceptually, 
and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world 11 • 29 In 
response to this hyper-reality, this ecstasy of communication, where 
everything becomes so charged with meaning that meaning becomes 
overdetermined, Herr has had to find some other way of talking about 
Vietnam one that will not operate outside the traditional narratives but 
will incorporate them in new ways. "Objectivity", if it is in any way 
possible, must stem from a self-conscious acknowledgement of the biases 
inherent in these structures and the incorporation of their logic into a 
discourse in such a way as to make visible their workings and assumptions 
and undermine their authoritarian attempts at closure. 
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Herr's strategy is to effect a lack of discrimination between types 
of discourse, a championing of subjectivism in order to break down the 
tyrannical and ultimately negatory patterns of objective communication. In 
this he is foregrounding the problem of representation in the postmodern 
world, a world characterised by a decline in the authority of master 
narratives. Dispatches is thus an extraordinary blend of styles and tones, 
incorporating rock lyrics, obscenity and profanity, Black jive and military 
acronyms, as well as more conventional passages of narrative exposition and 
journalistic observation, which are themselves coloured and inscribed with 
this plethora of discourses. The breakdown of the distinction between pop 
and high culture is a much commented upon feature of postmodernism, but in 
Dispatches the result is not, as it sometimes is with other postmodern 
works (eg. Pynchon's Lot 49) a slippage over into an identification with 
the language of kitsch and schlock as another kind of transcendental 
signified. Rather, the abandonment of claims of objectivity and detachment 
opens a discursive field in which no particular type of language is given 
priority. Thus Dispatches is by Herr, but not in the usual sense: he has 
collected observations, stories, snippets, half-formed sensory 
impressions ... ; less an author than a "scriptor" to use Barthes' phrase. 
"Scripting" is an important metaphor, in that what he sees himself doing is 
making a "movie" of his time in Vietnam. This is a recognition of the way 
in which our "experience" of Vietnam has been vulnerable in the degree to 
which it has been largely a visual/filmic representation, conditioned by 
other war films. And while Dispatches mirrors the techniques of film in 
its rapid cutting, its short "shots" and so on, the text attempts to 
subvert the authority of a filmic text. 
This "movie", for example, abandons the conventional narrative struc-
tures of cinema; there is no chronological coherence, and even a movement 
by association is sketchy. What this text seeks to do is reproduce the 
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temporal/spatial confusion of a communications glut: the first chapter is 
headed "Breathing In", the last, "Breathing Out", and between the two, the 
text "exists" in a vast suspensory pause, where the normal rules of 
coherence and rational logic do not apply. Even neo-mythic associations 
(one could well argue that names such as Khe Sanh and Hue have aquired a 
mythic significance, at least for Americans 3O ) and reference to other texts 
(Graham Greene's The Quiet American and several books on Dien Ben Phu) fail 
to exert any authority over the text. Yet the novel does possess a strange 
kind of "readability", derived in part from the familiarity of many of the 
images and types of language, but also from the one thing that exerts any 
coherence over the text: Vietnam. But it is Vietnam as nothing more than a 
name, so charged with association as to be affectless, an empty, absent 
referent, a hole in language like the Lurp's narrative - "Patrol went 
up the mountain. One man came back. He died before he could tell us 
what happened" - with its "absent" message around which the scattered 
dispatches collect. 
The form of Dispatches is reminiscent of the collage that Herr 
discovers on the wall of the young GI's house in Saigon: 
It included glimpses of burning monks, stacked Viet Cong 
dead, wounded Marines screaming and weeping, Cardinal 
Spellman waving from a chopper, Ronald Reagan, his face 
halved and separated by a stalk of cannabis; pictures of John 
Lennon peering through wire-rimmed glasses, Mick Jagger, Jimi 
Hendrix, Dylan, Eldridge Cleaver, Rap Brown; coffins draped 
with American flags whose stars were replaced with swastikas 
and dollar signs .... [Q, p. 144] 
As with Dispatches, the only thing that relates these fragments together is 
Vietnam, even if it is only to the extent that the collage was created in 
Vietnam. Yet there are lines of force running through and between the 
images, lines of sex, death, money, more and stranded cablings of all 
of these. It is a form in line with Jameson's belief that "the new politi-
cal art - if indeed it is possible at all - will have to hold to the truth 
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of postmodernism, that is, to say, to its fundamental object -the world 
space of multinational capital ... 1131 
Herr describes Vietnam as having a "poison history, fucked in the 
root no matter how far back you wanted to run your trace" (Q, p. 41) and 
this poison is in large part the history of the evolution and expansion of 
multinational capitalism, phases of trade development, imperialism, 
ideological competition, exploitation and greed on the part of the West as 
well as the Vietnamese, a network of interactions that is too complex to be 
unravelled. So when Herr talks about having to piece together fear and 
hatred of the war with a very real love for it - "I think that Vietnam was 
what we had instead of happy childhoods" (Q, p. 195) - or describes his 
"meta-chopper" as "saver-destroyer, provider-waster, right hand-left hand, 
nimble, fluent, canny and human; hot metal, grease, jungle-saturated canvas 
webbing, sweat cooling and warming up again, cassette rock and roll in one 
ear and door-gun fire in the other, fuel, heat, vitality and death, death 
itself hardly an intruder" (Q, pp. 15-16), he is, in part, in this 
evocation of contraries and heterogeneity trying to come to grips with the 
vast de-centred network that is multinational capitalism as it inscribes 
and is inscribed by Vietnam. 
This tentacular aspect of world capitalism and the cultural 
entrapment that characterised, specifically American perceptions in Viet-
nam, but in a wider context all perception, is manifested in Herr's discov-
ery when he returned that, "There'd been nothing happening there that 
hadn't already existed here, coiled up and waiting, back in the World" 
(Q, p. 200). It is a familiarity that breeds disorientation. In the 
Pacific TIME was right there on the side of the man in the aid station to 
bring us the facts: in Vietnam the communications somehow failed, the man 
died before he could tell us what happened, and we are left holding a nar-
rative with no centre, a narrative that is "about" the failure of narra-
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tive. There is also the realisation that is the dynamic of Dispatches 
- that what governs these historical processes, what creates them, is the 
way in which we talk about them. There is no History - in the sense of a 
stable, essential and wholly objective entity - only different 
(differential) structures of fictional narrative. Vietnam has a postmodern 
context, which is as much to say that people like Herr talk about it in a 
postmodern way, out of a recognition that the older narratives will not fit 
this new season. What emerges is that which Herr sums up succinctly in one 
line: "Not much chance anyrnore for History to go on unselfconsciously" (Q, 
p. 42). 
This realisation that History is just another name for narrative, a 
discourse of organisation that finally places us in no more privileged 
position to reality than black jive or a rock lyric - "Those who remember 
the past are condemned to repeat it too, that's a little history joke" 
(Q, p. 203) - does not sit comfortably with some readers. Jameson, for 
example, can say of the historical novel (in which class I would place Dis-
patches, if only to undermine the coherence of that category) that: 
If there is any realism left here, therefore, it is a 
"realism" which is meant to derive from the shock of grasping 
that confinement and slowly becoming aware of a new and 
original historical situation in which we are condemned to 
seek history by way of our own pop images and simulacra of 
that history, which itself remains forever out of reach. 32 
Hal Foster is even more upset and delivers a stinging rebuke, aimed impli-
citly at works such as Dispatches: 
This "return to history" is ahistorical for three reasons: 
the context of history is disregarded, its continuum is 
disavowed and conflictual forms of art and modes of 
production are falsely resolved in pastiche. Neither the 
specificity of the past nor the necessity of the present is 
heeded. Such a disregard makes the return to history also 
seem to be a liberation from history. And today many artists 
do feel that, free of history, they are able to use it as 
they wish. Yet, almost self-evidently, an art form is 
specific, its meaning is part and parcel of its period and 
cannot be transposed innocently. To see other periods as 
mirrors of our own is to turn history into narcissism; to see 
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other styles as open to our own is to turn history into a 
dream. But such is the dream of the pluralist: he seems to 
sleepwalk in the museum. 33 
One could write a lengthy critique on the metaphysical loadings that 
characterise this passage, but the initial criticism is valid: much of this 
(a)historical art can be seen as serving the ends of late capitalism by 
replicating its logic of fragmentation. Yet this has always been a 
problematic, if not unavoidable feature of historical analysis; older 
teleological models of representation fell just as easily into the service 
of the bourgeoisie, used to describe the linear logic of its dominance, 
just as it was used by communism to reflect the inevitability of its 
victory, thereby justifying its existence. It would seem that a critical 
strategy that advocates de-stabilisation and disruption has more radical 
implications than a return to the sanctity of context, the specificity of 
style and text, the rage for periodisation that Foster and Jameson, influ-
enced heavily by Marxist definitions of "political action" and "social con-
science", seem to advocate. 
The second part of Jameson's manifesto for political art says that 
such a form must achieve "a breakthrough to some as yet unimaginable mode 
of representing ... 1134 This new mode of representation necessarily involves 
new modes of perception, one commensurate with the hyperreal in which we 
live. In Dispatches a model of something approaching this radical 
self-referentiality is provided by the figure of the photographer, Tim 
Page. 
His talk was endlessly referential, he mixed in images from 
the war, history, rock, Eastern religion, his travels, 
literature (he was very widely read and proud of it) but you 
came to see that he was really only talking about one thing, 
Page. [Q, p. 191] 
Dispatches does finally effect a narrative closure - one must finally 
breathe out again - but the next breath is now problematic, for the 
"meaning" of the text "closes" not on a resolution, like Goodbye Darkness, 
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but on its opposite: "And no moves left for me at all but to write down 
some few last words and make the dispersion, Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam, we've 
all been there" (Q, p. 207). 
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REVELATIONS REVALUATIONS 
The current explosion of textual material on Vietnam has one of its 
sources in the Vets' desire, in common with the survivors of all wars, to 
find some way of talking about what had happened to them "over there". 
Talking about an experience that was, and for many still is, an extremely 
traumatic one represents a means of coming to grips with that experience, 
of reducing the repercussions of the traumatic events by creating for them 
a context to replace the one that has been destroyed. Telling others what 
it was like creates a narrative unity, and by virtue of this generates 
meaning to replace that which has been lost: narrative engenders a meaning 
for singularly brutal events and, by extension, the meaning of the whole 
world, whole no longer. 
But the status of Vietnam as creator/destroyer/distorter of languages, 
to the extent that it turned the linguistic and physical environment of the 
word Vietnam, and of the Word as a stable basis for meaning, into Herr's 
"communications pudding", shattered the possibility of a common language of 
shared experience. Frederick Downs Jnr., an assistant Director of the 
Veterans Administration in New Mexico, commented in 1979: 
We Vietnam Veterans cannot get ourselves organised as a 
group. Our ideas on Vietnam and on America's reaction to us 
have never come from one strong voice. If there is one thing 
Vietnam veterans have in common, it is our inability to band 
together in one large single group. We have been so busy 
coping with our individual problems as Vietnam Veterans that 
we have stayed away from each other. That in itself is 
unusual. Anyone who has shared an experience with someone 
else should not have any trouble joining with that person. 
But it is almost as if we have spent so much of ourselves 
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trying to regain our dignity, our lives and our personhood 
that we do not want to join any group for fear we will lose 
what we have worked so hard to attain. 1 
Those who have gone to war are already powerfully alienated from those on 
the Horne Front by virtue of the gap between their experiences; when this 
gap is widened further by an inability to communicate within the group, all 
that remains to Vets are private idiolects: fragmented, idiosyncratic and 
representationally unstable. 
This was compounded by an attempt, on the surface at least, to erase 
the memory tape. Most people in the US thought they knew all there was to 
know about Vietnam because it had been so extensively televised - at any 
rate they did not want to know more. Vietnam was dismissed as a costly and 
bloody failure, spoken as if somehow the country itself was responsible and 
not the CIA, the Viet Cong, the Marine Corps or General Westmoreland. For 
many, the Vietnam experience was not what had happened in a small country 
10,000 miles away, but what had happened within the US. The dissent and 
debate about involvement in Indochina showed that the US was not as 
homogeneous, especially in support of its government, as most Americans had 
thought. Events also posed severe questions about fundamental US beliefs, 
especially in terms of the perceived gap between the nation's actions, 
stated intentions and underlying moral justifications. After Kent State 
and the Chicago Convention, questions about how the government dealt with 
people overseas were matched by questions as to how it presided over the 
wishes of its own citizens. With the protest against the war, the Civil 
Rights movement, the Women's movement, the ghetto uprisings, and later 
Watergate and the Oil Shocks, the period from the large-scale commitment of 
US forces in 1965 to the fall of Saigon in 1975 was a traumatic one for the 
US, perhaps more so than any period except that surrounding the Civil War. 
Traumatic in that it was not only a period of great social change but, like 
the Civil War, a period in which many of the US fundamental perceptions of 
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itself were called into question. And the first response to trauma is, of 
course, denial. 
But there were over a million men who served in Vietnam, and millions 
more who were affected in various ways, more deeply than they realised at 
the time. As individuals and as a culture they were working through the 
second response to trauma, a compulsion to repeat the traumatic experience. 
There was, also, always money to be made. So the books came out slowly, 
feeding the lure of the forbidden, but also building up a discursive 
pattern, a repertoire of images, momentum: Going After Cacciato, A Rumour 
of War, Dog Soldiers, Dispatches, The 13th Valley, Chickenhawk, - until it 
appeared there was collective agreement that a decent interval had passed. 
The humiliating events of the Seventies had been compensated for, through 
actions such as the raids against Libya and the invasion of Grenada, and 
the past could be resurrected from the sanctity of a secure 
present/presence. 
The current discourse on US involvement in Vietnam, which is only 
sometimes extended to incorporate US involvement with Indochina as a whole, 
involves not only the events of that period but also the way in which the 
US interprets events and forms their relationship with the recognition and 
transmission of some of its most fundamental values. As Dispatches 
demonstrates, this is largely a question of imposing a historical narra-
tive: establishing a framework for events that imposes meaning upon the 
nation's past and uses that past as justification for the present and a 
pattern for the future. 
It is very hard to separate perception of the disparate elements of the 
Vietnam experience - the brutality, the racism, the economic exploitation, 
the loss of meaning, informational entropy - from the fact that the US lost 
the war, that it was all for nothing. It was as if the US had not been 
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defeated but rather repulsed, and there are all the emotions of the scorned 
lover: bitterness, rage, a desire for retribution, enormous sadness -
especially if the lover knows, deep down, that their intentions have been 
less than honourable and selfless. Even more devastating was the loss of 
the moral high ground, not only from the point of view of the rest of the 
world, but also with its own citizens. The "right" of the US to make 
decisions on behalf of others had been called into question, also the whole 
basis upon which it assumed that right - the picture of the US as a 
democratic utopia to which other countries could aspire. The race riots, 
protest rallies, assassinations, the Chicago Convention all showed that the 
US was not a New World paradise; that it was a society torn by strife, with 
a State that practised violence not only against its poverty-stricken and 
oppressed, but against the products of its upper and middle classes. Never 
again could the US lay claim to the clean backyard it presumed to set up in 
others. 
This is the trauma of Vietnam: that it was a lost cause, a hell on 
earth for those who were sent there, unredeemed by any final victory or 
sense of a more total purpose back in the world. This makes it hard to 
separate the Vets' feelings of betrayal, and the US public's hostility 
towards the Vets, from an overall communal sense of loss. In this there 
are striking parallels between the US' experience of Vietnam and the 
European experience of World War I. For Europeans World War I also was 
traumatic; there was the feeling that it had been revelatory but in such a 
way as to shatter some cherished cultural illusions. It is interesting to 
note in this context that what was World War I for much of the world was, 
and is, the Great War for Europeans. In point of statistical fact, it 
ranged far less widely, involved fewer countries, and killed less people, 
especially civilians, than did the Second World War. As far as the US was 
concerned, it had been involved for a shorter time and had suffered fewer 
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casualties than the European countries. The war had also not touched the 
majority of US citizens in the same way that it had Europeans. Yet US 
involvement was not insubstantial and the fighting in 1917 and 1918 was 
some of the bloodiest of the war; US soldiers suffered and died in the same 
conditions that provoked Owen and Sassoon to verse - yet culturally World 
War I remained World War I. Part of the reason may lie in the fact that 
the US had already had its "Great War" back in the 1860's - it also 
featured trench warfare, large scale use of artillery and the introduction 
of machine guns and aerial observation. 2 
Another reason is that the effects of a war are as much ideological 
as physical. For Europeans the First World War did not shake the founda-
tions of their society as much as the foundations of their belief. So much 
nineteenth century faith, of various kinds, was invested in order, systems, 
logic - power could be balanced, the self-interest of states could be 
played off against one another almost indefinitely to provide a definition 
of the common good, man was rational (even if woman was not); nurtured in 
an institutional ferment European society was the apotheosis of 
civilization. The war dealt this system of beliefs a serious blow, 
stripping away the layers of supposed advance until it seemed that the 
progress of civilization was defined only by the ability of humans to kill 
each other in ever increasing numbers. The US did not suffer this 
disillusionment, or at least not as deeply. Its isolated mentality meant 
that it did not have an emotional investment in the European State System, 
even if it indirectly required its existence for the success of its 
economic ventures. 
Given that the aftermath of a war is determined as much by the cultural 
expectations and self-image which proceed it as by the actual events of the 
conflict, it is possible that history will reflect upon Vietnam as the US' 
Great War. Like Europe before World War I, the US before Vietnam 
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evidences a faith in the superiority of its culture and its worldview, 
including the right to promote its version of economic and political 
reality around the world. Certainly the effects of Vietnam in combination 
with the other events of the decade from '64 to '74 have been of far 
greater significance for the US and of greater duration than those from 
World War I. One does not, for example, discover references to US foreign 
policy in the twenties as suffering from the "Great War Syndrome". 
This feeling is implicit in Caputo's A Rumour of War3 where many of the 
chapters are prefaced with quotes from Wilfred Owen or Siegfried Sassoon. 4 
There are certainly parallels between the US and European experiences in 
terms of a loss of the illusion of cultural innocence, a substantial 
measure of social dislocation, the destruction of ideals and the 
"discovery" of a dark, irrational, savage side of human nature. Also 
similar is the way in which the US perceives Vietnam and its aftermath in 
terms of a profound spiritual crisis that affects not just individuals, but 
the national character as a whole. Vietnam is seen not merely as the most 
significant event of a generation, as is the case with most wars, but as a 
watershed in the nation's history. Descriptions of Vietnam and its effects 
habitually employ biblical terminology: the experience has been revelatory, 
even apocalyptic, involving problematic spiritual, moral and ethical 
choices and rituals of judgement, sin, guilt, blame and atonement. 
What is worrying about all this is that it looks very much like an 
attempt to "place" Vietnam within a series of traditional cultural con-
texts. This mood is captured in a comprehensive discussion in a 1981 issue 
of The Center Magazine entitled "Vietnam: Will There be a Collective 
Healing? 115 A diversity of viewpoints is represented, but by and large the 
various perspectives are marked by a singular inability of their proponents 
to see themselves as actors in a process of helping to create a narrative 
framework for the Vietnam experience. There is the assumption, largely 
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unchallenged, that whether it is possible or not, "collective healing" is 
still a relevant theme for discussion, when it is far from certain that the 
US has truly been "injured" in anything more than a superficial manner. 
Much of the discussion is pitched at the level of conventional religious, 
moral or therapeutic doctrine to the degree that the Vets become 
insignificant and their experiences almost irrelevant. 
The impact of Vietnam is being experienced through a conti-
nuing ritual, a process very much like that of confession, 
absolution and restoration. The Vietnam Veteran centres are 
the places where the ritual is being worked out. The 
counsellors in these Vet centres function as confessors, like 
secular priests. The vet centres themselves are like 
neighbourhood religious communities, all of them involving 
persons °living and working together in the ritual process. 6 
There is a grain of truth in this but it is hard to picture the overworked, 
often underfunded Vet centres, (many of them set up as self-help refuges, 
while others struggle for political acceptance) as modern-day equivalents 
of the mediaeval church. 
What is at work here is an attempt to collectivise and generalise, to 
publicise what has been personal and private so that it can be more readily 
understood. Knowledge is power; in this case one suspects that it is power 
over the demons that beset Americans, the dark side of American endeavour 
that forms the great American Nightmare: fear of failure, fear of betrayal. 
Above all, fear of impoverishment both financial and spiritual. All the 
talk of the religious anguish of the Vets perhaps conceals a fear on the 
part of the commentators that the US has lost the ability to form a 
unified, collective, national spiritual response. 
Now, sadly, "It don't mean nothin' has become for many 
veterans a deeply imbedded way of perceiving all life. It 
informs their evaluation of their own spiritual and moral 
capacity, and it describes their experience with religion, at 
least with a distinctively American brand of religion. 7 
"It don' mean nothin'" was one of a number of standard responses used by 
soldiers in Vietnam. It could be said in bitterness, a grunt raging to the 
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point of apathy against the meaninglessness of his suffering, of all 
suffering. But in Vietnam it was also a form of reassurance; reaffirming, 
even if it was as a last ditch attempt, the individual's ability to control 
his mind, if not his body; if not his everyday existence then at least the 
way in which he interpreted it. It reflected less an experience with 
religion than a brutal confrontation with the subjective and arbitrary 
nature of all meaning. Like the revulsion/excitement of combat, and 
intimately connected with it, this unconstrained freedom of the individual 
to order their world raised possibilities for both ecstasy and despair. 
The problem with saying that the Vets are suffering from a spiritual 
malaise is that the same could be said of almost everyone in the US to some 
extent - indeed Carter did say it in the late 1970's. In the postwar 
cultural climate there is hardly anyone who has not come up against the 
profound relativism of all life; society and community, of course, are 
designed to either frustrate or compensate for these realisations, at the 
very least to keep them at bay. What separates the Vets off from the rest 
of the culture is thus the question of degree, and the fact that there was 
little community support for them when they came back. They were exposed 
suddenly and completely to an environment made completely relativistic by 
those things usually relied upon to give the World and our lives meaning: 
information and language. They came face to missing face with the 
arbitrary nature of morality, ethics, and spirituality and the absoluteness 
of death. The effect of talking about a "spiritual malaise" is thus to 
perpetuate the confusion, to locate the cause of the Vets' disaffection in 
a nebulous conjectural realm, almost completely severed from the social and 
political realm and issues of power and powerlessness. 
The Vet's experience is one of alienation and betrayal from the rest of 
US culture, yet there is also the realisation that even if there were not 
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this hostility, they stand out from other men because of their strange and 
terrible knowledge. 
We learned about death at an age when it is common to think 
of oneself as immortal. Everyone loses that illusion eventu-
ally, but in civilian life it is lost in installments over 
the years. We lost it all at once and, in the span of a few 
months, passed from boyhood through manhood to a premature 
middle age. The knowledge of death, of the implacable limits 
placed on a man's existence, severed us from our youth as 
irrevocably as a surgeon's scissors had once severed us from 
the womb. [RW, p. xv] 
This alienation is the source of a number of unresolved tensions within the 
Vet movement, not the least of which is a nostalgia for Vietnam and for the 
friendships that were made there. In Fields of Fire, Hodges, reassigned to 
Okinawa after being wounded, gives voice to an emotion that occurs 
repeatedly in the writings of Vets: 
He had missed the people in the bush more than he had ever 
missed any group of people in his life. There was a purity 
in those relationships that could not be matched anywhere 
else. A person's past was irrelevant, unless it affected his 
performance. A person's future was without exception bright: 
the Great Reward for doing battle awaited all of them in the 
World. There was a common goal and a mutual enemy. And the 
stakes were high enough to make each minor victory sweet, 
each loss a cause for grief. 8 
Yet most Vets cannot lose sight of the paradoxes that these feelings 
invoke: choices are more clear-cut and life more meaningful only in the 
context of a situation of almost staggering complexity; brotherhood and 
humanity become possible as the result of a most savage and barbarous 
disregard for human life; men feel affirmed in the midst of meaningless 
destruction. Caputo writes, "I could protest as loudly as the most con-
vinced activist, but I could not deny the grip the war had on me, nor the 
fact that it had been an experience as fascinating as it was repulsive, as 
exhilarating as it was sad, as tender as it was cruel" (RW, p. xvi). Many 
treasure that special knowledge at the same time as they are alienated by 
it and there is confusion over the form of recognition which they are to be 
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accorded, how they are to be re-integrated with society. But their experi-
ence is not collective, nor does it pretend to be universal. 
The literature of Vietnam is different from the literature of other 
wars in that it deals with not just the experience of combat, the savage 
inhumanity of war, or a loss of innocence and a fall into experience. Vet 
literature places a strong emphasis upon the individual's relationship to 
his culture and Vietnam is seen to involve the fall into experience of a 
terrifyingly innocent US political and social culture. The literature is 
heavily autobiographical, even confessional; there is ritual here but it is 
not a ritual of redemption. For the confession is not directed towards God 
but towards the US people - the confession that as soldiers they sinned 
against US culture, but that in doing so they were perhaps more sinned 
against. In this ritual there is no clergy that mediates between man and 
God in the article of confession. The mediator has become the media, but 
as of old there are forms to be observed and certain patterns develop in 
the responses despite the deeply personal, often idiosyncratic nature of 
the confession. 
The texts written by Vets are saturated with religious references and 
echoes, and seem to invoke the Vietnam experience as a profound spiritual 
event. A Rumour of War is prefaced with a quote from the Gospel of Matthew 
that details images of the Last Days. Dog Soldiers also opens with talk of 
the Last Days and there is the feeling of events winding up towards 
Apocalypse. But both texts and others like them, tend to use the religious 
references in order to suggest the problematic nature of the notion of 
spiritual crisis as it relates to Vietnam. There is an implicit 
recognition that the apocalypticism that the experience seems to involve, 
has become an integral part of postwar culture. After 40 years of being 
told that we are constantly living on the brink of global extermination, 
apocalypticism has become a fact of life, a description of the violence 
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that is characteristic of culture's process of transformation and mutation. 
Dog Soldiers is prefaced with a quote from Conrad's Heart of Darkness that 
suggests the decline in the force of "apocalyptic" passions: 
I've seen the devil of violence and the devil of greed and 
the devil of hot desire; but by all the stars! these were 
strong, lusty, red-eyed devils that swayed and drove men -
men, I tell you. But as I stood on that hillside, I foresaw 
that in the blinding sunshine of that land, I would become 
aquainted with a flabby, pretending weak-eyed devil of a 
rapacious and pitiless folly. 9 
Thus the "heroes" of the book are drug smugglers, the lead character's name 
is "Converse" and the final section of the book is played out amidst the 
searing heat and baked, shimmering flatness of the New Mexico desert; an 
image that suggests the entropic flatness of the emotional relationships in 
the novel. It also recalls Eliot's "not with a bang, but a whimper" 
speculation of the end of human affairs. 
In the same vein, Tim O'Brien's Going After Cacciato10 evokes a host of 
mythic and religious associations that range from Grail quests and trips 
into the underworld to the Fisher King and the persecution of Christ, only 
to subvert these and throw their powers of coherence into disarray through 
a narrative that is unstable and uncertain. Del Vecchio's The 13th 
Valley11 while it may echo both the biblical and Tennysonian Valleys of 
Death as well as drawing upon conventional unlucky associations, refers 
rather to the indistinguishable sameness, to Western eyes of the Vietnamese 
landscape; the title is drawn from a phrase used by an intelligence officer 
in a briefing in order to make the topography more comprehensible. Webb's 
Fields of Fire meanwhile, seems to reinforce a traditional perception of 
the battleground as a place of honour where men are baptised, where they 
obtain self-knowledge and possession: but the title is also a strategic 
term - a pragmatic exploitation of the terrain to give you the most 
effective means of destroying human beings. And the continuous religious 
references in Caputo's text are constantly subverted, disconnected and 
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re-attached to warlike associations: "Evening vespers began about seven 
o'clock, when the howitzers and mortars started firing their routine 
harassment missions" (RW, p. 222). What these Vets are describing is not 
merely a spiritual crisis but a crisis of spirituality. 
This calling into question of the very concept of spirituality stems 
partly from Vets' resentment and feelings of betrayal at the hands of 
secular religion: far more real to most Americans than the religions of God 
such as Catholicism, Judaism, Buddhism, are the religions that surround the 
Deific America - so special in the eyes of God that the country itself has 
assumed the mantle of Divine Authority. It is the US that the Vets feel 
has let them down. Harry Ashmore, again in a Center Magazine article, puts 
it thus: 
The most significant impact of Vietnam, then, was not upon 
those combat soldiers who endured it, but upon the whole 
college generation that avoided military service - and upon 
the establishmentarian elders who came to support their 
children in defiance of their own ingrained values .... The 
debacle in Vietnam was not merely a failure of arms, but a 
failure of patriotism - and patriotism, by definition, is a 
matter of faith. 12 
Although Ashmore downgrades the soldiers' experience based upon his belief 
that Vietnam was a war like any other, he does pinpoint quite clearly the 
cultural changes which led to much Vet disaffection. Many Vets point to an 
elitist withdrawal of responsibility which is reflected in the widespread 
failure of a large portion of the civilian culture to uphold its share of 
military service, both physically in the form of fighting, and morally in 
terms of supporting the fighting men when they were over there and when 
they came home. 
The depth of the disillusionment can be understood in terms of the 
strength of the illusions that reigned before the war. The investment of 
the US political system with an ultimate value to the point where it 
becomes a religion in its own right, is reflected in everything from the 
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religious phraseology that characterises its Foundation documents to a 
continual endorsement of its democratic ideals, even by those who are on 
the losing end of the system. At the beginning of the Vietnam War it was 
possible to look back to the US military and economic triumph in World War 
II and the relative stability of the fifties that seemed to be its reward 
and invoke a national mythology: the US had been called by God to a special 
destiny that lay in South East Asia. Caputo in particular is very bitter 
about this, with the ferocity that only a disillusioned former believer can 
possess. He is also in no doubt as to where the blame lies. He says that 
he and his colleagues were "seduced into uniform by Kennedy's challenge to 
"ask what you can do for your country" and by the missionary idealism he 
had awakened in us" (RW, p. xiv). Later he describes JFK as a "political 
witch doctor" (RW, p. 315) and says that "If he was the King of Camelot, 
then we were his knights and Vietnam our crusade" (RW, p. 66). 
W. P. Mahedy, in his article exploring the idea of the religious 
malaise, extends the crusade metaphor: 
Most veterans embraced the theology of our foreign policy. 
They went to Vietnam with great fervour to stop the onslaught 
of Godless Communism. Most were products of homes which were 
at least culturally Christian. Many former altar boys were 
among them. War - glorious war, that cultic act of civil 
religion - was unquestionable part of the mythology which 
gripped them as they went off to the great crusade in 
Southeast Asia. 13 
The reasons for the disaffection can be gauged when one compares the above 
with the reality. Caputo again: 
And then there was that inspiring order issued by General 
Greene: kill VG. In the patriotic fervour of the Kennedy 
years we had asked, "What can we do for our country?" and our 
country answered, "Kill VG" (RW, p. 218). 
While the metaphor of the crusade is undoubtedly one embraced by a large 
part of the nation, one needs to be wary about ascribing it as a motive for 
all soldiers. Certainly it was part of the experience of most soldiers and 
may have formed the framework of much of their initial understanding of 
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Vietnam. But the crusade against "godless communism" is a curiously middle 
class ideal, believed by many soldiers only at the level of rhetoric and 
becoming more problematic the more one experienced of the war. 
Many of those who fought in the early part of the war had joined the 
military rather than specifically signing up for Vietnam, even though this 
seemed the most likely focus of US action. The reasons they joined up were 
often various and had little to do with godless communism; Caputo himself 
admits that he joined mainly out of a sense of boredom with the SO's 
suburban lifestyle and out of a need to prove something about his manhood. 
Others - the majority - who lacked the middle class background of Caputo 
joined up because it got them out of either the ghetto or of one of the 
many depressed rural areas of the US: the military offered money, a career, 
status in the community, a sense of both camaraderie and self-worth. And 
there were many who joined up then, and later when war became an actuality, 
who wanted to fight, to experience the glorious combat that had formed the 
substance of Hollywood films and much of the literature of the culture. 
What the Vets cannot forgive the US is that the US cannot forgive them. 
Many see themselves as being condemned for doing their job in the service 
of a military that is a profession like any other, a profession that many 
Vets still regard as noble. Yet not quite like any other. For the job 
that soldiers are paid to do is to kill on behalf of a society and a 
culture irrespective of the reasons for doing so; whether they be offensive 
or defensive, moral or immoral, the soldier is paid to kill and run the 
risk of being killed so that others won't have to. As Caputo points out, 
they had done what their country had asked them to do, and their country 
had turned around and blamed them for doing it. 14 Many Vets came to see, 
while still in Vietnam, that as opposition to the war grew, so did 
opposition to them as people. They were waging terrible war for people who 
no longer wanted it. 
69 
The public's perception of the war was that it was not only brutal, but 
unnecessarily and immorally so. Much of this was due to the televising of 
the fighting, but Vets themselves acknowledge the savagery of the war. 
Caputo discusses the two most common explanations for US brutality: 1) US 
troops were racist; they found it easy to kill Asians because they regarded 
them as non-human; although this recalls the near pathological hatred of 
the Indian and their near genocide, this would seem to be far from a 
uniquely US vice, but perhaps one that afflicts all imperial, colonial 
powers; 2) A corruption of the Frontier thesis, the idea that Americans are 
inherently violent and pre-disposed towards confrontation and brutality. 
Caputo points out that there is a grain of truth in each hypothesis but 
that they ignore the atrocities inflicted upon the Vietnamese by the French 
and by their own people in the form of the ARVN, VG and NVA (the mass 
executions in Hue, for example). 
The evil was inherent not in the men - except in the sense 
that a devil dwells in us all - but in the circumstances 
under which they had to live and fight. The conflict in 
Vietnam combined the two most bitter forms of warfare, civil 
war and revolution, to which was added the ferocity of jungle 
war. Twenty years of terrorism and fratricide had 
obliterated most reference points from the moral map long 
before we arrived. [RW, p. xviii] 
Some observers have explained the US' hostile reception of its return-
ing soldiers by pointing out that people had not only become opposed to the 
Vietnam war, but increasingly to the idea of war in general; Vets were thus 
unpopular for what they had done but also for what they represented. While 
this may have been the point of view of some Americans the support that 
Reagan has received for the administration's military adventures indicates 
that opposition to the idea of war was not widespread or very deep-seated. 
The opposition was rather to a war that caused so much internal disruption 
in the US and in the minds of its people. When Americans looked at the 
Vietnam soldiers and what they had done, they saw a whole side of 
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themselves they had no wish to confront, and the soldiers became a 
scapegoat for the promise of the sixties that had turned sour. 
Mahedy argues that although the anti-war movement challenged the idea 
of the Holy Crusade, it too was rooted in special ideas about national 
destiny - the American nation had sinned against its special covenant by 
becoming involved in Vietnam. This idea of the Covenant was just a 
powerful as that of the crusade because it is an idea that goes back to the 
first Puritan settlements. Despite being perceived as such, the anti-war 
movement was not politically radical as far as the majority of its 
participants were concerned, nor was it particularly anti-American. They 
were opposed to the people in LBJ's government and to certain policies, but 
it was also somehow more American to oppose the war. The invocation of 
patriotism to oppose a government that seemed to disregard its moral 
responsibilities helps, in part to explain the strength of the movement and 
the intensity of the backlash against the Vets as agents of that moral 
bankruptcy. 
It also helps to explain the strength and success of the Conservative 
resurgence in the eighties which likewise employed a description of the 
culture that had a religious basis. God had deserted the US because it had 
violated other articles of its covenant in favour of liberalism, sexual 
permissiveness, flabby moral tolerance and so on, thus taking the liberal 
argument and standing its on its head; even to the point of advocating the 
original liberal evil, involvement in the affairs of other countries. This 
tendency to describe the cultural climate of the US in either explicitly 
religious terms or more general spiritual ones is thus far from new and not 
limited to any one ideological affiliation. To describe the experience of 
Vets in this way, to characterise their criticism of the US culture in 
terms of a spiritual crisis, is thus to co-opt their experience within a 
traditional perception of the US relationship to history. 
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The other major reason for the Vets' disillusionment is the shock to 
their more conventional religious sensibilities when they discovered that 
war is not merely inhuman, but anti-human; part of a more general postwar 
erosion of the humanistic worldview. Humanism allows for a range of 
thought from the Renaissance to high modernism, that credits man with some 
autonomy from the world and control over it. Even modernism, which repre-
sents the crisis of humanism, asserts that one may be divorced from direct 
contact with the world but still be able to order the representations of 
it. This Independence of the human spirit is seen to be almost meaningless 
in Vietnam where war is a matter of mobility, firepower, accuracy, the 
attainment of coded objectives and numerically identified identical hills. 
At first it seems that this changed nature of modern warfare is 
perceived by Lieutenant Sidney Martin in Going After Cacciato: 
He knew something was wrong with this war. The absence of a 
common purpose .... But the lieutenant knew that in war purpose 
is never paramount, neither purpose nor cause, and that 
battles are always fought among human beings, not purposes. 
He could not imagine dying for a purpose. Death was its own 
purpose, no qualification or restraint and war was the way. 
He did not celebrate war. He did not believe in glory. But 
he recognised the enduring appeal of battle: the chance to 
confront death many times, as often as there were battles. 
Secretly the lieutenant believed that war had been invented 
for just that reason - so that through repetition men might 
try to do better, so that lessons might be savoured and 
applied the next time, so that men might not be robbed of 
their own deaths. In this sense alone Sidney Martin believed 
in war as a means to ends. A means of confronting ending 
itself, many repeated endings. He was neither stupid nor 
full of bravado. He was quiet. He had blue eyes and fine 
blond hair and strong teeth. He was a professional soldier, 
but unlike other professionals he believed that the 
overriding mission,was the inner mission, the mission of 
every man to learn the important things about himself. 15 
The passage sheds light on the enduring appeal of war, which Caputo 
describes as "the ordinary man's most convenient means of escaping from the 
ordinary" (RW, p. 6). Yet Sidney Martin is only one of a number of voices 
and like most things in Going After Cacciato needs to be regarded with 
extreme caution. His belief evokes memories of Hemingway in another time 
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and expresses well the humanism that underlays modernism: talk of the inner 
mission, and war as an experience of self-discovery; the central humanist 
dictum that "man is the measure of all things" is expressed in Martin's 
belief that war is a mighty test laid on for Man's benefit. That 
lieutenant Sidney Martin's point of view may be outmoded is perhaps 
indicated by his undignified death when he is "fragged" by his own men, who 
obviously do not share his belief in war as a testing ground for the human 
spirit. 16 
Of a completely different character is the following piece from Dog 
Soldiers, where Hicks describes what he learned in Vietnam: 
One insight was that the ordinary physical world through 
which one shuffled heedless and half-assed toward non-entity 
was capable of composing itself, at any time and without 
notice, into a massive instrument of agonising death. 
Existence was a trap; the testy patience of things as they 
are might be exhausted at any moment. 
Another was that in the single moment when the breathing 
world had hurled itself screeching and murderous at his 
throat, he had recognised the absolute correctness of its 
move. In those seconds it seemed absurd that he had ever 
been allowed to go his foolish way, pursuing notions and 
small joys. He was ashamed of the casual arrogance with 
which he had presumed to scurry about creation. From the 
bottom of his heart he concurred in the moral necessity of 
his annihilation.17 
The view of human nature that is being presented here is one in which 
humanity has lost control completely and is now at the mercy of an envi-
ronment that is actively hostile. There is the sense that the destruction 
is personal, yet it seems to have no connection to anything else, no 
narrative; with a terrifying impersonality it just happens. 
War is still an act of discovery, but the nature of the discovery is 
vastly different. "In a manner of speaking, he had discovered himself. 
Himself was a soft, shell-less quivering thing encased in a hundred and 
sixty pounds of pink sweating meat. It was real enough. It tried to 
burrow into the earth. It wept. 1118 The use of the neutral "it" is 
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significant here and the passage as a whole bears a striking resemblance to 
Caputo's description of his experiences. 
The horror lay in the recognition that the body, which is 
supposed to be the earthly home of an immortal soul, which 
people spend so much time feeding, conditioning, and beauti-
fying, is in fact only a fragile case stuffed full of 
disgusting matter .... The sight of mutilation did more than 
cause me physical revulsion; it burst the religious myths of 
my Catholic childhood. I could not look at those men and 
still believe their souls had "passed on" to another 
existence, or that they had had souls in the first place. I 
could not believe those bloody messes would be capable of a 
resurrection on the Last Day. They did, in fact, seem "more" 
dead. Massacred or annihilated might better describe what 
had happened to them. Whatever, they were gone for good, 
body, mind and spirit. [RW, p. 121] 
The dis-covery here is often a quite literal uncovering of the body's 
workings. It is less a self-discovery than the dawning of the awful truth 
that the self is but one more fiction destroyed by the onset of violent 
death. As these conventional myths were undermined by wartime experience, 
for many soldiers the "meaning" of their lives in Vietnam, and sometimes 
after, lay almost solely in having survived. It lay in marking the days 
off on one's calendar, with all physical and mental progress relative to 
the day that one could catch the Freedom Bird home and away from Vietnam. 
Thus the quote from the Book of Matthew that prefaces A Rumour of War ends: 
"But he that shall endure unto the end, he shall be saved." This also 
illuminates the title of Dog Soldiers. Hicks recalls an old proverb to the 
effect that the live dog is revered more than the dead lion. Nothing 
matters if you don't survive. 
Conventional religious myths, like the myths that surround the religion 
of America, seek to bind men together by defining each man as a self-
sufficient whole, his self/soul is his own on loan from God. But this did 
not match up to the soldier's experience in Vietnam. 
I had begun to see almost everyone as they would look in 
death, including myself. Shaving in the mirror in the 
morning, I could see myself dead, and there were moments when 
I not only saw my own corpse, but other people looking at it. 
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I saw life going on without me. The sensation of not being 
anymore came over me at night, just before falling asleep. 
Sometimes it made me laugh inside; I could not take myself 
seriously when I could already see my own death; nor, seeing 
their deaths as well, could I take others seriously. We were 
all the victims of a great practical joke played on us by God 
or nature. Maybe that was why corpses always grinned. They 
saw the joke at the last moment. (RW, p. 219] 
Much that is described here runs counter to traditional religious mythology 
- the multi-layered nature of experience, superposition, the fear of not 
being, death as a natural yardstick, death as a moment that is both 
revelatory, inscrutable and final .... Faced with this, soldiers had to 
create their own mythology, their own way of describing the world and their 
experience. These descriptions are strongly personal in response to the 
breakdown in myths of collectivity and contain much that is both new and 
very old. Soldiers throughout the ages have, to an extent, made the same 
discoveries and come up with the need to create their own mythological 
version of reality. But the cultural context in which this act of re-
covery takes place does not remain static. Hemingway, for example, also 
creates his own mythology, but this is established through a number of 
cultural references to masculinity, honour, self-discovery and so on. This 
possibility of inflating one's personal rationale into a general cultural 
belief has become extremely problematic in the context of Vietnam. The 
failure of the older myths represents a failure of narrative, because it is 
by putting things within a narrative framework that we create meaning. 
This is usually a meaning based on accumulation; events follow each other 
in a series, thus the meaning of each individual event is based upon a 
continuity with its predecessors; based also on the "meaning" of the 
narrative as a whole and on the larger continuity of its relationship to 
other narratives. The relativism that this creates is obvious but up until 
the postwar period this was more or less held in check by cultural codes 
and by a traditional regard for the sanctity of context. 
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It is precisely this loss of context and disruption of a smooth 
continuity of events that has characterised both the Vets' experience in 
Vietnam, and the experience of the culture as a whole. The collapse of 
religious myths was coextensive with an undermining of the basis for 
collective action; the sense of community upon which mainstream organised 
religion depends. This failure of collectivism is also a failure of the 
individuality which it posits as its antithesis but which it must cultivate 
within itself in order to overcome. During the postwar period, and 
increasingly during the sixties, there is a rise in religious phenomena 
based around a surrender of individuality. On the one had there is an 
increase in cult worship with their fascist denial of the individual self 
in favour of the group, which in turn has its manifestation and fulfilment 
in the body of its leader. On the other hand the sixties seem to preside 
over a re-emphasis on the individual and the possibility of individual 
action; but self-discovery and self-actualisation increasingly become 
self-abandonment and a submergence of individualism in pantheistic 
philosophies: meditation, drugs, and so on. This has links with an 
American Transcendentalist tradition, but its appeal is also the lure of 
fascism. So getting in touch with oneself and liberating oneself from the 
shackles of role enforcement proceeds during the sixties in the form of 
large spectacles of collectivism: Be-Ins, Love-Ins, Sit-Ins, protest 
marches, and the rise of the massive outdoor rock rally. 
Herr's statement that: "There was nothing happening over there that 
hadn't already existed here, coiled up and waiting, back in the World" 19 
shows that the same processes that eroded the representational stability of 
communications in Vietnam were at work in mainstream US culture, turning 
each person, if not into an island, then into a very tiny nodal point 
amidst a technological lattice of an awesome and frightening complexity. 
What had happened to the Vet may not have made sense, may have been almost 
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unbearable in the awful intensity of its experience, but at least in 
Vietnam he was amongst men with whom he could share the experience, and if 
not exorcise it then at least be among those who understood its special 
terrors. The vets called the US "the World" out of recognition that it was 
a different place that might as well be no place. The World was at least 
nominally a province of sanity, normality, a life regulated by rules and 
their enforcement. But the soldiers lived for at least thirteen months and 
often longer, in a heart of darkness where they were required to perform 
deeds that were sometimes darker than any that either Kurtz or Conrad had 
contemplated. In Going After Cacciato, the soldiers communicate with the 
US via the Military Air Radio System, and its acronymic substitute might 
just as well be where they are calling for all that the day to day life of 
middle America has any relevance to their experience. 
It is inevitable that the US will create new myths and narratives to 
replace the old ones about Vietnam; a traumatic suspension of meaning and 
context is never permanent. But before the US can "confront" its history 
it needs to confront its culture; to confront the ways in which it makes 
its history and the mechanisms it uses to appropriate its past for purposes 
of the present and the future, to confront the construction of its need to 
confront. Instead it is apparent that the resultant discourse is less a 
response to Vietnam than a response to the trauma; US culture is moving 
quickly to fill the chasm that was left in its self-perception and give 
meaning to that which denied meaning. Thus the Vets' confrontation with a 
relativistic field of experience and the arbitrary nature of US culture is 
re-interpreted in terms of a traditional religious crisis. Co-extensive 
with this has been the classification of Vets in terms of a therapeutic 
model; to say that they are suffering from PTSD, as if this really 
signifies anything beyond their incorporation within a field of rational 
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scientific discourse. In this way Vietnam is once more designated as a 
field of study through the imposition of a pattern of observation. 
It is not immediately obvious that this is happening because the more 
traditional narrative is masked by a surface acceptance of Vietnam and the 
Sixties as a watershed event that profoundly altered the character of 
America. This is the "loss of consensus" argument which states that the 
period of the Sixties saw a breakdown in the broad political consensus that 
had reigned throughout the Fifties. In its place the US has evolved 
towards a more pluralistic worldview that is characterised by competing 
belief systems in the fields of both domestic politics and foreign policy. 
This argument is very plausible given the turmoil of the sixties but it 
ignores the way in which the "loss of consensus" relates only to a surface 
level of methods and actions, rather than more fundamental attitudes 
towards the US. This acceptance of the importance of Vietnam masks the way 
in which the unrest and trauma that surrounded Vietnam is being assumed 
into a cultural narrative that expresses a set of extremely traditional 
attitudes about the US and its place in the world. The conservatism that 
is revealed casts a pall over the glitzy surface of a discourse whose 
central contention is that Vietnam will not happen again. 
Two sociologists, Holsti and Rosenau, have analysed the consensus 
argument in some depth in two articles. 20 They mailed a questionnaire to 
representatives of a broad spectrum of leadership roles that ranged from 
governmental positions to labour leaders, in order to gauge the impact of 
Vietnam upon decision-making. Their study found an initial agreement that 
the US should learn from past mistakes, but beyond this there existed deep 
cleavages in attitude towards the significance of Vietnam and what could be 
learned from it. Their hypothesis of Vietnam as a watershed tended to be 
supported by the success of their initial classification: knowing where 
someone stood on the Vietnam War gave a strong indication of where they 
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stood on other foreign policy issues. While they acknowledge that the 
existence of opposed extremes is not in itself an indication of a breakdown 
in consensus - even the consensus of the forties and fifties had its 
critics - these dissenting elements represented nearly a third of the 
sample and are therefore hardly fringe elements. The authors conclude: 
"These differences appear to be embedded within and sustained by 
well-defined clusters of supporting beliefs that extend from conceptions of 
the international system to the most effective means by which the United 
States should pursue its foreign policy goals. 1121 
There are however a number of points about Holsti and Rosenau's 
methodology that demonstrate the problematic nature of both cultural change 
and its perception; although the authors are arguing for a loss of consen-
sus, many of their analytical assumptions are founded on a traditional set 
of beliefs about the way in which US culture operates. Daniel Hallin, in 
his study of journalistic reporting of the war22 , has argued that the 
political sphere is divided into three realms: the sphere of consensus 
(non-controversial beliefs), the sphere of legitimate controversy and the 
sphere which contains those views that are held to be unworthy of being 
heard. Most of the questions in Holsti and Rosenau's survey deal with the 
mechanisms of US involvement, and attitudes towards the rest of the world, 
without examining whether the core beliefs and self-perceptions of US 
foreign and domestic policies (Hallin's realm of consensus) have been 
affected. US involvement in Angola for example, occurring immediately 
after Vietnam, indicated a change to support for limited military 
engagement and restraint on spending upon covert activities and client 
regimes; but fact of involvement in Angola tends to support that the thesis 
that US perceptions about itself and its place in the world remain 
unchallenged. In this regard their survey also fails to examine the third 
political realm to determine whether attitudes to those who were beyond the 
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pale, (communists, atheists, etc.) have changed. The reason for this may 
lie in the way in which the form of their research is based upon a very 
American espousal of individuality. They assume that it is the individuals 
themselves that wield the power. Individuals in leadership roles however, 
always act through institutions, and Holsti and Rosenau's work is lacking 
an analysis of the structural and procedural elements that shape 
decision-making, as well as of the perceptual modes and categories which 
permeate institutional functions. 
Problems with the consensus theory become even more evident in the 
second part of their research which examines the idea that the cleavages in 
belief systems are primarily generational in origin. Broadly, the division 
is between the World War II "Munich" generation and the Vietnam generation: 
between isolation and its consequences, and involvement and its 
consequences. Their description of generational cut-off points is purely 
arbitrary but it is a pretty safe assumption that the wars of this century 
represent significant benchmarks. The authors have also placed a special 
emphasis on late adolescence and early adulthood: this is where belief 
formation and development takes place, but it also encompasses eligibility 
for voting and military service - consciousness of and involvement in 
foreign affairs may thus be heightened by the prospect of personal 
involvement. Their results however, indicate only moderate support for the 
generational thesis; instead they tend to indicate that differences within 
generations are far more significant; that generational identification by 
itself carries a rather modest load of information about a person, although 
the task is made easier if the generations are widely separated. 
Occupations prove far more significant; if a persons's occupation is known, 
guesses can be made about their socialisation influences such as education, 
group membership, professional norms and so on. 
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The major problem with this is one that is admitted by Holsti and 
Rosenau: they are examining the attitudes of the leadership group that is 
on its way out, rather than the generation that came of age during the 
Vietnam war. Their sample does not adequately represent the younger members 
of the Vietnam generation - those who were of College age during the 
Vietnam War. This may be an even more serious flaw than the authors 
realise, because presumably it also excludes large number of those men who 
actually fought there. It may even be that the impact of Vietnam will be 
even greater upon those individuals coming of age now, who have access not 
only to a variety of textual records and memories of the trauma, but also 
to more information about decisions, policies, and events than was 
available to those involved; and now also to the same amount of information 
concerning the US re-examination of all this material. But the reason why 
the work of Holsti and Rosenau throws up little support for the 
generational thesis lies in the problematic nature of the term 
"generation". The assumption that the authors make, one perhaps inscribed 
within the word itself, is that you can draw lines to designate a temporal 
categorisation of people. "Generation" implies a fixed point from which 
other elements are produced or follow - the loose flow of births and deaths 
makes this impossible. "Generations" are not distinct in time, they merge 
into one another in just the same way that groups of people do not start 
anew with their belief patterns, but are extensively socialized by a 
variety of cultural factors; these may undergo change but not all at once, 
thus creating a flow-through of certain beliefs: core beliefs about the 
society. Foreign Policy preferences may change but the core beliefs upon 
which they are based rarely do. 
Lau, Brown and Sears effectively undermine the basis of the fractured 
consensus theory with their study of civilian attitudes to the Vietnam 
War. 23 Their starting point is the notion of self-interest. By 1968 
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almost 30% of the US population had relatives or friends who had served or 
were serving in Vietnam; theories of self-interest argue that the 
ever-present possibility that these people could be killed or maimed could 
be expected to shape attitudes to the war. "The theoretical polarity, 
then, is between, on the one hand, need-satisfaction or cost-benefit 
theories which essentially take a drive-reduction point of view - people 
adopt the attitudes that pay off for them in a reinforcement, incentive, or 
functional sense - and on the other hand, a non-motivational "symbolic 
politics" alternative invoking early conditioning plus later consistency -
people learn their attitudes early, then interpret later issues in terms of 
their consistence with earlier attitudes. 1124 Simply then, if self-interest 
prevails, then those whose relatives are exposed to death and injury in 
Vietnam will be opposed to the war. 
The authors found that Vietnam was more salient as a political issue 
among the self-interested but the statistical correlation was disappoint-
ingly weak. They also found, contrary to expectations, that the self-
interested with relatives in Vietnam were more likely to feel that the war 
was the right thing, although the correlation was again weak. Overall, 
symbolic attitudes proved to be most predictive of attitudes to the war, 
even to the point of influencing a consistency between attitudes to the war 
and perceptions of the Presidential candidates and their positions. The 
authors concluded: 
Whether or not people relate policy issues to their long-
standing symbolic commitments depends, therefore, a great 
deal upon the issue and its symbolic meaning. And it could 
well be that this ability, or inability, of the public to 
deal with an issue at a symbolic level has a great deal to do 
with the effectiveness of governmental policy on it. When 
the public cannot relate an issue to familiar symbols, either 
positive or negative, government efforts may simply flounder, 
as was the case in Vietnam and the energy situations. 25 
There are then, a number of problems with the theory that the post-
Vietnam US is suffering from a breakdown in political and social consensus. 
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The theory of loss of consensus, like notions of self-interest, preswnes 
that hwnans are rational actors: given the turmoil of the sixties they will 
experience uncertainty and diversity and learn a variety of different 
lessons from the US Vietnam experience. Much of the research is thus 
already weighted towards looking for patterns of diversity rather than 
coherence. What evidence there is for a loss of consensus is undermined by 
a tendency to look only at methods and their application, particularly in 
the foreign policy arena, rather than the system of beliefs and symbols 
that maintains them. 
This insistence upon a loss of consensus is another term for the 
"malaise" - also known as Post-Vietnam Syndrome - from which, many claimed, 
the US was suffering throughout the seventies. This decade is widely 
perceived as a time of weakness and uncertainty where the US proved unable 
to exert any influence over its domestic economic situation. Here, and in 
the sphere of international politics, the US seemed to be at the mercy of 
foreign countries that were able to take advantage of US weakness and walk 
all over it - in much the same way as the country of Vietnam had done, it 
seemed. This malaise, this lack of consensus was seen to be a bad thing, 
something which needed to be overcome, but the bias inherent in this 
attitude perhaps indicates how little the fundamental consensus had been 
altered. 
This conservatism is especially prevalent amongst many Vets as a result 
of the many tensions that remain unresolved in their attitudes towards 
Vietnam. Most Vets acknowledge that a part of themselves bears a strong 
affection for their experience in Vietnam, and in terms of 
self-justification this often spills over into a need to affirm the moral 
correctness of their presence in Vietnam. One example is John Wheeler, a 
former chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund and identified by a 
1985 TIME article as Head of the Securities Exchange Commission. He 
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attempts to come to grips not just with his experience in Vietnam but with 
the way in which it shaped the experience of a whole generation. 
If the Vietnam War is taken as extending from 1959-1975 (the 
official date of the first and last American casualties) 30 
million women and 30 million men reached draft age during the 
war; ten million of the men wore the uniform, three million 
of them went to Vietnam, about 300,000 were wounded and 
nearly 60,000 died. The big question is how the 60 million 
of us matured, how we were transformed and divided by our 
journey to adulthood. 26 
The importance of this generation is obvious when one considers that their 
active political life will extend well into the 2020's and they will be a 
decisive factor in the next ten presidential elections. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that at least some of the presidents will be drawn 
from the ranks of the Vietnam Vets, as most presidents since Truman have 
been World War II veterans. The fact that Vietnam has exercised a major 
influence on these people is therefore very important. 
Wheeler accepts that there was a contract of silence, 27 not just within 
the Vietnam generation but also on the part of many of the World War II 
generation who were architects of the Vietnam era policies. He sees their 
silence as reflecting deep division within the culture. Those who were not 
in uniform feel estranged from those who were, as if they had somehow 
failed to perform an expected rite of passage. Those who were in uniform 
feel that they were looked down upon because of it. 
As a Vietnam veteran, I take pride in my service. Like most 
veterans I believe that going to Vietnam was like going into 
hell, and that we went in the true spirit of self-sacrifice. 
But it took years for this self-affirmation to surface and, 
without it, Veterans experienced an unhealthy separation of 
self from self. I am thankful this sense of affirmation is 
spreading. 28 
Wheeler sees this affirmation as having a number of positive results. He 
argues that Vets are being accorded a late but strong recognition of their 
contribution and in many cases this is being translated into political 
authority. Dan Quayle would have been a good example - had he actually 
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made the contribution he led everyone to believe he'd made. In many ways 
Quayle stands for all that is outwardly good but inwardly problematic about 
Wheeler's argument. 
Wheeler for example also regards the US as being the first major 
culture in which men and women share policy-making power - and by anyone's 
standards the US has a long way to go here. He also sees that the anti-war 
passions aroused during Vietnam have been insufficiently digested or spent; 
if an unpopular war broke out a massive protest movement could block 
successful US participation - this, he implies, would be a bad thing. The 
problem is that his sense of affirmation often tips over into jingoism. 
Our troops in Vietnam succeeded in eliminating the Viet Cong 
as a principal adversary in the battle of Tet 1968 and then 
depleting the North Vietnamese regular forces to the point 
where the United States could obtain the cease-fire and peace 
of 1973. This is how young veterans see the results of their 
ground battles. They know that they accomplished their 
military task. They know that the slaughter of civilians at 
My Lai was an exception to the general rule that American 
soldiers respected the most complex and restrictive rules of 
engagement ever placed on troops in a battle zone. Those who 
were staff officers know that they successfully operated the 
longest and most complex line of military logistics and 
communication in history. In the eyes of the veterans, these 
things are a source of pride.29 
Much of what Wheeler maintains here runs directly counter to the testimony 
of many Vets. This is hardly surprising as he dismisses the literature on 
the war as being retrospective rather than introspective or prospective; 
while it is true that the literature often avoids looking into the future, 
it is nothing if not introspective. 
Wheeler argues that the recent social and political success of the Vet 
"confirms one of the fundamental attributes of most cultures: that those 
who put themselves in harm's way for the sake of the community earn the 
community's respect 11 • 30 This new respect accorded Vets will mean, according 
to Wheeler, that in the coming decades the US will be the only major world 
power whose most senior government ranks include a significant number of 
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men who have experienced war; who possess and understanding of logistics, 
of the difficulties of reporting and controlling battlefield events, as 
well as possessing a personal knowledge of the guerilla fighter and of the 
limits of technology. Whether this bestows any benefit upon US society as 
a whole is dubious, especially when one considers that it was a generation 
of similarly experienced World War II men who blundered the US into Vietnam 
in the first place. Far more men served in the Second World War than in 
Vietnam, so the effect of their "wisdom" should have been correspondingly 
greater. Wheeler concludes: "The new respect and emerging political voice 
accorded Vietnam Veterans illuminates the generation as a whole. It is a 
confirmation of two values that are fundamental to a strong foreign policy: 
the principle of honouring our commitments and the belief that there are 
things worth dying for 11 • 31 It seems a small step from this to a "Better 
Dead than Red" sort of statement, and sits oddly with Wheeler's claim that 
Vets show no significant sign of the bitterness that created a hunger for 
military display in post-World War I Germany. In fact, it can be argued 
that a dissatisfaction bordering on bitterness with the impotency of the US 
during the 1970's swept Reagan and a new reactionary conservatism to power 
in 1980, and has since then manifested itself in massive defence spending, 
the jingoistic spectacle of the Los Angeles Olympics, and a succession of 
new military interventions. 
Now it may well be that there was a breakdown in consensus within the 
decision-making elite that came of age in World War II as the result of the 
foundering of an older ideology in Vietnam, and other literature tends to 
support this. 32 It is also possible that there was an intellectual lack of 
consensus amongst Americans at large, but in practical, functional terms, 
the symbolic level of political thought and motivation prove to have 
emerged substantially unchanged from the turbulence of the sixties - and it 
is this irrational level at which people relate to the arena of US politics 
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that influences people's belief. This gives rise to the conservatism of 
the Reagan years with its emphasis - surprise, surprise - on the core 
values and symbols of America: unity, strength, moral fortitude, religion, 
plain-but-tough-talking, home, the family, chastity and so on. In times of 
stress the US has always returned to its symbolic, largely Puritan, roots 
and this conservatism has never been far from the surface of the Vietnam 
issue. The series of articles run by The Center Magazine, many of which 
have been quoted here, elicited the following responses from a selection of 
readers. 33 
James R. Groundwater talks of "a steady decline of national 
integrity accompanied by an increasing unreadiness to enforce 
our laws." 34 
Anthony L. Wermouth claims that "In response to desperate 
requests from a sovereign nation being unquestionably 
aggressed against, America shed blood and treasure, as 
America had done in both World Wars. Though done partly in 
its own interests, this was, on the whole, a humane and 
generous performance on our part." Although evoking a wider 
context for the war he re-invokes a number of classic 
conservative cliches: "Our forces were not defeated; they 
were withdrawn."35 
Alan L. Benosky in a piece strikingly reminiscent of Lau et 
al states: "Our efforts in Vietnam represent a failure of 
leadership which neglected to make the war intelligible for 
Americans It could have been done had our opinion-makers been 
as enthusiastic about the war as they had been about World 
War II." He ties this in with an assessment of the US itself: 
For many years our national ideology and education have 
tended to erode people's patriotism, loyalty and sense of 
duty. These values are not as strong as they used to be. 
Our culture and educational systems have emphasized rights 
more than obligations, producing a kind of every-man-a-king 
attitude. 1136 
The expression of traditional symbolic attitudes is obvious. This sort of 
attitude even crops up in the research literature. Smith et al, in their 
investigation into PTSD conclude: "Research efforts that illuminate this 
normal process and clarify appropriate interventions facilitating recovery 
will enrich us all, for the strength and moral character honed in this 
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process have already begun to lead us from our national post-Vietnam 
malaise." 37 
The substance of the conservative view is accurate at the same time as 
its underlying motivation is anachronistic. A lack of consensus does exist 
in that the US is now a more culturally diverse, pluralistic, fragmented 
culture than ever before. There has been a loss of the authority vested in 
universal truths and a calling into question of all the old absolutes. But 
functionally, on an administrative level, the US retains the ideologies of 
unity, home, family, etc., in the structures of its institutions and in the 
minds of those who work within their walls. The fact that the US 
government is predicated upon a system of checks and balances ensures, 
however pluralistic the inputs and negotiations within the actual 
structures, that ideas of consensus and either unified action or no action 
at all will predominate. While the experience of the culture may be 
pluralistic, the bureaucratic process by which the government makes its 
decisions makes sure that all the pluralistic confusion of people's lives 
is translated into unified, monotheistic policy options. Bureaucracy after 
all sustains systems of consensus as the cultural enshrinement of a rage 
for order and procedure. 
The most serious implications of the longevity of symbolic politics 
derive from the conservative attitude towards history. They claim to be 
returning to History, to be learning from it, both in the sense of return-
ing to fundamental values and processes and re-examining specific issues in 
a new light: hence the re-examination of Vietnam. But an acceptance of 
history as an unproblematic field of study, coupled with a denial of the 
relativism that has evolved as a feature of Western culture means that they 
are not so much returning to history as escaping from it. By assuming that 
it is possible to step outside history and analyse it, one only becomes 
embroiled more deeply in its contrRdictions. This attitude has manifested 
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itself in a quest for the "lessons of Vietnam". Like all apocalyptic, 
revelatory events, Vietnam must be capable of teaching us something. But 
the idea that we can learn essential, absolute truths from history, other 
than from within a highly subjective framework, is now extremely 
problematic - such lessons are, at best, highly selective and usually only 
of a temporary nature. It is worrying that many of the "lessons" of 
Vietnam seem to be how to avoid it happening again - and this relates 
primarily to more efficient military techniques. How To Avoid It Happening 
Again By Doing It Better Next Time. 
An article by David Fromkin and James Chace, appropriately titled "What 
Are the Lessons of Vietnam1138 exemplifies many of these points. It is 
remarkable in that it juxtaposes some insightful comments on the US 
involvement in Indochina with a subtle, yet virulently reactionary 
framework for the present. Fromkin and Chace argue that the whole attempt 
to find lessons in Vietnam is based upon finding a unifying metaphor for 
the past. For this a consensus about the past must exist. In fact 
Americans do not all have a similar perception of what happened in 
Indochina, and this has been created and exacerbated by Governmental 
ignorance and irrationality, arguments over how the US became involved, and 
so on. They cite the War Powers Act as an attempt by Congress to learn 
from history which has not however, restrained President Reagan from 
military intervention. 
The authors talk about the ways in which US involvement distorted Third 
World realities by viewing them solely as East-West conflicts, but then 
have this to say: 
What was wrong in backing a weak, corrupt, inefficient regime 
against a brutally powerful, fanatically puritanical, 
ruthlessly efficient adversary was that our side was likely 
to lose. 
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It is fundamental that when we intervene abroad we should 
do so on behalf of a cause powerful enough so that we stand a 
chance of winning. 39 
Quite apart from perpetuating a number of nasty stereotypes of the Asian 
enemy and an "us or them" attitude, the implications of this statement are 
that the US should reserve the right to intervene anywhere in the world 
based upon whether the US can come out of it looking good or not, rather 
than considering its effects upon the country or the world as a whole. 
This type of thinking was behind the invasion of Grenada, which the authors 
not surprisingly regard as a success. Fromkin and Chace also talk of the 
"North Vietnamese leadership who, far from giving priority to the quest for 
prosperity, were prepared to suffer and to impose suffering on their people 
in order to obtain their objectives. 1140 This ignores the fact that the US 
did the same thing to its "side". It also equates Vietnamese motivations 
and aspirations unproblematically with those of the US, and smacks of the 
attitude of those who cite the Boat People and the butchery in Kampuchea as 
justification for the moral rightness of US intervention in Indochina, 
without considering that they may be culpable in the savagery of the region 
after the US withdrew. 
The disturbing facet of this article is that it is explicitly aimed at 
finding lessons from Vietnam to apply to the US experience in Central 
America. The authors conclude by acknowledging that the lessons from 
Vietnam are not self-evident. 
The lesson of Vietnam, if there is one, cannot be applied 
because we still do not agree about what happened. Far from 
helping to clarify policy issues in Central America or the 
Middle East, appeals to the lessons of Vietnam merely 
compound a conflict about current policy with an argument 
about history. Reference to Vietnam4 therefore, is at this 
point divisive rather than unifying. 1 
There is no need to read between the lines here. Fromkin and Chace are 
explicit in their denial of history as having any importance for political 
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decision-making. The unity they are talking about is rather a lack of 
criticism, a sort of wistfulness that began cropping up in the late 
seventies, that if everyone would just stop criticising the US and accept 
that it was a great country then a lot more would get done a lot faster. 
But globally and within the US consensus and unity function only as 
illusions. To refuse to attempt to learn any lessons is to succumb to a 
loss of any sense of history, and a sense of history is perhaps one of the 
last vestiges of power left open to people. For there are lessons to be 
learned, even if what we mean by "lessons" and "learning" is now not so 
unproblematic: lessons about cultural interaction, procedures and 
assumptions of governments, interaction between groups - even the lesson of 
the impossibility of stable representational lessons is one which most 
people in our culture have yet to acknowledge. The alternative favoured by 
Fromkin, Chace and all those who in subtle and not so subtle ways perceive 
a loss of consensus and grieve for it, is to let the government do what it 
likes under the nebulous assumption that it knows best. 
The problem is not always one of a deliberate desire to distort; 
operating under older preconceptions also contributes to a critical 
conservatism: as is evident, for example, in Caputo's introduction. "This 
book does not pretend to be history. It has nothing to do with politics, 
power, strategy, influence, national interests or foreign policy; nor is it 
an indictment of the great men who led us into Indochina and whose mistakes 
were paid for with the blood of some quite ordinary men" (RW, p, xiii). Of 
course the book has much to do with everything that Caputo denies here, and 
the implication, shared by most Vet literature, that a personal account is 
somehow more truthful, politically and theoretically innocent is one that 
is not supportable in the present US cultural context. The facts do not 
speak for themselves, they are extremely complicat.ed puppets that can be 
made to appear to move rather simply and obediently; and the apoliticism of 
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Caputo and others surrenders this power unopposed to forces of cultural 
appropriation, human and mechanistic, and to "the forces of history" which 
are very far from being an innocent determinism. 
The "crisis" of Vietnam is part of an Old World literal fixation with 
truth and meaning which has proved replicatory rather than revelatory. A 
critique of US involvement in Indochina is thus deeply flawed by a lack of 
self-reflection, in every sense of the term. The perception of Vietnam as 
a religious crisis and a national trauma, as a failure of national will, 
focuses almost exclusively on what that decade was, rather than how it was, 
and is, seen to be what it was. It ignores the way in which Western, and 
particularly US culture in the postwar period has steadily evolved in the 
direction of constituting itself as being in a state of perpetual crisis. 
So the current re-examination of US involvement in Vietnam argues that 
Vietnam was the crisis of postwar culture and ignores the way in which 
culture continually feeds off the spectacle of crises, even to the point of 
positing the re-examination process itself as one of crisis. 
It is understandable that many people, Vets in particular, may feel 
uncomfortable with a discussion of the political aspects of the war, for 
fear that it will stir up bad memories, literally rattle a few skeletons 
and maybe obscure current issues. But that obscuration is taking place 
anyway, in such a way as to blind many people to the US cultural processes, 
particularly the tendency of the present to engulf the past and turn it 
into spectacle, appropriating it for its own purposes. This of course has 
political and ideological aspects that cannot be separated from the 
cultural ones and indeed often seem to hide behind them. All the post-
structuralist theory that stresses the way in which we do not write but are 
written has fallen on deaf ears. For we are written, culturally, 
aesthetically, morally, and ultimately politically. And it is more than 
cheap conspiracy theory that leads one to believe that the whole 
92 
confrontation with the "evil" of Vietnam is being used to seemingly close 
the book on the past, while at the same time the page is prepared, and the 
material already written for another chapter in an older narrative. 
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WE GOTTA GET OUTTA THIS PLACE ... 
It was a matter of hard observation. Separating illusion from 
reality .... Doc was right about that. He was right, too, that observation 
requires inward-looking, a study of the very machinery of observation - the 
mirrors and filters and wiring and circuits of the observing instrument. 
Insight, vision. What you remember is determined by what you see, and 
what you see depends on what you remember. A cycle, Doc Peret had said. A 
cycle that has to be broken. And this requires a fierce concentration on 
the process itself: Focus on the order of things, sort out the flow of 
events so as to understand how one thing led to another, search for that 
point at which what happened had been extended into a vision of what 
might've happened. Where was the fulcrum? Where did it tilt from fact to 
imagination? 
Going After Cacciato, p. 198. 
The words and pictures of Vietnam are ghosts, alive as anything dead 
and unreal can be; they exist as images but interact with the world only 
through our perceptions of, and relations to, the illusion of their 
presence. There have been several factors that have prompted a renewed 
US interest in the period of the Vietnam war: Vets demands for special 
recognition of their adjustment problems, a cultural context imbued with a 
new nationalistic confidence, a more general re-examination of the Sixties, 
and perceived similarities between Vietnam and the next likely arena for US 
intervention, Central America. By far the most influential single 
factor, even though they cannot be separated from the cultural climate from 
which they are derived, is the appearance of the various films on Vietnam: 
primarily Platoon and Full Metal Jacket but more recently Hamburger Hill, 
Gardens of Stone and Good Morning Vietnam. These films are all striking 
portrayals of the Vietnam "experience" and have served as vehicles upon 
which to mount a diverse range of discussions concerning US involvement in 
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Vietnam. The films themselves however, tend to exhibit a markedly 
unproblematic attitude toward their status as yet more visual 
representations of a war that was so extensively, and particularly 
visually, represented. There have been few attempts to relate these 
films to previous films that dealt with Vietnam, or to the larger context 
of films that have been released since the Vietnam war; also lacking is 
criticism of the way in which the new Vietnam films depend for their impact 
upon a larger familiarity with images of Vietnam that have permeated our 
culture. For in the wider cultural context, the thing that has been 
summoning all the ghosts from where they've been hiding, if indeed they 
have been, is the one spectre of Vietnam that never died: a culture of 
media saturation, glutted with information, intrapenetrated with 
overdetermined images and ephemeral meanings. 
There is a strong link between this media saturation and informational 
overload, and what has come to be known as the cult of the spectacle. The 
spectacular, as Hal Foster remarks, is central to a great deal of 
postmodern artistic production. "In the commodity and spectacle all types 
of productive labour and material support are erased; they fascinate us 
because they exclude us, place us in the passive position of the dreamer, 
spectator, consumer 11 • 1 Foster argues that our society is, in particular, 
fascinated with images of fascism, whether it be on the grand scale of 
cultural production appropriated by fascism, or in terms of a reactionary 
individualism. This fascination with the spectacle compensates for the 
"loss of the real" (the lack of distinction between subject and object, 
mass and individual, pop and high culture, the ungrounding of traditional 
cultural distinctions) during the rise of consumerism in the fifties; in 
Freudian terms, a fetish object has been made of the period preceding this 
- the period of the Depression and the heyday of Nazism, but also the 
nationalistic rhetoric and symbols of the New Deal (imaged to some extent 
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by most countries during this period, although most intensely in Nazi 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the US) and the invigorating spectacle of nations 
banding together in wartime. 
Foster's description of the spectacle makes it obvious that the 
spectacle itself possesses many of the attributes of fascism. One thinks 
of Nazis at Nuremburg: lines, symmetry, order, human and musical 
orchestration, individuality submerged within the powerful collective mass; 
a spectacle that places us in "the passive position of the dreamer, 
spectator, consumer" with all material support apparently erased. It is a 
grandeur that achieves its full effect not from participating, but from 
watching; this observance, indeed the power of the spectacle is fully 
realised as spectacle when it is filmed. So our society is not so much 
fascinated by images of fascism as it is mesmerised by the fascist nature 
of the spectacle. It is not merely images themselves that compensate for 
the lack of the real, but the way in which they are presented. 
Fascism relates to the paradoxical attainment of an enhanced 
individuality through a surrender to the communal mass. It has 
quasi-religious elements and the relationship to objects, aesthetic and 
political is characteristic of iconography; certain values, structures, 
institutions and personages are enshrined within or as images, which 
themselves take on a sacred character: pictures of the leader, national 
symbols and quotations, words of the leader and so on. Fascism, as is the 
case with all ideologies also employs history in order to constitute itself 
as ideology: confining the flux of events into a narrative that portrays 
experience as a logical sequence involving the slow revelation of the logic 
of the particular ideology. 
The spectacular, with its fascist tendencies is manifested in a 
diversity of cultural forms ranging from the spectacular presentations of 
Phillip Glass and Robert Wilson through MTV and cable television to the big 
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budget musicals such as Les Miserables and Phantom of the Opera. On the 
political level it can be seen in the US public's fascination with the 
spectacle of corruption - Watergate, Irangate etc.: what seems to outsiders 
like self-flagellation in the form of a public airing of the dirtiest 
laundry, is not so much a desire to get at the truth (neither the Watergate 
nor Irangate hearings have), but to indulge in the spectacle of Wrongdoing, 
perhaps, as Foster says, to revel masochistically in the degree to which 
these events reveal that the public, and the tenets of democracy have been 
excluded or ignored. 
The spectacle comes into its own in postmodern culture because 
it benefits from an advanced level of technology, not only to create its 
illusions, but to erase the evidence of their creation; to present us with 
apparently "seamless" images and products. It is this fascination 
with perfection expressed through increasingly complicated and 
visually startling images, such as those found in Rock videos, that 
characterises postmodern popculture. Bernard Sharratt provides an analysis 
of forms of popular entertainment from 19th century melodrama to 
(post)modern television culture. 2 Sharratt limits his definition to the 
working class but it is obvious that many of the entertainments that he 
lists are patronised by all classes. While Sharratt acknowledges that his 
analysis is merely a starting platform, and seems to by-pass a more 
comprehensive theory of representation and audience-performer 
relationships, his study raises questions about the ways in which we relate 
to popular entertainment; it also has strong links with Foster's treatment 
of the spectacle with its fascist impulse. Sharratt's theory suggests that 
popular entertainment is not escapist in the conventional sense. Indeed, 
large numbers of popular entertainment forms seem to involve the experience 
of an actual or vicarious fear; the circus, fairground rides, horror films, 
97 
war films, disaster movies, supernatural terror films, even some sporting 
events. 
Two characteristics of popular entertainment are evident most clearly 
in relation to sporting events, but upon reflection, in other cultural 
forms as well. The first is that the spectator is always their own expert; 
the sports watcher knows what the referee and players ought to do. This 
assumption of spectator expertise is also pandered to in many other popular 
entertainment forms: quiz programmes, games shows, and even the news. 
While viewing TV programmes, and to a lesser extent while watching films in 
the cinema, the viewer will often pass asides to fellow viewers, or address 
the characters and action on the screen, even to the extent of offering 
advice (as in 19th century melodrama) of the "look out behind you" variety. 
The second characteristic of popular entertainment is that the specta-
tor will often claim knowledge of the performers as persons, to a degree 
that may even approach the level of a personal friendship: referring to the 
performer by his/her first name, demonstrating a knowledge of their family, 
and so on. This is the obviously the case with sporting heroes but also 
manifests itself in a fascination with the most trivial and banal details 
of the lifestyles of the rich and famous, and with the Western adulation 
for British royalty. "What is perhaps being displaced, or compensated for, 
here is a relative lack of kinds of knowledge elsewhere. Since the people 
who actually control our society are not known personally to many of us, 
and since the systematic nature of that control is itself difficult to 
grasp, it may become important to assert an expertise and 
quasi-acquaintance-ship in areas which at least masquerade as important 11 • 3 
The form of popular entertainment that embodies these characteristics 
most fully is the News. The presentation of events is geared toward a 
subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) dichotomising of situations, placing 
them in the context of traditional n~rratives and frameworks; current 
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affairs presentation extends to the viewer the implication that s/he has 
considerably more knowledge concerning a given situation than they may 
actually possess. The assumption is that the viewer can be presented with 
the "facts" and make an informed, reasoned judgement based upon carefully 
weighed alternatives. 
This is, of course, completely false; the alternatives are not weighed, 
but rather weighted before they reach the viewer. The presentation of 
"issues" upon which a judgement (often, it seems, with heavy biblical 
overtones) needs to be pronounced is itself a valorisation, the need to 
make a judgement is not an objective fact but rather a product of the 
presentation of "news". Such a judgement is not hard to make as the 
"facts" often amount to little more than the most readily marketable 
packets of sensation, stripped of all contextual ties, other than those the 
media selects to highlight. This is coupled with the intensely visual 
' 
nature of "news" presentation where everything revolves around the 
enhancement of the film images - the frontperson's speech is mere 
introduction to visuals, rather than a distinct commentary, and this is 
underscored by the widespread practice of displaying a picture, graphic, or 
even the channel logo for the items for which there is no actual film; if 
it is an ongoing "story" these static visuals preserve a sense of 
continuity with earlier footage and help to give the issue a recognisable 
identity in the viewers mind. In the same way a film "voice-over" 
could be more accurately termed a "voice-under"; the application of the 
original term may have reflected a niggling doubt that the image was out of 
control, needed checking by the "presence" of a voice, but in fact the term 
also points to the secondary nature of the voice, which now serves as no 
more than a disembodied prop for a suite of images that have already been 
edited for maximum impact within given time constraints; the voice seems to 
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have the authority that it has always assumed through the ages, but it has 
suffered a textual displacement and now derives its authority from the 
image. 
The low degree of reality of the filmic representation4 enables the 
viewer to fit the remainders of reality that masquerade as objective fact 
into a personal narrative. This is abetted by the way in which the "news" 
exploits a cult of intimacy: through interchangeable talking heads that 
may, nevertheless, achieve a kind of star, or even superstar (Walter 
Cronkite/Dan Rather) status; the TV interview, where the words and pictures 
seem to be directed at the viewer, but are in fact slightly off-centre in 
order to take in the media representative posing the right questions; the 
items on stars and royalty that are often separated from gossip only by the 
respectability of being labelled as "news"; and the portrayal of events as 
always conflicts (accommodation is boring and not very spectacular) between 
personalities. On a more basic level, the "news" serves one of the 
functions of 19th century melodrama in its vivid and spectacular portrayal 
of crisis and catastrophe. 
The example of the "news" highlights some of the mechanisms of 
spectator involvement with modes of popular entertainment; it does not 
explain their continued popularity, which must stem from a perceived 
relevance to the lives of people who watch them. Sharratt demonstrates 
this sense of relevance in relation to 19th century melodrama -
conventionally regarded as being the most simple form of escapist 
entertainment - and extends this to a discussion of the TV spectacle. If, 
he says, we accept that working class existence was, and is, one 
characterised by a great deal of uncertainty, where even the slightest 
fluctuation in one economic variable could mean the difference between just 
getting by and abject poverty, then the plot of the melodrama is strikingly 
familiar - initial brief security, through long and various perils to 
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re-established security. 5 The importance of melodrama lies not so much in 
an escape into it, as an escape back into the world, away from the play's 
perils and dangers. Sharratt likens this to the modern relationship with 
television: 
Television may provide an escapist avenue into a beautiful 
and impossible fantasy-world at times, but perhaps the main 
form of "escapism" it offers is that repeated escape back 
into our own, safely familiar and familial living room: 
whatever insecurities, fears or problems hover over our 
actual situation we are less at risk than in the world that 
glows through the darkness from the set in the corner. 6 
In our existence, dangers, terrors and insecurities, whether social or 
economic, often seem to inhabit a parallel world capable of interacting 
unexpectedly with the domestic one; television's images of violence and 
disorder, also seem to exist in a parallel dimension, but one whose horror 
can be dismissed with the flick of a switch. 
It is obvious that there are gaps in Sharratt's thesis. There remain 
the people who feel compelled to check the doors and windows after seeing a 
horror movie; for them the alternative reality does not evaporate as 
readily. There is also the confusion that TV creates in people's minds 
between what purports to be real and what is unreal. The "News", for 
example, claims its representations to be truthful. But with news slots 
placed side by side with sitcoms, dramas, game shows and a massive number 
of adverts (that range from the exhortational to the informational) a 
number of perceptual modes can quickly become scrambled. It is possible 
that the demands of adverts, for instance, that we buy and consume, spill 
over into imitations of style and behaviour, such as with those programmes 
that enforce violence as a positive ideal; conversely, world leaders are 
evaluated by viewers (abetted by media presentations) as if they were 
participants in a soap opera, and so on. 
What is important here is the ambiguous role of TV in extending a 
perceptual power to viewers while leaving them effectively powerless. As 
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has already been noted, one of the attractions of TV is that it gives us 
control over an alternative "reality", a simulacrum of the random, 
invisible forces that govern our lives. To this can be added the freedom 
to appropriate - because TV's experience appears to parallel that of our 
own visual interpretation of events we are free to assemble and interpret 
it in any way that we choose. The paradox is that those who live by the 
box die in front of it. As Sharratt recognises, there are extensive 
overtones of ideological control involved in popular entertainment. It is 
not that popular entertainment is intrinsically inferior in quality to 
"real" art, critical art, but that popular entertainment extends only an 
ersatz form of power and self-action to those who are its subjects, 
providing nothing substantial with which to action the desires that it 
arouses; leaving, often enough, only violence as the last resort of the 
powerless. 7 At the root of all popular entertainments, from melodrama to 
the majority of television programmes, is the assumption that this world 
can be made to seem not so bad in comparison to possible worlds. These 
entertainments discourage active questioning of the structures of this 
world in favour of an aquiescence in its processes; cultivating a belief 
that normality is tolerable if only barely, and desirable if only cruelly; 
denying pursuit of alternative worlds by furnishing the means of their 
disposal, as well as sanctioning imaginative processes that lead only to a 
consumptive transcendence of violence and fear. 
A discussion of the representational qualities of television and its 
interaction with the family sitting room may well seem a long way from the 
discussion on the recent spate of films on Vietnam, or the resurrection of 
a discourse on US involvement with Vietnam. But more people will see these 
films, and probably see them more often, on video than they will in a movie 
theatre. Just as "live" theatre lost out to film, so film is losing out to 
video, because video is everything that people want from film, but on their 
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own terms, on their own turf. This illusion of control marks television as 
an important element, perhaps the most important, in US culture's 
fascination with spectacle. Foster's discussion implies that spectacle is 
not merely a matter of scale and expense, a play of grand illusions that 
overawes us with its dimensions; spectacle is, rather, a state of mind, a 
perceptual relationship between a consumer and an image-product. The 
impact of television derives from its reinforcement of a larger sense of 
cultural spectacle. To own a television set is thus an individual act that 
plugs the owner/viewer into a complex cultural matrix. On the one hand 
this connection becomes the major source of the transmission of cultural 
values and images, a shared medium that serves to link almost all members 
of a culture which itself comes to depend on a degree of TV literacy. At 
the same time, television places viewers at one remove from a sense of 
culture; culture unfolds as spectacle before which people are passive, the 
only illusion of involvement is the tenuous connection provided by the 
flickering insubstantiality of the TV screen. 8 
The relationship to culture and the relationship to many of its media 
forms thus seems to be characterised by a fascination with spectacle which 
in turn is inhabited by impulses that have certain links with fascism. 
This is the context for the resurgence of interest in Vietnam. A vital 
component of fascist rhetoric is the attainment of a collective power that 
will enable people to recover something that was lost; in the case of the 
US there are a variety of perceived losses that occurred during the 
seventies; the loss of the Vietnam war, a loss of "innocence", a loss of 
prestige, a loss of economic stability, a general loss of confidence and 
assertiveness. Fascism however, does not recover these losses but merely 
compensates for them in much the same way, if Sharratt is correct, that TV 
serves the ideological ends of aquiescence and maintenance of the status 
qua. This aspect of seeming to grant power while in fact denying it is 
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important in analysing the recent film attempts to capture the Vietnam 
"experience", because it is linked with the way in which the problematic 
aspects of US involvement in Vietnam are being incorporated within an older 
style of national mythology. The Vietnam films' lack of awareness of the 
representational qualities of big and small screen and the relationship of 
their subject-matter and style to a sense of cultural spectacle, mark the 
endeavours of Kubrick and Stone also as less a confrontation with the US 
past than a reconciliation with its mythologies. 
The idea of US culture as a constant process of self-reconciliation is 
hardly new but seems to be one which is particularly relevant to the US 
film industry. While aesthetic and ethical values are not absent from 
Hollywood, they are peripheral, or at best secondary, to the process of 
making money. Because the primary concern is economic gain, there has been 
a tendency since the Sixties for Hollywood to produce films that deal 
directly or indirectly with the flawed nature of (US) society, a matter of 
increasing concern for many people, but in such a way that they flirt with 
the issue, playing on people's insecurities in such a way as to reinforce 
cultural values and ideals. 9 For this reason the assumption that the 
Vietnam films represent a meaningful confrontation with US history needs to 
be carefully questioned. For if one examines the films that have been 
popular in the US since the early Seventies, it places the Vietnam films in 
a context that has been less confrontational than compensatory. 
In the early seventies one sees the appearance of the disaster films. 
While not quite a genre, they formed a definite cycle and a person going to 
see a disaster film knew pretty much what to expect. The films themselves 
were extremely profitable and Hollywood has, as Nick Roddick points out, 10 
rarely succeeded in sustaining variations on a formula for so long. The 
film industry failed, for example with the string if violent films that 
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followed The Dirty Dozen in 1966 and the "youth movies" that tried to cash 
in on the success of Easy Rider. So obviously the films pandered to some 
basic need in their audience. Roddick argues that "the movies are worth 
studying in detail because they give clear indications of how a cultural 
industry reacts to a period of economic and political crisis in capitalist 
society, and how culture can become ideologically active. Disaster movies 
are 'reactionary culture' par excellence 11 • 11 Although culture is always 
ideologically active, what distinguishes reactionary culture is its 
readiness to actively exploit the fascist tendencies within the 
spectacle. 
Disaster and catastrophe appear in many different types of film but, 
according to Roddick, if the film is to be classified as a disaster movie 
the disaster must be central and indiscriminate in that it could happen to 
all sections of the population, not just certain professions. It must 
also be unexpected - although not necessarily unpredicted - and 
all-encompassing. Most importantly it must be ahistorical: no specific 
conjunction of economic and political forces are required to bring it 
about. The modern cycle of disaster films really gets underway with The 
Poseidon Adventure in 1972; Juggernaut, Earthquake, The Towering Inferno, 
Airport 1975 (all 1974); The Hindenburg (1975); The Big Bus (a parody in 
1976) and Airport '77 (1977). The emphasis in these films is on the 
reaction to the disaster more than the disaster itself. What the audience 
is presented with is spectacular entertainment but also a didactic lesson. 
The constituent elements of these films are important for the way in 
which they present the audience with a recognisable world which 
nevertheless conforms to a rather simplistic version of everyday life. The 
situation of the characters is one of isolation - ships, planes, tall 
buildings - where normal means of escape have been rendered impossible. The 
characters are often surrounded by a luxurious setting which serves a 
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two-fold purpose: it adds to the spectacle of the film, particularly when 
it is destroyed, and allows a wish-fulfilling indulgence in and celebration 
of the capitalist world; at the same time the sumptuousness demonstrates 
that such luxury is a dangerous delusion and that the technology that 
supports it is incapable of withstanding elemental forces. The characters 
are a random gathering of people - who, nevertheless, are also recognised 
as "stars". There are no complex relations between them and interaction 
occurs between stereotypes -the 'frustrated wife, the crook on the run 
-extended by the "known" personality of the star which often appears so 
much more substantial. At the outset these interactions are characterised 
by conflict; what is interesting here is that the audience by and large 
knows that it is going to be watching a disaster movie and the suspense is 
generated by waiting to see not only which stars get it, but also the 
thrill of being able to judge who "deserves" to get it. 
Roddick argues that the presentation of the world before the disaster 
reflects a contemporary phobia generated by the political, economic and 
social uncertainty of the time, a fear that traditional values are either 
threatened or have collapsed. 
It is a society which has lost sight of "frontier values", 
has grown weak through excessive self-indulgence and total 
reliance on a protective shell of technology, whose moral 
codes are threatened by liberalism and permissiveness, and 
whose institutions have been diverted from their original 
purpose: instead of protecting the collective and providing a 
firm foundation for individual initiative, they now frustrate 
initiative and act as a safet1 net for the weak, the incom-
petent and even the criminal. 2 
The disaster is merely a means of effecting a transformation of the world. 
There is no suggestion, as with the horror film for example, of things 
"getting back to normal". Rather the suggestion is of a new world, purged 
of certain aspects, with an alternative structure erected in its place. 
The key action in the film is that of banding together in a collective 
in the wake of the disaster. The strong protect the weak and wounded, the 
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men protect the women. There emerges a natural leader - white, male, and 
usually, as Roddick notes, wearing a uniform. Thus the groups of survivors 
are led by pilots, navy officers, policemen, fire chiefs, priests and bus 
drivers. In the wake of the disaster it is also common to see the 
resurrection of the technology that has been called into question but now 
in the safe and reliable hands of the new leader. The new hero thus has 
all the masculine attributes of the old coupled with a technical knowledge 
- which is not however, to be confused with what is seen to be the 
obsessive and destructive objectivity of the scientist. Thus the disaster 
transforms the world and the new leader takes up the reins. The wicked are 
punished and so are the weak, except for those who have the excuse of being 
infant, elderly or female. The film presents a simplistic social 
Darwinism, implying that complexity of motivation and problematic social 
solutions are products of degeneracy. 
Roddick sees this as reflecting a corporatist worldview, but his 
language also reveals the elements of fascist ideology that are contained 
within the film. 
Such men who in the normal, liberal, capitalist, democratic 
run of things have risen to positions of power through 
commercial enterprise or by due (or even undue) process of 
election are, it is implied, not fit to run society. 
Business acumen is no guarantee of leadership potential, and 
the mass electorate no judge of it. More efficient methods 
of selection are called for. Our leaders have been shown to 
be wanting at times of crisis. This fear, fuelled by 
Watergate and exploited by the "super-cop" cycle, is 
evidently a very real one. And disaster movies respond to it 
in a typically demagogic fashion: by portraying the transfer 
of power from the old, the incompetent and the corrupt to the 
new race of super heroes, brave, morally upright and 
technologically brilliant. Behind them the people can be 
united into a corporate identity, free from the divisions and 
the individual selfishness which characterised them before 
the disaster. 13 
The films are not as overtly fascist as Nazi rhetoric and images; 
nevertheless they possess a set of powerful assumptions that derive as 
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naturally from the Oil Shocks and ensuing Energy Crisis as the Nuremburg 
rallies sprang from the financial collapse of the Weimar Republic. The 
films simplify complex cultural problems and play upon a desire for unity 
and for an ideologically and morally pure society. Like Nazism, disaster 
films express a yearning for a society purged of the inefficient, weak and 
corrupt people who are seen to be running our society - but in the American 
egalitarian spirit, these people are not to located merely in one ethnic 
group. Of course the degree of ideological simplification in these films 
means that they are primarily wish-fulfilments; offering no real 
possibility of self-actualisation beyond the experience of the film. Rather 
they reinforce a passivity in the face of traditional role models, 14 a 
surrender of will and judgement that is abetted by the audience's 
willingness to surrender themselves to the spectacular indulgence of these 
films. Disaster movies represent a successful coincidence of the fascism 
that is inherent in the spectacle and a reactionary politics. 
It is hardly coincidental that what followed the cycle of disaster 
films was another cycle that relied on the creation of spectacle and a 
willingness to be submerged within its grandeur: the third wave of 
science-fiction films that appeared as a result of the runaway success of 
Star Wars. Predictably, Star Wars was as good as these films ever got. 
Films such as Battlestar Galactica and Close Encounters are visually, rich 
but critically they pale into insignificance beside the sci-fi films of the 
Sixties and early Seventies - 2001, Soylent Green, Zardoz, THX 1138 -
which examine problematic future societies that are reflections of our own. 
They expressed a concern for conservation and the utilisation of resources, 
the creeping influence of totalitarianism, the extent of our submission to 
technology, particularly communications technology. The films after Star 
Wars however rely almost completely on the spectacle that is created by 
their technological capability to make sci-fi look "real". They are grand, 
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dramatic and spectacular; reference to them as "space opera" captures well 
their appeal while indicating also the existence of story-lines and a 
critical perspective that is as simplified and well-worn as that of 
traditional opera. At the same time, these films rely heavily on a 
nostalgia for earlier sci-fi films and comic books: they are filled with 
quotes, allusions and in-jokes designed to delight scene-watchers. 
Nostalgia is a vital component of fascism and here it combines with the 
spectacular to create a vision that masquerades as apolitical, reflecting 
little more than a yearning for a world that is morally simple, where good 
and evil are readily distinguishable and diametrically opposed. Star Wars 
preserves a continuity with the disaster films in that it extends to the 
audience an illusion of self-action: it posits the need to discern and 
combine the "good" halves of both technology and metaphysics against their 
"evil" halves. For the remainder of this cycle of films, the distinction 
is unproblematic, and the sophisticated technology involved enforces a 
passivity, both excluding the viewer and burying its own political 
assumptions. 
Disaster films and science-fiction represented the two major filmic 
trends during the seventies and certainly the major box-office successes, 
but there appeared also a second strand of cinema. Although never as 
popular, the fact that it appeared at all, served to indicate how extreme 
was the perception of a crisis within the US. A fascination/horror with 
the dark and corrupt underbelly of the US characterises films such as The 
Godfather (1972), The Parallax View, All the President's Men, and Network 
(1976). These films were also a response to the fears and insecurities of 
Americans at the time, but unlike the palliative reaction of the disaster 
and sci-fi films, were deeply critical of US institutions, and as critical 
of "the system" as one is likely to get from Hollywood. The Parallax View 
and Network present us with traditional heroes who take on corrupt big 
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business, as generations of Hollywood heroes have done - and get creamed. 
The Godfather provided a glimpse of a state within a state, characterised 
by corruption and criminality and made all the more chilling by the fact 
that the Mafia was presented as succeeding because they had adopted values 
of home family, and free enterprise more completely than most Americans. 
In amongst these films there emerged the first of the Vietnam films, 
all in 1978: Apocalypse Now, The Boys in Company C, Corning Horne, and The 
Deer Hunter. The boys in Company C was a dressed up WWII combat narrative 
that seemed to realise Vietnam possessed some significance but couldn't 
decide exactly what it was. Coming Home likewise starts out exploring the 
way in which Vietnam changed the US but founders in a sea of liberal 
self-justification. Lacking the textual background of a dozen Vet's 
memoirs, documentaries, TV rnovies and interviews against which to situate 
themselves, the impact of Apocalypse Now and The Deer Hunter was 
vague and ill-defined. The two films did not provide images to complement 
the words and they still don't. Yet the concern of both films is somewhat 
larger than merely showing how it was. 
The Deer Hunter received a number of Academy awards but also a great 
deal of criticism which labelled the film as hideously reactionary and 
racist, not to mention jingoistic in the extreme. It is all of these, and 
its portrayal of helpless GI's held in Tiger cages by barbarous captors may 
have had some basis in the experience of POW's, but is presented in the 
film as being symbolic of the Vietnamese character. John Pilger in a New 
Statesman review15 argues that compared to The Deer Hunter, The Green 
Berets was an honest film: its B-grade techniques were visible to all but 
the most fanatically patriotic. The Deer Hunter, on the other hand, 
possesses a slickness that hides its reactionary politics beneath a cinema 
verite surface. 
There are times when, even by the film's own standard, the 
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slick runs precariously thin; the strong, silent, Batman-
jawed Robert De Niro and the brave, sensitive, baby-faced Boy 
Wonder Christopher Warren [ok, so he got it wrong, it was 
Christopher Walken] could not merely suffer in captivity as 
soldiers; no, the Dynamic Duo get away by wiping out a 
house-full of their captors, mighty M-16's rotating from 
their hips. Pow! Wham! Rat-tat-tat! "C'mon, letsgetout-
tahere!" ad nauseum. Big John would have shown them how it 
was really done. 16 
On this level the film argues all too clearly that an innocent America was 
sucked into the conflict by a corrupt Vietnam but just managed to extricate 
itself in time. The film closes with a communal singing of "God Bless 
America" that was enough to send radical critics running retching from the 
cinema. 
The film came out at a time when Vietnam was being victimised by the 
international community for its role in the Indochina conflict. 
The "new patriotism" and the mood of national redemption 
decree that it is time the American conscience was salved and 
the Vietnamese "punished" for defeating and humiliating the 
greatest power on earth. Last month Vietnam was attacked by 
America's new ally China, on the pretext that the Vietnamese 
were the stooges of Moscow. The American government 
condemned the action with all the force of a verbal leg-slap, 
while linking it, astutely, to a condemnation of Hanoi's 
overthrow of the genocidal regime in Cambodia: there was no 
mention that Cambodia had attacked Vietnam in 1977. 17 
At the time of its release the jingoistic elements of The Deer Hunter 
prevailed, but viewing it now, especially in relation to other Vietnam 
offerings, it is perhaps possible to see a reluctant subtext emerging that 
may not have been visible at the time. In an overview of the 1978 crop of 
Vietnam films, John Shannon makes an interesting comment about ideology and 
film-making. 
Deeply conservative art, like Deerhunter, is too busy 
justifying the present to analyse it, Liberal art, like 
Coming Home is too busy justifying its own attitudes to 
notice the present. And, sad but true, most of the radical 
art is caught when the flare goes up with both eyes set on 
the future, trying hard, thinking deeply, hardly touching the 
present. It's only the reactionaries who seem to reach down 
and touch the earth - and find it coming up shit in their 
hands. 18 
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Although the separation of conservative and reactionary art seems 
problematic, Shannon's comments point to the way in which 
reactionary/conservative art forms often express some of the more 
fundamental contradictions of society, often in spite of themselves. In 
this light The Deer Hunter is still reactionary and racist, but other 
elements in the film serve to undercut its attempts at jingoism. 
In many ways The Deer Hunter is not a film about Vietnam at all. Only 
three quarters of an hour of the film's three hour running time is set in 
Vietnam and most of that is in the almost unrecognisable wastes of Saigon's 
human jungle. But as Herr says, "There'd been nothing happening there that 
hadn't already existed here, coiled up and waiting, back in the World 11 • 19 
At the same time as The Deer Hunter is intent on clarifying the issue of US 
involvement, it portrays many of the aspects of US culture which helped to 
create and sustain the confusion in the first place. It may, for example, 
have been the intention of director Michael Cimino that the cinema verit~ 
style glorify the men, creating a sort of poetry of the commonplace. But 
the technique also ensures that the characters retain a certain 
inscrutability that makes it difficult for the viewer to identify with them 
completely. There is an interesting tension within the film in that the 
naturalistic style that reproduces action and speech as "realistically" as 
possible creates a film where beneath the copious quantities of discourse 
there often seems to be very little - or a great deal - going on. The 
actions and motivations of the characters are almost impervious to our gaze 
and we are forced to put our own construction on their actions. Robert De 
Niro may come across as a Superman, performing amazing physical feats in 
order to rescue his friends, but he is a superhero that is more empty than 
any comic book drawing - we can see what he does, but we have little idea 
why. The film reveals the same postmodern tendencies that led to the 
fragmentation of language into a series of private idiolects and a 
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breakdown in the conventions of coherent narrative - the very processes 
that led to the Vet's inability to describe his experiences and communicate 
it to others; a singular manifestation of a wider cultural tendency. 
Film critic Pauline Kael 20 dismisses the film as an exhaustive study of 
male bonding where the Victorian ideal of war as a test of man's courage is 
resurrected and reaffirmed. Rather it is these values that are portrayed 
in the film as ideologically false and inapplicable in a modern context. 
The male bonding is highly problematic and centres around the machismo of 
the deer hunt - a burnt out leftover of the US' frontier mythology, a myth 
of wilderness redemption that is momentary only and completely at odds with 
the men's urban existence as factory workers. The men believe in a bonding 
between them which does not exist; their relationship to each other is 
fraught with tensions and suppressed violence that sometimes erupts in 
open, if inexplicable conflict. Even on the hunting trip the men are 
brought into conflict, and each man hunts alone. 
The action of the men while hunting betrays their lack of respect for 
life, and it is ostensibly this lesson that Robert De Niro learns through 
his ordeal in Vietnam - the famous scene where De Niro and Christopher 
Walken are forced to play Russian Roulette against each other for their 
lives. It seems obvious that Cimino invented the Vietnamese penchant for 
this game. Pilger says that while he was over there he never came across 
the game, nor did any of the correspondents that he knew. It is also never 
mentioned in any of the Vet's texts. The film thus makes it seem as if the 
Vietnamese gamble on life as easily as the British gamble on the pools. 
But Russian Roulette is also important in a symbolic context. It 
represents the other side of the lesson, that which sends Walken over the 
edge, turning him into a drugged professional Roulette player in the 
back streets of Saigon. 21 The lesson for Walken is that everyone is 
expendable and fundamentally valueless; in a world where everyone treats 
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life as if it doesn't mean anything, it doesn't. The Russian Roulette 
motif also carries the implication that in terms of its attitudes toward 
the rest of the world the US has been playing with a loaded gun throughout 
its history. 
The film lacks an epiphanal moment. Sonny's encounter with the deer in 
which he (deliberately?) misses and it escapes, is another private, 
idiosyncratic moment, and the patriotic singing at the end of the film 
verges on hollow mockery, its communitarian impulse undercut by the 
problematic nature of the connections (or lack thereof) between the people. 
The film shows that an inability of people to relate to each other before 
the war was amplified during it by the vastly different experiences of 
those who fought and those who remained at home. The Deer Hunter also 
gives us glimpses of the postmodern processes of cultural fragmentation and 
privatisation that helped to make the experiential connections difficult. 
On one level the film exhibits a profound conservatism, but in endeavouring 
to show the US as it really is, it also reveals a host of contradictions 
that serve to undermine the reductive aspects of the conservative 
worldview. 
Apocalypse Now is a completely different type of film and one that was 
fundamentally misunderstood at the time of its release. The film has an 
anti-realistic form but many viewers mistakenly regarded this as surreal 
with the nested linguistic assumption (sur = above, therefore, higher 
reality) that this surrealism was supposed to re-present, the "realness" of 
Vietnam. Others merely dismissed the film as melodramatic, excessive and 
indulgent - the last perhaps in reference to Marlon Brando's incoherent and 
frequently inaudible monologues that occupy the latter part of the film. 
The critics miss the point that Apocalypse Now is not a portrayal of the 
fighting man's experience of the war, but that of the TV viewer. On one 
hand the film is laughing behind its hand at its inherent representational 
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falsity, on the other it is deadly serious, just as these representations 
were and are deadly serious. The explicitly mythic structure of the film 
argues that most Americans' experience of Vietnam, and their belief in the 
truth of that experience was obtained through TV spectacle: images of 
violence, holocaust, grandeur and personal corruption merging in people's 
minds until Vietnam disappeared into the heart of a Conrad paradigm scored 
by Wagner. 
The multi-level images contained in Apocalypse Now indicate the unusual 
cultural and perceptual juxtapositions that were forced by Vietnam - the 
Playboy helicopter descending to give a show in the heart of the jungle -
and because they have some basis in legendary fact, they also serve as 
critical comment - the Playboy show links the ideas of sexual exploitation, 
rampant desire, male violence and economic and cultural exploitation. Yet 
the images are almost too over the top to be believed, and the riot that 
forces the abrupt closure of the Playboy show is both possible and 
improbable, forcing us back to the problematic nature of its existence as a 
visual image. 
The best example of this duplicitous realism is the well-known scene 
where the Cavalry choppers sweep in to attack the Vietnamese village with 
Wagner's "Ride of the Valkyries" spewing from door-mounted speakers. 
Graphic violence alternates with bizarre disjunctures - men surfing amidst 
bursting shells, and a telling cameo by Coppola himself, as the director of 
a film crew who exhorts a confused Martin Sheen, "Go on! Go on! Look as if 
you're fighting!". This gives way to the image of the Cavalry commander 
(Robert Duvall) striding across the beach while his men cower and shells 
burst all around him - a self-conscious parody of all the gung-ho, 
not-afraid-of-a-little-gunfire war heroes we have ever seen. Yet the 
moment retains just enough of a sense of reality; it is an image of life 
imitating art, art imitating life, life imitating art imitating life .... 22 
llS 
The film's use of an older narrative, Conrad's Heart of Darkness, is 
explicit and acknowledged, unlike the use of narrative paradigms in more 
recent films. Coppola's choice of this particular narrative to reinscribe 
is extremely important. As Jameson points out: "This whole global, yet 
American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression 
of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout 
the world ... " Apocalypse Now is thus making the connection between the 
massive European imperialist/expansionist phase around the turn of the 
century and the American expansion into Vietnam. Just as there are 
similarities there are also differences. US imperialism represents the new 
methods of penetration of the Third World that have been made possible by 
the emergence of multinational capitalism, as opposed to the more 
nation-specific imperialist capitalism that Conrad was writing about. 
The imperialism that derives from multinationalism differs sharply from 
single-nation imperialism in its forms of exploitation. The 
older style of imperialism was concerned to maintain a distance from the 
exploited object, thus favouring a degree of regional autonomy: through 
rule by governor, for example. By contrast, multinational capitalism seeks 
to interpenetrate the object thoroughly, to merge with it, to finally 
absorb the exploited object, so that the multinational framework as a 
whole is altered but at the cost of the elimination of the distinctiveness 
of the object; modern telecommunications have also made more direct control 
and influence possible between the exploited territory and the country that 
is the nominal origin of the expansionist drive. 
Imperialism thus sought to extract the resources, human and material 
from the host country, to be processed at home; multinationalism takes the 
processes to the host country in the form of Free Trade Zones and invest-
ment capital - this is the significance of the "Made in Taiwan" label, as 
well as one of the reasons for the mnssive shift of Japanese industry into 
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South-East Asia during the sixties and seventies. An important shift thus 
takes place: the country now has very little strategic value in itself, as 
it did with Imperialism, but enters a field of relational strategic 
imperatives, both with regard to its neighbours and to the multinational 
matrix as a whole; patterns of influence are no longer described by the 
domino theory (linear, causative and with effects limited to a region), but 
by a field that is heterogenous, associational and capable of imparting 
repercussions over the whole globe. 23 
The most important change is perhaps in the modes of influence used by 
the respective types of capitalism, and by the way in which these modes are 
perceived. The methods employed by Imperialism were primarily political 
and military, related to the actual possession of the territory concerned; 
while there were, of course, cultural inscriptions and implications that 
underlay these actions, they were generally not capable of exercising power 
independently of military and political force. Multinationalism, supported 
by the blurring of the distinction between fields such as culture and 
politics, often employs culture as its main weapon, aided by the 
establishment of a global communications network; the barrage of cheap US 
image-products, is thus both a giant advertisement to copy the lifestyles 
that are portrayed and an attempt to displace the cultural products of the 
host culture, until it is entirely described and inscribed by US cultural 
forms. The paradoxical corollary of the use of culture as a weapon in 
capitalist exploitation is that military and political intervention, when 
it occurs, is more unrestrained, and less modified by cultural "moral" 
qualms: the US in Grenada and Nicaragua, Israel in Lebanon, Britain in the 
Falklands, Russia in Afghanistan, France in New Caledonia ... 24 
Conrad's text indirectly points toward the multinational phase of 
capitalism in that the journey up the river is characterised by a decline 
in the mechanisms of imperialist economic control which paradoxically 
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enables Kurtz to exploit his object more fully - by tending toward becoming 
one with the object. In Apocalypse Now, the journey up the river is 
paralleled by increasingly erratic displays of military and ideological 
control; the need to "control" and "win" becomes de-stabilised, lacking an 
object with which to associate the terms, and the domain of Colonel Kurtz 
is something approaching a domain of "pure" desire and power. 
The layered narrative situation that we get in Conrad's text is missing 
in Coppola's. Marlowe tells his story of the journey up the Amazon to a 
group of undifferentiated individuals, barely present in anything more 
substantial than the role of listener, on board a yacht drifting at anchor 
as they wait for the tide to turn. The narrator is one of these listeners 
so we are at two removes from Marlowe's story - assuming it is the truth. 
Whereas narration is the substance of Conrad's novel, narration in the film 
breaks down almost entirely. The film's voice-over puts us in the position 
of Marlowe's faceless, drifting listeners, reinforcing our passivity before 
the averted face of the visual image. There is, of course, a continuum 
imposed by the camera, but although the film starts off with a story, 
somewhere along the river this becomes less important and the film 
becomes a journey through a series of images. Along the river the hero 
consults an official dossier and we are given glimpses of an assortment of 
written and photographic textual images of Kurtz. In Conrad's text Marlowe 
becomes consumed with a desire to hear Kurtz speak, and when he finally 
meets Kurtz, he encounters a shadow that is indeed little more than a 
voice. But if Conrad presents us with a narrative voice's quest for voice, 
what we get in the film is an imagaic quest for image. Both Sheen and 
Brando exhibit typical method acting performances; their speech is supposed 
to be "realistic" and is therefore often garbled, inarticulate and often 
nearly inaudible. Brando's in particular is as blurred and insubstantial 
as his voice. We seem to enter a fi.e1d of "pure" image, just as Kurtz' 
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methods represent the application of a "pure" power and will. Neither is 
pure of course, the purity of the will-power is its formlessness, its 
chaotic absence of meaning, its horror. In the same way, the focus of the 
last part of the film is literally on the fragmented formlessness of Kurtz 
rather than on his fuzzy philosophising - on the way the light strikes his 
bald head, his eyes and lips shining in the dark, the hazy silhouette of 
him reading "The Hollow Men". When Kurtz is dead we have an image of him 
saying "the horror" but no idea of what the horror might be, in the same 
way that in Conrad we get not "the horror" but Marlowe's narration of it, 
as he speculates on what it was Kurtz saw in those dying moments. 
So what is Coppola's Heart of Darkness? It seems significant that in 
the film, Sheen is sent up the river not to bring Kurtz back, as in the 
book, but to kill him; what is at issue are not Kurtz's methods (the 
blasting of the village at the beginning testifies to that) but the lack of 
control that the US military has over him. Vietnam is no longer an 
exercise in control for military, economic and political purposes, but has 
evolved into the exercise of power for its own sake - firepower, 
communications power, manpower ... the next stage in capitalism? 25 In 
Conrad's text, Marlowe returns to "the World", but in Coppola's film we are 
treated to the sight of exploding napalm - a comment on the seductive 
beauty of destructive images but also an indication of the degree to which 
American culture remains trapped in Vietnam, trapped by its images. There 
is also an important link with the title which is deliberately hyperbolic 
and points to the way in which Western culture has moved beyond the 
modernist ideal of the transformative value of periodic crises, to a state 
that approaches an existence that treats of itself as perpetual crisis. 26 
In the texts of Conrad and Coppola the heart of darkness is not something 
that Kurtz happens to stumble across in the jungle, it is the result in 
each case of the transformation of specific modes of capitalism that he 
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takes in there with him, within a context in which the potential for 
exploitation is radically unrestrained. 
It is a long way from Apocalypse Now to Rambo: First Blood Part II. 
The latter film was enormously successful, obviously striking a responsive 
chord with audiences, particularly in the US but also in this country. The 
film has also been reviled by many groups for its violence, its casual 
brutality and its single-handed resurrection of a macho ethos. For many, 
the film, and Rambo Stallone, have comes to stand as symbols of a new 
American political and military aggressiveness. This is not accidental as 
the film obviously tapped into an emotional need in Americans, but in 
combination with a reactionary political situation, raised that need to the 
level of rhetoric. The importance of Rambo for this discussion lies in the 
fact that, like it or not, it helped to pave the way for Platoon and Full 
Metal Jacket - the same cultural climate that manufactured the one, 
produced the other. 
The film, directed by someone appropriately named George P. Comatos(e?) 
is completely unrealistic but uses a type of fantasy that passes for 
realism; a product-image in which people believe and with which they 
identify, not because it corresponds to "lived" experience, but because it 
corresponds to the way TV reality looks. The film is structured like a 
cartoon yet presents this structure in a "realistic" way. Rambo, a Vietnam 
Vet, is sent back into Vietnam to rescue American POW's - to symbolically 
retrieve America's memory of its past sacrifices; also, one suspects, to 
remove some of the messy evidence of its involvement. But this flimsy 
plot-line is really only an excuse for Stallone to single-handedly 
depopulate the whole of South-East Asia. The whole film is a massive show 
of physical and ideological muscle-flexing - all except for one tender 
moment between Rambo and his subservient Vietnamese woman helper (who can't 
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make up her mind whether to speak colloquial American very well or very 
badly). The audience is left with a warm feeling for about 15 seconds 
before the woman is turned into a colander by a nasty gook ambush, and 10 
armed men, proving no match for an enraged Rambo, are turned into 
hamburger. 
Yet Rambo is not so much escapist entertainment as direct, moral 
instruction, and in this it preserves the link with the disaster and sci-fi 
films. Its uncomplicated structure reflects its yearning for a world that 
is morally simple, unambiguous, with a strict us or them confrontational 
attitude. So naturally the Vietnamese are only subservient puppets for 
Russians with close-cropped hair and cold-grey eyes. The film also 
attempts to set up a confrontation between man and technology -
sophisticated computers on the one hand and muscle-bound Stallone on the 
other - this despite Rambo's liberal use of helicopters, rocket-launchers, 
and explosives, and the fact that the film champions death and destruction 
on a scale that only mechanisation makes possible. The real confrontation 
is between those for whom Vietnam "meant" something and those for whom it 
was merely bad press for America. This panders to the belief held by many 
Americans and by certain sectors of the US military that the war was lost 
by the politicians and bureaucrats back in Washington; after all, with a 
few more men like Rambo running loose there wouldn't be a Vietnam, and 
therefore no problem. But the "stinking bureaucrats", concerned only with 
men as financial symbols, turned the war into a lie - while the average 
American was over there fighting for King and Country, the bureaucrats were 
back home feathering their own nests and stirring up hatred against 
returning Vets. 
Rambo arrived in the midst of a media environment which had slowly, 
almost osmotically been incorporating elements of a Vietnam identity 
without any real discussion concerning those elements. This was the time 
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when every second TV show or film seemed to have a character that was a 
Vet, an implicit acknowledgement that a large number of Americans had 
fought there, even as niggling rumours of Vet's readjustment problems began 
to surface. But the portrayal of Vets was limited to murderous 
psychopaths, or characters whose Vietnam experience gave them an excuse to 
react violently to confrontational situations: cops, private detectives, 
truck drivers (BJ and the Bear) and so on. Rambo is thus operating on 
stable ground by using the stereotype of the violent Vet; similarly the 
issue of US military personnel missing in action has remained an emotive 
and politically "safe" issue which does not necessitate any discussion on 
the actual US involvement in Vietnam. 
The film is answering the need of those who felt that the US had become 
soft and morally flabby during the seventies. It urges an aggressive 
military stance toward America's enemies and sets out to champion a type of 
US individualism that has ever existed only in myth. Thus, when Rambo is 
given his assignment, he asks his commanding officer, "Do we get to win 
this time?" and the answer is "It's up to you". This is an appeal to the 
belief that the individual can make a difference, but it requires a 
cultural blindness of an almost unbelievable degree. It carries further 
nasty overtones of a willingness to re-write history to suit present 
purposes, to freeze change, to reinforce the status quo. Rambo returns 
from his mission and symbolically machine-guns the array of computers that 
was set up to monitor his operation, proving that he's no slave to 
technology. 
This unwillingness to deal with the historical specificity of the US' 
involvement in Vietnam is important because it is something that charac-
terises most of the current wave of Vietnam films. In Rambo, the US 
soldiers are not really being rescued from Vietnam, but from an extremely 
idealised, American view of the whole experience; they are being rescued 
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from America's forgetfulness, brought back to its consciousness in all 
their glory. Hence Rambo's instructions to the bureaucrat at the end of 
the film: "You know there are more men out there, you know where they are. 
Now find them or I'll find you." This is less an appeal for a CIA mission 
into Vietnam, than it is a demand that Vietnam be remembered. This is made 
obvious at the end when Rambo is asked, "What do you want?" Having managed 
most of the film with monosyllables, he gathers his mental resources and in 
a syntactically tortured, and obviously physically painful effort at speech 
Stallone replies: "I want (pause) what every other guy (pause) who came 
over here and spilled his guts (pause) wants. (pause) For our country to 
love us (pause - facial twitch complements palpitation of the left 
pectoral) as much as we love (pause) it." 
Of course it is not as simple as this. The film asks that the Vets be 
remembered, but demands that this remembrance take place in a context where 
the war in Vietnam is remembered as a worthy struggle against the forces of 
darkness, rather than a military debacle of near genocidal proportions. At 
the same time it posits a denial of history through its attempt to turn 
back the clock to a period before Vietnam: a period of perceived moral 
simplicity where the good and the bad were clearly visible, where the US 
was a nation working in concert, where a man could be a man without fear of 
losing his humanity in a vast array of technological process and 
communications complexity. As with the disaster and sci-fi films, the 
fascist appeal that is inherent in the cult of the spectacle is exploited 
through being co-joined with a conservative politics. Yet the reactionary 
posture of this film was certainly in tune with its time and played a large 
part in promoting an acceptance of Vietnam as a topic of discussion. 27 But 
the question is: is subsequent discussion taking place only within the type 
of ideological framework set up by Rambo? 
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John Stevenson, in a review of the second wave of Vietnam films, is 
correct when he says that although these fantasy-revenge films may appeal 
to a large section of the population due to their comic-book realism, in 
cultural terms they are soon perceived as insubstantial. 
But such obvious fantasies - much like the early Hollywood 
efforts in World War II, with their cardboard feats of 
derring-do - fail to satisfy many for very long. In addition 
(and rather similarly), the trumpeting chauvinism and 
accompanying military adventures of the Reagan administration 
have aged badly. The contemptible token victories of the 
Grenada and Libya raids can't hide the miscarriage of 
imperialist ambition in the Middle East and Central America. 
These failures of the promised easy fix have generated a need 
for a more realistic look at Vietnam, that fulcrum of 
America's recent understanding of itself - or at least a more 
realistic-looking portrayal of the war there. 28 
Stevenson's reasoning however, is perhaps the reverse of the actual 
process. Libya and Grenada were not seen as contemptible token victories 
by the majority of Americans, and Grenada in particular certainly aided in 
the re-election of Reagan over a year later. Stevenson suggests that the 
Vietnam films were invoked to compensate for the miscarriage of imperialist 
ambition, but it would seem that the climate for these films was created by 
what were ultimately seen as successful incidences of US intervention. 
The new wave of Vietnam films thus reflects a return of confidence in the 
US ability to create a more sophisticated mythic version of its past. 
The films Platoon and Full Metal Jacket are probably the most 
influential films on Vietnam but they do not represent a meaningful 
discussion of the experience as much as an appeal to the notion of 
spectacle. Both films are couched within pretty conventional narrative 
structures, which lack the self-consciousness of Coppola's use of Heart of 
Darkness. In Platoon the narrative is quite obviously the battle for the 
young man's soul with all the conventional associations of a loss of 
innocence; even the presence of good and evil angels. As Stevenson points 
out, this is an extremely simplistic view of the US involvement in Vietnam. 
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There is something narrow about viewing Vietnam simply as a 
testing ground for the American soul, about seeing the war 
only in terms of what Vietnam did to America rather than what 
America did to Vietnam and what the Vietnam war meant on the 
stage of world history. And there's something very narrow 
about a representation of good in the person of simply a good 
officer like Sgt. Elias, a character whose virtues are 
chiefly the traditional military merits of bravery under 
fire, concern for the men's welfare, and respect for the 
rights of noncombatants. 29 
The "hero" (Charlie Sheen) even gets wounded in the groin - a Hemingway 
wound - which recalls an older, traditional attitude to war, sacrifice and 
virility, but not in such a way as to make us question these assumptions. 
This is symptomatic of the way in which all of the second wave of films 
"accept the basic terms set by the American military presence in Vietnam, 
and draw out their drama of character and moral conflicts within those 
parameters 11 • 30 In contrast with the situation that prevailed during the 
sixties, the military's has become accepted as the official version: 
Vietnam is seen as just another war, at best as a noble crusade. 
Full Metal Jacket is a swept-up, fragmented version of one of the 
oldest war narratives - from boot camp to the front. At least one half of 
this traditionalism is successfully undermined however, and the film 
deconstructs what is supposedly a constructive process, revealing the 
assumptions upon which military training is based. Paris Island is shown 
as an arena of brutal dehumanisation, an exercise in character 
assassination rather than character building, where the men's conditioning 
is mental as much as physical. It consists of taking attitudes towards sex 
and women, many of these already demeaning, misogynist, and aggressive, 
and re-attaching them to figures of violence associated with war and 
killing. Thus the men are marched around the barracks simultaneously 
hefting their rifles and their genitals and chanting: "This is my rifle, 
this is my gun! This is for fighting, this is for fun!" They are also made 
to sleep with their rifles and to chant while running: "I don't want no 
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teenage queen, all I want's my M-14". The instructor continually demeans 
their sexuality, charges everything with sexual connotation - his idea of a 
compliment is: "I like you. You can come over and fuck my sister." 
- finally instructing the future soldiers that "God has a hardon for 
Marines because we kill everything we see. And in return for this power we 
keep Heaven supplied with fresh souls". It is impossible for the men to 
identify with each other, or for us to identify with them. The plight of 
Private Pyle shows that clumsy, unfit, sluggish men - "disgusting fat 
bodies" in the words of the DI - do not become likeable figures of fun like 
Gomer Pyle: they are destroyed. 
The second half of the film does not impact as strongly as the first 
half. Stevenson argues that it turns into a "lessons of combat" film which 
exalts bravery under fire and other traditional military virtues. There 
is, for example, the neanderthal "Animal Mother", a massive redneck who is 
perfectly in tune with his role as an efficient killing machine. On 
reflection one may feel some horror at this; nevertheless, while watching 
the film the viewer is drawn into the combat context, and "Animal Mother" 
comes across as being virtually lionized. 
Yet the second half of the film follows on from the first by showing 
the results of the men's training in a combat situation. In particular, 
the association between sex and violence has become almost habitual in the 
way the men view the war. Thus it is hardly insignificant that the second 
half of the film opens with Joker and Rafterman negotiating with a 
Vietnamese prostitute. This sexual element also saturates the language: 
Joker, during the attack on Danang says, "I hope they's just fuckin' with 
us"; the Captain asks for some low-angle shots of Anne-Margaret: "Don't 
make it too obvious, but I want to see fur and early morning dew"; the 
soldiers stand around a dead comrade talking about how he was repeatedly 
jerking off trying to get a section 8 "discharge". At one stage an ARVN 
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soldier brings a prostitute to service the troops, who make derisive 
comments alluding to South Vietnamese cowardice while gladly making use of 
the prostitute: it is a literal and figurative metaphor for the US "fucking 
over" Vietnamese culture. Most telling is the scene where Joker shoots the 
wounded VG woman in the face and one of the soldiers comments in 
horror/admiration: "Hardcore. Fucking hardcore". It is a pornographic 
moment where the male sexualism that reinforces the violence of war merges 
with the violence that underpins male attitudes toward sex and women: the 
woman on her back, begging the man to shoot her, pleading for release; the 
man/soldier standing over her with the power of life and death, his weapon 
in her face. Bang. 
Yet this scene does not come across as the epiphany of Vietnam that 
Kubrick has said he intended. 31 It is almost impossible to see the VG woman 
as a victim knowing that it is her that we have just watched shoot apart, 
limb by limb and in brutally explicit slow motion, two of the men that we 
have come to identify with. When Joker shoots her, the audience is left 
thinking, not about the moral questions involved, but "Gee, they sure had 
to do some shitty things over there." This applies also to the sense of 
absurdity that the film cultivates. The final scene, where the soldiers 
march along silhouetted against the burning rubble of Hue, singing the 
Mickey Mouse Club theme song not only makes reference to the "Mickey Mouse" 
nature of the war, but is evocative as a moment of absurdity in its own 
right. But it also portrays "the essential disengagement of the Americans, 
who could see the war as spectacle (dangerous or horrific spectacle, often, 
but nonetheless something apart from the most concrete reality of their 
lives 11 • 32 
The most problematic aspect of these films is that none of them are at 
all self-conscious about the contradictions involved in their status as a 
visual representation of Vietnam, and of their contribution to the media 
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spectacularisation of Vietnam. The last is especially surprising in Full 
Metal Jacket where the lead character is a journalist and Michael Herr 
co-wrote the screenplay (it appears there were some moves left for him 
after all). The film talks about the Media's distortion of events 
(significantly, only in relation to the armed forces' media) but obviously 
considers itself to be outside those distortions. All of the films seem to 
accept that any distortions that were imposed upon Vietnam were deliberate 
and ideological, rather than a product of the actual communications 
processes. Thus while much of the distortion was ideological, designed to 
mask the reality of what was happening through terms such as Rolling 
Thunder and Refugee Resettlement - a lot of it was ideological only in the 
sense that the belief that there was a "truth" to the Vietnam experience (a 
black and white reality that could be defined and described), was born from 
the same cultural climate as the military belief that the war could be 
reduced to an "us or them" situation where the moral superiority of 
technological advancement would prevail. 
The lack of awareness that these films are part of the same media slush 
that helped to create "Vietnam as we know it" is troubling. There is, as 
Herr shows, a component of war that, whatever way you cut it, remains 
glamorous, heroic, romantic and spectacular. It is not enough to present a 
trained killer who enjoys it, like "Animal Mother" as a revolting human 
being: the site of him charging across a sea of rubble, firing his M-60 
from the hip still looks heroic, in such a way as to make us forget the 
problematic aspects of this portrayal. The tendency of the visual image is 
thus to present the glamour of war only; however horrible the 
subject-matter, it remains fascinating in the way that all voyeurism is 
fascinating, spectacular, specular: we are outside events, nothing is 
hidden from us, we can impose meaning on any situation. This unproblematic 
approach to filmic representation is evident in the rest of the film. 
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While Kubrick may have made it impossible for us to identify with the 
characters in the first part of the film, in the second part, in order to 
try and convey the feeling of what it was like to be in Vietnam, and to 
build tension and suspense, he uses a lot of low-angle camera work: we are 
creeping through the ruins with the men, running with them, peering round 
corners with them; naturally we begin to identify with them and make 
judgements from within the combat context. 
It is hard enough for film to undercut the reification inherent in the 
gaze of the camera: it is therefore offensive when this thrill-seeking 
aspect is exploited. An example of this occurs in Full Metal Jacket where 
men are blown away in a slow motion style similar to that of Peckinpah, 
with seemingly impossible amounts of blood splattering everywhere - a 
gratuitous and completely sensational indulgence in the spectacle of 
violent death. There is a sense in which this balletic portrayal of death 
can, if we think about it, reveal to us our fascination with the spectacle 
of violent death, in the same way that turning extreme violence into comic 
opera through the use of music in A Clockwork Orange raises the problem of 
the subjective nature of violence. But in both cases there is also 
failure, simply because there is no attempt made to acknowledge the 
empowering function of the camera; the way in which these Kubrick films 
legitimise our fascination with watching violence. 
It is not that these films are deliberately pro-war; rather they are 
cast in the mould of a traditional anti-war film which is no longer, and 
perhaps never was, relevant. A traditional anti-war film, like All Quiet 
on the Western Front or Hell is for Heroes argues that war is inhuman, it 
is barbaric, brutal, typically not the values that we associate with 
civilized man. Thus anti-war films such as the above will attempt to 
inject some element of humanity into a war situation, by portraying social 
dislocation, or more commonly by focusing on an individual so we can see 
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war's effect as something more immediate than that which happens to a 
statistical abstraction. But the rub is this: when war is perceived as 
inhwnan it is still literally in-hwnan; values of barbarism etc., are not 
what we would prefer to regard as typically human but they are still 
recognisable as such. What is barbarous is always constituted in terms of 
what is regarded as hwnan: one definition of hwnanity may countenance the 
killing of the wounded on the field of battle, another not. But war, 
especially as it has become more technological, reveals itself to be not 
inhwnan but anti-hwnan, and the difference is important. War is 
increasingly staged as a technological exercise and Vietnam is the best 
example to date. Men are subordinate to their functioning within a 
firepower unit, reduced to numbers in a communications package. What is 
important is the ability to deliver napalm with pin-point accuracy, to 
introduce and evacuate speedily, to drop a tonnage of explosives, to occupy 
map references: the best example is the Search and Destroy missions, which 
in practice were just the reverse - the one is inhuman, the other is 
anti-hwnan because it puts technology before men. 
This is implicit in the Vietnam films but is not dealt with as such. 
One has only to look at the titles: Platoon - the unit of military 
organisation as opposed to the men themselves; Full Metal Jacket - a type 
of bullet, the focus is thus on the killing technology; Hamburger Hill -the 
concentration is upon the place rather than the men who fought there. This 
last is a particularly interesting case: it is a reaction against the 
anti-hwnan nature of the war (as represented in the naming of a hill 
according to its map height in metres - 907) at the same time as it 
acknowledges that anti-hwnanism (the hill now has a "hwnan" reference, but 
one that shows how men were turned, quite literally, into hamburger by 
technology). 
The photographic image of course seems to reinforce the human 
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perspective; it is what we see, and it places the human gaze in a 
privileged position. In fact the photographic image is anti-human, because 
it is only the mechanical reproducibility of its agent, the camera, that 
makes this sort of perception possible; the photograph reinforces our 
passivity in face of the superior reality of the technology. The Vietnam 
films seem to have an implicit awareness of the anti-human nature of the 
war and the power of the visual in glorifying certain aspects of the war 
and therefore perpetuating the fascination with it. An example is the way 
in which both Platoon and Full Metal Jacket, use a voice-over technique. 
Neither film requires it structurally, the spoken words are not essential 
to the progress or explanation of the action or the images; the voice-over 
is rather a qualifier, a reminder that there is a human element in the 
midst of all this mechanized death and destruction. But neither works in 
successful opposition to the power of the image or convinces us that human 
values actually matter in an environment such as Vietnam; indeed the use of 
the voice-over in Platoon verges on the cliched and trite. 
The power of these films and their popularity stems from the fact that 
they are not presenting us with anything new, but rather with more perfect 
representations of that with which we are already familiar. The images of 
Vietnam are, like the idea itself, overdetermined - the choppers, the blown 
away bodies, the burning of villages, even the thousand yard stare, will 
all be familiar to the generation that lived through the TV coverage, and 
to the subsequent generation through the use of Vietnam images, almost 
furtively, in countless rock-videos and documentaries. There is nothing 
new to look at in these films, and although Hamburger Hill, for example, 
may perhaps be the most brutal and uncompromising view of combat of which 
film is capable, the images of combat are in themselves already familiar. 
So what is the fascination that these films possess? It is not their 
realism, but something akin to a hyperrealism: 
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unlike a typical representation which works via our faith in 
its realism, spectacle operates via our fascination with the 
hyperreal, with the "perfect" images that make us "whole" at 
the price of delusion, of submission. We become locked in 
its logic because spectacle effects the loss of the real and 
provides us with fetishistic images to deny or assuage that 
loss. 33 
The recent Vietnam films seem at first to be merely part of a tradition of 
"gritty realism" but their realism is dependent upon their ability to 
accurately re-present images with which we are already familiar. Thus what 
would normally be incongruous - people walking out of Platoon or Full Metal 
Jacket talking about how each film really gave you an idea of what it was 
like to be over there - is readily understandable in the context of a prior 
familiarity with a wide assortment of images from Vietnam. The films 
themselves are regarded as being somehow more real than the images 
contained in the television and magazine coverage of the actual war. This 
tendency to hyperrealise Vietnam may have been what Coppola was trying to 
undermine with the obvious spectacles of the Cavalry sweeping in to the 
attack playing Wagner, and the men surfing amidst bursting shells. But the 
other films rely heavily on simulacra to present us with the "realism" of 
the spectacle of Vietnam: 
the ruined city of Hue and the Vietnamese exteriors were 
built in a gasworks in Beckton, East London. Kubrick flew in 
50 palm trees from Spain but the site - also used recently to 
film 1984 - was perfect. The same French architect who had 
built Hue had also built part of Beckton, and the results of 
German bombing in World War II were evident even before 
Kubrick's set designers went to work on the buildings to 
really ruin them. 34 
Kubrick's unproblematic approach to all of this is reflected in his 
statement: "Art, in my experience, imitates life. Life does not imitate 
art". One may have had an excuse for uttering this statement in the 
nineteenth century: not in the twentieth. 
None of the films is finally as powerful as most of the books about 
Vietnam. Slow motion is, for instance, about as close as any of them come 
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to suggesting the altered states of perception/consciousness/conscience 
that many soldiers experienced. They rely instead on the spectacle of 
Vietnam, the familiarity we already possess with its images which enables 
us to submit to this new context of hyperrealism. The power of the image 
in these spectacles is certainly symptomatic of the process that helps to 
induce the "loss of the real". But maybe, as Foster suggests, this 
fascination with the power of destruction and the "truth" of the Vietnam 
experience, conceals an underlying fear of a lack of authority, a loss of 
reality and responsibility35 - things that people like Herr experienced in 
Vietnam, saw when they returned to the World, and which are now being used 
to assuage our discovery of the magnitude of these losses. The US is not 
exorcising the ghost of Vietnam as much as appropriating it, entrenching 
its mythology more deeply. There are as yet no films exploring the 
Vietnamese (North or South) side of the story and these may be a long time 
coming. For this war has become "our" war in a peculiarly unsympathetic 
manner, that reserves its pity only for "our boys" who suffered and died 
"over there" - the films seem to expect that their mere discussion of 
Vietnam is enough to make up for the treatment of the Vets "back here". In 
spite of their many artistic accomplishments, these films, as with much of 
the whole Vietnam spectacle, raise the consciousness only to divert it, 
fuel our anger with horror only to dissipate it in spectacle. 
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CONCLUSION? SIGNS OF THE TIMES 
Monuments and memorials tell us a great deal about a culture. This is 
because (and also despite the fact) they represent a point of forced 
cultural signification; they are de-signed to tell us something. They are 
intended less to represent people and/or events than to create the 
appearance of transparent screens through which we may glimpse the working 
out and through of the grand narrative of culture; to constitute a mythic 
moment that reflects back to the originary mythic values of the culture. 
This is particularly the case in the US where there exists such an 
elaborately crafted mythology of Foundation: the Pilgrims and then 150 
years of irrelevancies until the Founding Fathers and the set of first 
principles that serve to constitute the Union - as if there had not existed 
thousands of years of aborigine settlement before this. Although monuments 
ostensibly recall the specificity of a moment or person, this is rather the 
very thing t~t remains absent, distorted and confined to a representation 
of cultural precepts. Monuments appear singular, yet they always rest on a 
number of foundations. 
In addition to reinforcing a set of cultural values traditional 
monuments also reinforce modes of perceiving those values. In the US, the 
monuments to Lincoln, Jefferson and Washington help to cast in concrete the 
ideology of patriarchy, the idea that history is made by Great Men, 
benevolent Founding Fathers. These monuments are, like the Statue of 
Liberty, on a grand scale; it is not enough to view them, one must go 
inside them and experience them. We arrive once again at the appeal of 
fascism: to lose oneself in the spectacle at the same time as one confronts 
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the objective immutability of these objects; experiencing their grandeur in 
comparison with ones own reduced stature and transient presence. 1 Other 
types of monument seem to manifest an objective relationship to history, as 
well as the possibilities of transcending history: the names of the dead 
carved into an obelisk, a cairn, an archway, a portal, on the village green 
or in city centres reinforce our apartness, our detachments from their 
deaths while at the same time invoking religious associations and 
reverence, constituting them firmly in the past as an object of worship. 
Meanwhile the soldier on the pedestal looks out over a real or 
imaginatively real battlefield: he is objectively present before us at the 
same time as he literally rises above our plane and the plane of history. 
~onuments and war memorials, from the town plaque to Mount Rushmore, 
have played an important role in the history of the US. They serve to 
constitute the pervasive singularity of the country's history, to give 
physical form to its logic and values. Their existence also defines the 
past as past, paradoxically creating an apartness from history by immersing 
people in it. Monuments are thus a way of representing US history at the 
same time as they constitute the past firmly as History. Yet after Vietnam 
this process failed almost entirely. There were no monuments to great 
battles or returning heroes; many towns refused to add the names of the 
dead to their existing war memorials and names that were added were often 
defaced or erased. To be sure, there was a political and ideological 
unwillingness to represent the war. Yet the war and the events that 
interacted with it also called into question, if not temporarily blocked, 
the process of representation. How could the war be incorporated with 
notions of bravery and heroism and the noble sacrifice of war, when not 
only the Vietnam war but the idea of war in general as an acceptable 
cultural phenomena had, at least temporarily, been destroyed for many 
people? How could Vietnam be reconciled with traditional US values when it 
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was these values that had been seen to be compromised? Permeating this 
discourse on Vietnam, largely unacknowledged but resulting in a vague sort 
of discomfort, was the notion that such ideas of direct representation were 
no longer tenable. The "credibility gap" was not just evidence of 
political duplicity and it did not go away after the US withdrawal from 
Vietnam. The term indicates, literally, a gap in belief itself, an absence 
that lurked inside the representations themselves - film, television, 
newspapers, novels - upon which knowledge of "the truth" depended. Vietnam 
and the sixties had shown that ideas of objective historical detachment and 
narrative coherence were now highly problematic; carrying with them the 
suspicion that it was adherence to these ideals that had resulted in the 
debacle in Vietnam in the first place. 
Yet while trauma retains its absence, its blockage of meaning which is 
really a rupture, a destruction of context, it cannot halt representation, 
which inevitably manufactures a new context to replace the old. Too many 
men had fought in Vietnam and their demands for representation were 
directed not only at the government: US culture as a whole required symbols 
and a narrative in order to deal with the absence. The push for a Vietnam 
memorial was begun in 1979 by Jan Scruggs, a former Vet, and the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial Fund. A nationwide, jury-judged competition for the 
design of the memorial attracted 1421 entries; the contest and part of the 
memorial were funded by the Texas millionaire H. Ross Perot. The winning 
entry was that of a 21 year old art student, Maya Ling Lin. 
The monument stirred up a great deal of controversy for Lin's design 
was not what many had expected. 
The memorial, whose walls are angled so that they point to 
the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial, is designed 
to involve the viewer with both the Vietnam dead and American 
history. It appears as a rift in the earth, a long V-shaped 
wall of polished black granite, emerging from and receding 
back into the earth. From a distance it is impossible to 
make out the names carved on the 250ft of walls. But the 
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closer you get, the more distinct the names and mirror-like 
the wall. You cannot in the end make out a name without also 
finding your own face - and usually the sky and clouds -
reflected back. 2 
What is obvious is that the monument does not explicitly say anything about 
the aims of the war, the relationship of the Vietnam war to US cultural 
attitudes or its relationship to traditional attitudes toward war: it does 
not invoke "sacrifice" or "suffering" except by association in the mind of 
the viewer. This is art in the funerary tradition, like the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier at Arlington. The memorial by its orientation does involve 
the viewer in US history but does not say how. For example, does it's 
V-shape, pointing to both the Lincoln and Washington memorials suggest that 
Vietnam was the awful, but logical result of the progression of US history 
from its "founding" principles? Is it significant that Washington, a 
Founding Father, nevertheless counselled against foreign entanglements? 
Does the monument point to the fact that it was Lincoln who presided over 
another crisis in US history, but who also enlarged the power of the 
Executive branch of government in a way that directly benefitted LBJ in his 
ability to wage an undeclared war? 
The monument eschews the colour white with all its conventional 
positive associations to suggest something darker about US history, but 
perhaps also about the fact of remembrance. From a distance the monument 
is a black absence, just as attempt based on assumptions of historical 
objectivity and distance, to find the "meaning" of Vietnam only reveal a 
greater relativism and absence of meaning. The Vietnam memorial is not 
elaborate, nor does it rise above its surroundings - except to sink back 
into them, reflecting, literally, the transience of the "transcendent" 
moment and its links to both evolution and decay. The memorial imposes its 
own sense of narrative upon the Vietnam war - by its existence it could 
hardly avoid doing otherwise - but it is a narrative that is singularly 
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flat and without significance. The walls are covered only with the names of 
the dead, the narrative sequence is the order of their death, each name 
pointing only to more names, following them around the wall until the 
observer is back where s/he started. Thus the monument represents the 
singularity of each death while losing it amidst the enormity of the 58,000 
plus other dead. 
The memorial also offers a profound disruption to notions of personal 
and historical objectivity: the mirror-like surface reflects the observer's 
face back at themselves. The meaning "in" the monument must be created by 
the observer, thus s/he is seen to be involved with his/her own history, 
exposed to a self-objectification that serves to indicate their culpability 
in the deaths of nearly 60,000 young men. It is not impossible to place 
other constructions upon the monument but one is then aware that they are 
the observer's constructions or cultural loadings. One could say: "So much 
suffering!" but this is a cultural linkage rather than a feature of the 
monument itself. The memorial proves itself fiercely resistant to 
interpretations other than that of the deaths of a lot of men. It ensures 
that we will obey the injunction to remember them, apart from the 
controversy of remembering for what it was that they died. Not 
surprisingly the wall has been the site of what amount to religious 
pilgrimages, allowing relatives and friends to find their own significance 
and personal meaning in the names. Like Confession, the memorial offers 
the satisfaction of an intensely private public spectacle. 
However there have been many people, Vets in particular, who have 
criticised the monument. They argue that many of their comrades went to 
Vietnam and died for something and this fact is not acknowledged in the 
apoliticism of Lin's memorial. They argue that the men did suffer, did 
make sacrifices, and that to ignore this is not to remember them at all. 
As a result of the controversy, a second monument designed by Frederick 
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Hart, was built. It features a more conventional statue: three life-size 
soldiers, one black and two white, standing together in a mixture of 
camaraderie and exhaustion. Nicolaus Mills claims this is not a version of 
raising the flag on Iwo Jirna: 
In a war of unheroic iconography - the ditch at My Lai, the 
burning of the village of Carn Ne, the evacuation of Saigon 
- Hart's statue captures the one value that sustained 
soldiers throughout Vietnam: loyalty to each other. Despite 
their muscularity and combat gear, Hart's three soldiers 
are not glorified and certainly not triumphant. They appear 
weighted down by the guns and ammunition they carry, and what 
comes through, as Hart himself has pointed out, are bonds of 
love "in the face of their aloneness and vulnerability 11 • 3 
The problem with this is that it is precisely this aspect of war that 
appeals. It is no longer the guns and glory aspect that proves attractive 
but war seen as embodying a tragic vision - man being placed in existential 
extremity and being given the chance to overcome. The exhaustion and 
camaraderie were undoubtedly a part of the war, perhaps the only thing that 
gave it any meaning - for this reason they were also part of the appeal of 
the war, as most Vets testify. 
The differences between these two memorials - their assumptions about 
narrative, the relationship of Vietnam to US history and traditional 
attitudes toward war and sacrifice, what they say, or can be made to say, 
about themselves as memorials - embody many of the contradictions of US 
culture, especially as it believes that it is possible to measure itself 
against the Vietnam experience. 
For if Lin's memorial asks whether we are prepared to honour 
those who died in Vietnam while refusing to honour the war 
they fought, Hart's statue raises a more immediate and human 
question: Are we prepared to honour those soldiers who 
survived Vietnam while refusing to honour the war they 
fought? 4 
The two memorials situate themselves in completely different relationships 
to US culture: Lin's recognises the problematic nature of that relationship 
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and tries to subvert it; Hart's statue lacks this awareness and is easily 
assimilated into a traditional discourse of intentions and rational facts 
where saying "Thank You" to the Vets also legitimises the war, rehabili-
tates it without learning anything from it. This type of discourse tells 
us nothing we do not already know but it possesses an enormous power in 
context. 
with challenges to the American empire from South Africa to 
Peru, from South Korea to Haiti; with US warships thrown at 
the Middle East again and again; with American and Soviet 
Ambitions bumping up against each other all over the globe 
and both proceeding with preparations for war; with the 
quickly suppressed revelation at the Iran-Contra hearings 
that one of North's activities had been to set up a plan for 
mass roundups of potentially rebellious elements and 
suspensions of freedom and speech and assembly in the case of 
a national emergency - with all this as the context for a 
reconsideration of the war in Vietnam, what faces us is not 
so much the danger of repeating that war, but of preparing 
the way for something far worse. 5 
The treatment of both memorials indicates that without iconography the 
US is lost in its attempt to interpret the past. This point is made in 
"graphic" fashion on the cover of TIME magazine's acknowledgement of the 
anniversary of the fall of Saigon: it features a portion of the memorial 
wall, with its litany of names, but it is superimposed over a rendering of 
the famous photograph of a helicopter evacuating people from the roof of a 
Saigon apartment building. 6 The images from Vietnam are no less 
problematic than they always were, but a cultural refusal to accept the 
challenge of representations such as those of Lin that question how the 
culture represents itself ensures that the US has very little chance of 
learning anything from its involvement in Indochina. A preference for 
iconolatory over iconoclasm has speeded Vietnam's unproblematic passage 
into cultural myth: familiarity breeds content. 
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